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Four Cambodian Factions Meet in Jakarta

CGDK Says PRK's Attitude Unchanged
BK1702042489 Jakarta ANTARA in English
2051 GMT 17 Feb 89

[Text] Jakarta, Feb 16 (OANA/ANTARA)—A meeting of the four Kampuchean factions was held in Jakarta Thursday afternoon, Prasith, spokesman for the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) said here.

He further stated that the other side (People's Republic of Kampuchea) maintained the same rigid attitude which is not conducive to a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem which is in fact a problem between Vietnam and Kampuchea.

The plan proposed by the other side is tantamount to asking the CGDK to capitulate to a regime installed by foreign forces. As a matter of fact a fair and free general election cannot proceed while the structure and the fabric-administrative and military of the illegal regime are not dismantled, he said.

He further pointed out that the other side is only trying to put the blame on the CGDK and other countries and score points in public relations.

A durable and comprehensive political settlement of the problem of Kampuchea can only be achieved through the 5-point peace plan of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, president of Democratic Kampuchea and the modalities for its implementation.

They will ensure the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea within a clear time-table under an international control mechanism of the United Nations and to meet the concern of all about the return to power alone of the Khmer Rouge.

The five-point peace plan of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk is roughly as follows:

- (I) A definite timetable for the departure of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea with no linkage between this and the question of the aid provided by certain foreign powers to the Kampuchean armed factions.
- (II) Simultaneous dismantling, prior to the general elections in Kampuchea, of the "People's Republic of Kampuchea" and of the Democratic Kampuchea (the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea).
- (III) General elections in Kampuchea under the supervision of an international control commission and the outside framework of the illegal "People's Republic of Kampuchea" (PRK).
- (IV) Formation of a provisional quadripartite government and the setting up of a national quadripartite army (not excluding the Khmer Rouge army).
- (V) Dispatching of an international peace-keeping force (blue berets).

Coalition Rejects Phnom Penh Proposal

BK1702040389 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
17 Feb 89 p 4

[By Anurat Maniphant and Banyat Thatsanitawet reporting from Jakarta]

[Text] The Khmer resistance coalition yesterday rejected a peace proposal put forward by Phnom Penh, as Indonesia urged a narrowing of differences and Thailand called for priorities on the first day talks leading up to second Jakarta Informal Meeting [JIM II] starting Sunday.

Despite the resistance rejection of the Phnom Penh proposals, representatives from ASEAN, Vietnam, the four Khmer factions yesterday laid out their views and positions concerning the conflict.

Conference sources said the atmosphere of the current talks differed markedly from the previous JIM meeting in Bogor.

"Everyone came to work. We are talking about more substantial things than commas and full stops," said one delegate.

Although differences came out in the open, the atmosphere was much improved from JIM I with the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), for instance, was willing to talk about the Vietnamese withdrawal, a source said.

The resistance however, said the five-point proposal put forward by Phnom Penh at a separate meeting among Khmers was "tantamount to asking the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK] to capitulate to a regime installed by foreign forces".

The PRK's proposal calls for the setting up of a quadripartite council of national reconciliation "presided over by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk" with three vice-chairmen.

The council, to be "independent from all the parties, would have the mandate to organise a general election, set up electoral rules and control the polls.

According to the proposal, a general election would take place after the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops "and the cessation of external arms supplies under its control and that of the international control commission [ICC] and the quadripartite commission".

The council would also carry the mandate to "eventually draft a new constitution".

Phnom Penh's proposal, effectively a counterpoint to Prince Sihanouk's five-point peace plan, which was endorsed by the CGDK, calls for a ceasefire after

"partial or comprehensive" agreements on the withdrawal, cessation of support and guarantees for the non-return of Pol Pot "enter into force."

Following the ceasefire, "all the armed forces of the four Kampuchean parties will work to prevent hostilities, and the elected administration would "decide on the new national armed forces of Kampuchea".

The CGDK said: "A fair and free general election cannot be proceeded while the structure and the fabric—administrative and military—of the illegal regime are not dismantled."

Prince Sihanouk's proposal calls for the simultaneous dismantling of the PRK and Democratic Kampuchea to make way for a provisional government to organise elections.

"The other side maintained the rigid attitude which is not conducive to a comprehensive political settlement," the CGDK said.

"A durable and comprehensive political settlement can only be achieved through the five-point peace plan of Prince Sihanouk," the resistance said.

Khmer Rouge chief delegate Thiounn Prasith, representing the coalition, told a press briefing the root cause of the problem was the Vietnamese invasion and occupation.

"If Vietnam is so concerned about the return of the Khmer Rouge, why does it not accept the stationing of an international peace-keeping force," he said.

Mr Prasith said Vietnamese forces were being rotated rather than withdrawn and that a unilateral withdrawal was not credible.

Prince Sihanouk's proposal calls for a withdrawal with a "clear timetable under the international control mechanism of the United Nations.

PRK Deputy Foreign Minister Hor Nam Hong, who also participated in the briefing chaired by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, said the intra-Khmer meeting tackled internal aspects of the problem in order to promote efforts towards a comprehensive solution at JIM II.

Mr Alatas said plenary working sessions covered issues including the withdrawal, cessation of support for Khmer forces as well as the nature and modalities for an ICC and an international control mechanism.

There were prospects that common ground might be reached on some aspects although positions "are still apart" on others.

Mr Alatas is chairing all working group sessions through to February 18, an arrangement observers see as extraordinary since he is chairman of JIM.

Thailand, meanwhile, called on Kampucheans and regional states to set priorities to issues outstanding, saying the withdrawal from Kampuchea remains the most pressing issue.

A statement read by the director of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department, M.R. Thep Thewakun said: "A continued foreign military presence remains the most serious form of external interference in the affairs of Kampuchea.

"So long as foreign troops remain in Kampuchea, resistance by patriotic Kampuchean forces will continue and so will foreign assistance to such forces."

Factions Fail To Agree on Framework

BK1702043589 Bangkok *THE NATION* in English
17 Feb 89 p 2

[By Somphong Kittinaradon and Atthawibun Sisuworan]

[Text] Jakarta—Rival Khmer factions yesterday failed to agree on a framework for further negotiations to resolve both the internal and external aspects impeding a political solution to the Kampuchean conflict.

Although Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas warned all parties to stick to the rules of the working group—to work hard and talk little—Phnom Penh representative Hor Nam Hong divulged details of his five-point proposal at a news conference chaired by the Indonesian Minister. The Khmer Rouge representative responded by rejecting the plan out of hand in the presence of Alatas and reporters in the conference room.

The two Khmer delegates also distributed copies of their position papers during the press conference, prompting a brief commotion in which reporters scrambled for the limited papers offered.

The papers were issued after the first meeting, which was chaired by Alatas, between the four Khmer factions, divided into two groups: the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK]. Both sides' positions barred the meeting from delving into the concrete details of modalities to be implemented to bring about a peaceful solution to the Kampuchean conflict.

Alatas admitted the deadlock would have to be tackled in today's full session, which will include representatives from ASEAN, Vietnam and Laos, before a fruitful draft proposal could be put forward for the consideration of the ministerial meeting, to be held on Feb 19-21.

In the PRK's paper, entitled "Intervention of H.E. [His Excellency] Hor Nam Hong", the head of the PRK delegation at the working group for the second Jakarta informal meeting proposed a cease-fire by all Kampuchean parties be commenced immediately after any agreements, be they partial or comprehensive.

He then proposed that the cease-fire be followed by the creation of a quadripartite council of national reconciliation presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The council would be assisted by an International Control Commission and a quadripartite commission, charged with setting up electoral rules and overseeing the election before eventually drafting a new constitution.

Hong also proposed the armed forces of the four factions remain in their present positions and let the new elected government decide on the future of the new national armed forces.

Under the PRK's proposal, general elections would be held three months after the total withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the cessation of external arms supplies.

CGDK representatives, headed by Thiounn Prasith, responded to the proposal by asserting that the PRK had maintained the same rigid attitude which was nonconducive to a comprehensive political settlement.

Prasith said the proposal "is tantamount to asking the CGDK to capitulate to the regime installed by foreign forces". He said a fair and free general election could not proceed until the structure of the "illegal regime" was dismantled.

Prasith strongly insisted on the adoption of Prince Sihanouk's five-point peace proposal and the modalities for its implementation.

Son Sann Sees Possible Compromise at Talks
*BK1702063289 Hong Kong AFP in English 0602 GMT
17 Feb 89*

[Text] Jakarta, Feb 17 (AFP)—A Cambodian resistance leader said Friday he was prepared to compromise on a controversial proposal to link the Vietnamese pullout from the country to an end to external aid to all factions.

Nationalist former Prime Minister Son Sann told reporters that "some adjustments" could be made to the resistance position rejecting any linkage between the two.

In order to make a success of current regional talks in Jakarta on a Cambodian settlement, he said he would consider a cessation of external aid "in parallel with" the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops.

It was not immediately clear whether he was speaking as well for his partners in the resistance coalition, the Khmer Rouge and forces loyal to former chief of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Mr. Son Sann said only: "This is in the process of being negotiated. I hope we can reach an agreement here."

As the Jakarta talks opened, the tripartite coalition circulated a position paper here which reiterated its rejection of any linkage. Vietnam and the Phnom Penh government have insisted that the two issues must be linked in any political settlement for Cambodia.

All are attending the Jakarta talks, along with Vietnam, Laos and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Mr. Son Sann also announced he had taken over as military commander-in-chief of his faction, the Khmer People's National Liberation Front, in response to a petition from leaders in the field.

Denying there had been a coup d'état within his movement, he said that field officers had questioned the abilities and actions of former commanders.

Urged To Resume 'Leadership'
*BK1702103589 Bangkok THE NATION in English
17 Feb 89 Afternoon Edition p 2*

[By Somphong Kittinaradon]

[Text] Jakarta—The longstanding squabble within the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (CPNLF) spilled over to the informal talks on the Kampuchean conflict here this morning when CPNLF leader Son Sann declared he has been urged by his military supporters to take over the military command of the non-communist force.

Son Sann, who arrived here yesterday for the talks with the other three Khmer factions that will start on Sunday [19 February], said he wants to enter the talks as CPNLF president "with full power" and as prime minister of the tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK).

He said he had received petitions from "pioneer freedom fighters" who are "not small commanders" urging him to resume the military leadership of the CPNLF armed forces which are now headed by Gen Sak Sutsakhan.

He said they want him to "restore unity" within the rank and file of the movement and to put an end to violations of human rights against civilian followers of the resistance force.

He said they also want him to bring about discipline among the resistance fighters.

Son Sann made the surprise announcement at a news conference which he said he called to register concerns over press reports that the preparatory meeting preceding the informal talks that began yesterday was marked with tensions and polemics.

"I must show a good example that we need to work together to make use of the precious time at JIM II," he said, referring to the second Jakarta informal meeting.

Son Sann said that with full authority over the KPNLF armed forces, he would be in a position to help JIM II find a political solution to the Kampuchean conflict and end the suffering of the Kampuchean people as soon as possible.

Son Sann called the press conference at the Indonesia Hotel in the wake of a confrontation between the head of the Phnom Penh's delegation and the Khmer Rouge representative yesterday over their conflicting peace plans.

Khmer Rouge Opposes Aid, SRV Troops Link
*BK1702081489 Hong Kong AFP in English 0747 GMT
17 Feb 89*

[Text] Jakarta, Feb 17 (AFP)—Regional talks on Cambodia focused here Friday on the issue of "linkage" between a Vietnamese troop withdrawal and an end to foreign aid to resistance factions.

Two of the three factions in the Cambodian resistance coalition—which has previously rejected any linkage—indicated that they were prepared to work towards a compromise, but the third faction, the Khmer Rouge, reportedly remained opposed.

Hanoi and the Cambodian Government in Phnom Penh have demanded that a Vietnamese troop withdrawal and an end of foreign aid to the resistance be linked in any settlement.

Former nationalist Cambodian Prime Minister and leader of one of the resistance factions, Son Sann, told a news conference Friday that he would consider agreeing to a cessation of external aid "in parallel with" a Vietnamese troop withdrawal from the country.

A member of the delegation representing former chief of state Prince Norodom Sihanouk said: "This is being discussed, and we would like to reach an agreement."

But Khmer Rouge delegation chief Thiounn Prasith refused to comment, saying only: "The problem is that the Vietnamese must withdraw."

Phnom Penh delegation head Hor Nam Hong spoke of a "general consensus" on a withdrawal in tandem with an end to external aid to the resistance factions.

"The only ones to oppose this are the Khmer Rouge," Mr. Hor said.

China and Thailand are the main providers of military aid to the resistance and more particularly to the communist Khmer Rouge, the main military muscle of the anti-Hanoi grouping.

Asked how the talks—gathering the four Cambodian warring parties, Vietnam, Laos and representatives of the non-communist Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—were going, an aide to Mr. Hor said: "Slowly."

Another key issue at the talks was international supervision of the Vietnamese troop withdrawal and post-settlement events.

The resistance appeared to be easing away from its demand for an international peace-keeping force under United Nations auspices, which Hanoi and Phnom Penh had categorically rejected.

The Sihanouk faction was now calling for an international control mechanism under the U.N. (ICM-UN), amid continuing debate over the composition—military against civilian—of any such force.

Mr. Son Sann said the title and terminology of the force were not important, but that effective international supervision of a withdrawal was essential.

His delegation circulated a speech made at the meeting, stressing that Hanoi would have to accept such a supervision and control if it "sincerely wants" the world community to believe that its troops were leaving Cambodia and not merely being rotated.

Vietnam invaded Cambodia in late 1978 to oust the Khmer Rouge, blamed for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people during a four-year rule.

The current working group session in Jakarta is due to be followed by a second round of ministerial-level talks opening on Sunday [19 February].

Linkage 'Accepted' by Resistance
*BK1702011989 BANGKOK POST in English
17 Feb 89 p 1*

[By Jacques Bekaert in Jakarta]

[Text] Encouraged by China, the Khmer resistance has accepted the idea of linking the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea and the phasing-out of external military aid to the factions in the conflict.

At a Beijing gathering of three faction leaders of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK], Chinese Foreign Ministry officials appealed for flexibility to ensure the second Jakarta Informal Meeting [JIM 2] brings positive results.

While in China, the resistance as well as Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who has again resumed the presidency, adopted a lengthy document which serves as a guideline for their delegates at JIM 2 working group sessions and provides a framework for further talks with Vietnam, the People's Republic of Kampuchea [PRK] and ASEAN.

The document, entitled "modalities for the implementation of the five-point peace plan of Prince Sihanouk" deals in great length with two major aspects of a political solution: an effective international control mechanism and the formation of a provisional quadripartite government led by Prince Sihanouk.

The resistance believes control should come in two stages. Before a general election, an international control mechanism of the United Nations should supervise the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces, ensure the ceasefire among parties to the conflict as well as the disarming of the four factions where the number of 10,000 men is the limit.

The mechanism would also supervise the phased reduction of military aid to the four factions parallel with the withdrawal timetable.

Finally, it would guarantee free elections and the non-return of foreign armed forces and war materials to Kampuchea. After the election, the resistance wants to have in Kampuchea a UN international peace keeping force.

The role of the force would be "to prevent one Kampuchean party from abusing its forces to the detriment of another; to prevent a civil war and any act of external aggression against the country" and guarantee its "territorial integrity, independence, non-aligned status", thus contributing to the general peace and security of the region.

The final point, which extends the importance of Kampuchean peace to that of the region, also figures in the Indonesian document distributed recently to the participants of JIM 2.

The UN mechanism could be a civilian or military force or a combination with a minimum staff of 2,000 including representatives of the four factions, and Vietnam, at least until the last Vietnamese soldier leaves Kampuchea.

It should be deployed along main roads and establish check points in important localities along major supply lines. Any party could ask for members to be dispatched to verify whether there is really a clandestine movement of troops or transport of arms and ammunitions.

The resistance continues to insist on the simultaneous dismantling of the PRK and CGDK.

The CGDK claims it is "inspired by a sincere desire to arrive at a political solution and national reconciliation".

According to the document, "national reconciliation could not be conceived if the PRK were to be maintained in one way or another".

The formation of a provisional quadripartite government should involve the dismantling "from top to the bottom of the political and administrative apparatus of the PRK and the state of DK [Democratic Kampuchea]" and the formation "from top to the bottom of the political and administrative apparatus of a provisional quadripartite government of Kampuchea under the leadership of Samdech Sihanouk."

If the idea of an international control mechanism has been basically accepted by the four factions, even if divergences still exist regarding the modalities, one can expect strong opposition from the PRK to the idea of any dismantling of the Phnom Penh regime before the general election.

The resistance, nevertheless, makes an important concession—it accepts the idea of a linkage between the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and phased reduction of military aid to the resistance and, says the document, "that aid will be terminated the day Vietnamese forces have completely left Kampuchea".

The linkage, at first denounced by the resistance, is a consequence of JIM 1 last year in Bogor.

SRV Accepts 'Phased' End of Aid to Coalition
*BK1702100289 Hong Kong AFP in English 0953 GMT
17 Feb 89*

[Text] Jakarta, Feb 17 (AFP)—Vietnam said Friday that it had accepted a phased cessation of outside aid to the Cambodian resistance forces fighting Hanoi's troops and their allies in Cambodia.

Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co told AGENCIE FRANCE PRESSE that he had agreed at regional talks here on Cambodia that cessation of aid be "parallel" to the withdrawal of Hanoi's troops in that country.

Hanoi and its client regime in Phnom Penh had previously demanded that there be "linkage" between the withdrawal and an end to foreign aid.

China and Thailand are the main providers of military assistance to the resistance coalition grouping the Khmer Rouge and followers of Prince Norodom Sihanuk and former [as received] Prime Minister Son Sann.

The talks here began Thursday, bringing together the warring Cambodian factions, Vietnam and Hanoi-ally Laos, as well as the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia.

Mr. Co said foreign aid to the resistance must stop completely "with the departure of the last Vietnamese soldier from Cambodia."

Anti-Hanoi Cambodian sources confirmed that Mr. Co had accepted that the cessation of aid take place in stages.

But one Cambodian source charged that the Vietnamese official was "vague", and accused him of being inflexible on the question of monitoring the Vietnamese troop withdrawal.

Mr. Co said that Vietnam was prepared to discuss the issue of international supervision for the withdrawal, but he stressed that Hanoi would not accept a monitoring role for the United Nations as long as the resistance held Cambodia's U.N. seat.

The Hanoi official said that he was "optimistic" over the possibility of progress at the talks here on the "external factors" surrounding the 10-year-old conflict in Cambodia.

But, He said, he doubted that the warring Cambodian factions were at an agreement among themselves on a post-settlement political framework.

"Vietnam," Mr. Co said, "wants to see JIM-2 set off down the right path."

JIM, or Jakarta informal meetings, refers to the Cambodia talks here.

"But some parties," Mr. Co went on, "would like to scatter nails along the path. So we need an armoured tracked vehicle, which can crush those nails."

Mr. Co also expressed support for an international conference on Cambodia, but "to guarantee not to conclude a settlement."

Vietnam wanted such a conference to be convened in Southeast Asia to demonstrate that Cambodia is a regional issue, he said.

ASEAN View of 'Comprehensive Solution' Noted
*BK1602030189 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
16 Feb 89 p 6*

[By Anurat Maniphan and Banyat Thatsaniyawet reporting from Jakarta]

[Text] ASEAN is likely to insist on an unconditional, verifiable withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea with a specific timetable at Second Jakarta Informal Meeting being formally prepared by a working group opening talks here today.

Vietnam so far has only said that it would withdraw its troops by September if there is a political settlement on Kampuchea but it has not said "how" this is to be done, one analyst pointed out.

Moreover, the "condition" it has set—political settlement on Kampuchea—"amounts to a very big if," he told the BANGKOK POST.

The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops so far have not been verifiable, with one source estimating that there remain 30,000-40,000 troops "unaccounted for," on top of the 50,000 understood to be still left in the country.

ASEAN states believe a comprehensive solution to the Kampuchean problem should be reached by setting priorities to outstanding issues. Vietnam wants to address the problem of refugees when the main issue of the troop pullout is yet to be finalised, a source pointed out.

Western diplomats noted that Hanoi was pressing on with the refugee issue because it wants to cut the recruitment base for the Khmer resistance.

There are an estimated 250,000 Kampuchean "displaced persons" on the Kampuchean border with Thailand and Hanoi is believed to be more in favour of their being moved inside Kampuchea—rather than inside Thailand—in order to have control over the sizeable population.

ASEAN states would like "priorities" to be recognised by all concerned, as "shopping bag diplomacy" will not work in this situation.

"You may agree on everything but without proper order there is effectively no agreement," the analyst said.

Vietnam has linked the withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea with the cessation of support to the Khmer resistance. "If Vietnam delivers on a timetable for the troop withdrawal, then we will consider a timetable for the cessation of support for the Khmer resistance."

The presence of Vietnamese troops in Kampuchea is "the greatest form of external interference" in Kampuchea, the source added.

Vietnam's readiness to say how its troops are leaving Kampuchea, under a specific timetable, and in a verifiable manner will "show that it wants a political settlement. So far, they have put the onus on us."

The question of interim provisions following the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops is of less immediate concern to ASEAN states as they maintain this stage is yet to come.

One source however pointed out that the regional grouping had thrown its weight behind Prince Norodom Sihanouk's five-point proposal, reiterated with elaboration in a statement released in Beijing on February 9.

In this document, the prince reaffirmed his call for the simultaneous dismantling of the People's Republic of Kampuchea regime Phnom Penh, and the state of Democratic Kampuchea, in order to form a quadripartite provisional government which would organise general elections. [sentence as published]

The prince also reiterated his call for the stationing of an international peace keeping force (IPKF) in Kampuchea to supervise the elections, among other things.

Both issues are points of contention as JIM II approaches. Diplomats said there were scarce chances of Hanoi yielding on the dismantling of the PRK—as effectively this would undo ten years work and blunt Premier Hun Sen's edge over Prince Sihanouk if there are general elections.

Because Hanoi and Phnom Penh are likely to be unmoving on the dismantling issue, they may, in the most optimistic scenario, yield some points on the IPKF issue, in order to keep up communications, an analyst noted.

**Working Group Meeting, News Conference Reported
BK1702092489 (Clandestine) Voice of the Khmer
in Cambodian 0430 GMT 17 Feb 89**

[Station correspondent Pol Ham report from Jakarta; date not given—recorded]

[Text] The meeting of the working groups in Jakarta continued yesterday at 1500 with the four Cambodian groups discussing ways to find a solution to the Cambodian problem. However, it was not successful because the two sides still stick to their old positions, namely the Heng Samrin side still refuses to dissolve its illegal regime and take part in a quadripartite coalition government, which is the stand of the tripartite Cambodian Coalition Government in accordance with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's five-point proposal.

The session lasted for only 1 hour during which Hor Nam Hong, head of the Heng Samrin regime's delegation, did not respond to the proposal of the Cambodian Coalition Government's three parties but instead raised

his five-point proposal, which in sum refuses to dissolve the illegal regime. The five-point proposal of the Heng Samrin regime's delegation is as follows:

1. Discuss the cease-fire among all Cambodian groups.
2. Set up a quadripartite national reconciliation council headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk with three vice chairmen (arguing that this council is free from the four parties in its task to organize elections and draft a new constitution).
3. Set up another quadripartite committee to assist this national reconciliation council.
4. Organize an election in 3 months following the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the end of weapon supplies from outside.
5. Issue a statement on a cease-fire with armies of the four Cambodian groups remaining where they are.

The Heng Samrin regime delegation refused to dissolve its illegal regime.

Following is Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's proposal relating to a solution to the Cambodian problem and modalities for its implementation.

On the setting up of a quadripartite coalition government headed by Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. This should be done when the Heng Samrin regime and Democratic Kampuchea are dissolved. This provisional government should be on an equal basis from top to bottom and has the duty to organize elections under UN supervision.

The adherence to their own positions of the four Cambodian groups is the obstacle to the continuation of this meeting. The four delegations decided to end their meeting at 1600.

The meeting with the participation of the Cambodian groups and delegations from other countries, namely Vietnam, Laos, and the six ASEAN members, started at 1640 with a report by Hor Nam Hong of the Heng Samrin regime and a report by Thiounn Prasith of the party of Democratic Kampuchea, relating to the earlier session of the four Cambodian groups.

Hor Nam Hong said he put forward his five-point proposal but other groups did not respond to this while Thiounn Prasith said the Heng Samrin regime delegation also did not respond to the five-point proposal of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk. Thiounn Prasith also said the announced Vietnamese troop pullout from Cambodia was not under proper control and said this was just a troop rotation; more Vietnamese troops were even brought to Cambodia. He said the International Control Commission favored by Vietnam and Heng Samrin will not be effective, citing as an example the guarantee of Laos' neutrality in 1962 by this commission which was a futile exercise. Thiounn Prasith thinks that only the UN peacekeeping forces, namely the blue-bereted force, can

function effectively. Thiounn Prasith further said Vietnam affirmed that the Heng Samrin regime controls 95 percent of Cambodia—or more than this, 110 percent. If this so, why is Vietnam afraid of the United Nations?

Afterward, the Vietnamese and Lao delegations voiced their support for the Heng Samrin regime's statement. On top of this, Tran Quang Co, head of the Vietnamese delegation, said on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, there is no need to consider the number of troops or the geographical areas because this pullout will be done in a short period of time, by September 1989.

Before closing the session, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said he thought that an agreement had been reached on the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and on the international control of the troop pullout. However, there was still disagreement on how this control should be done. He said the discussion should continue on Friday, 17 February, the 2d day of the meeting, from 1000.

Ten minutes after the closing of the meeting there was a news conference held by Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, accompanied by Thiounn Prasith of the Democratic Kampuchea party, and Hor Nam Hong of the Heng Samrin regime. At this news conference we noted that Hor Nam Hong talked in detail about the Heng Samrin regime's five-point proposal while Thiounn Prasith told reporters about the five-point proposal of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk and the modalities for implementing this proposal.

Thiounn Prasith added that to solve the Cambodian problem, it should be realized that the major cause of this problem is the Vietnamese troops' aggression. International law and the UN Charter should be used as the basis for solving the Cambodian problem. Thiounn Prasith specified: How can we believe Vietnam's unilateral 'troop pullout'? Can the Cambodian problem be solved if the Heng Samrin regime, which acts only at Vietnam's orders, insists on solving the problem within

this regime's framework? Thiounn Prasith stressed that we absolutely cannot go along with Vietnam's plan. Thiounn Prasith said Vietnam argues that following the withdrawal of their troops, Vietnam is worried that the Khmer Rouge could return to power. If this is so, why does Vietnam refuse the presence of international peace-keeping forces in Cambodia? He stressed that we will certainly not allow the Vietnamese aggressors to dupe us.

Also on Thursday evening there was meeting between His Excellency Son Sann, KPNLF [Khmer People's National Liberation Front] president and prime minister of the Cambodian Coalition Government, and Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. However, there is no detailed report on the meeting.

ROK Notes 'Sectoral Dialogue' With ASEAN
*SK1402010989 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 14 Feb 89 p 7*

[Text] The government has agreed with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to have a dialogue partnership in limited sectors such as trade, investment and sightseeing. The sectoral partnership will be formalized during the ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting to be held in Brunei in July.

A Foreign Ministry official said Korea will be the first country to have a sectoral dialogue partnership with the organization.

When it is formalized, Korea will be able to participate in various inter-governmental and private projects of ASEAN countries but cannot send a delegation to the annual ASEAN foreign ministers' meeting. In addition to member countries, only full dialogue partners of the organization are allowed to attend the meeting.

Five nations including the United States, Japan and Canada are listed as full dialogue partners of ASEAN. The ASEAN summit agreement in Manila in 1987 closed the membership for full dialogue partners.

Japan

Bank Official Blames Yen Rise on Bush Proposals

OW1702064889 Tokyo KYODO in English 0550 GMT
17 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 17 KYODO—Bank of Japan Governor Satoshi Sumita Friday blamed the recent sharp drop in the dollar's value on market disappointment over U.S. federal budget proposals recently unveiled by President George Bush.

Sumita made the remark at a cabinet meeting during which he briefed ministers on the international and Japanese economies.

Sumita also attributed the yen's rise to continued uncertainty over prospects of redressing the U.S. trade deficit and the effect tighter U.S. credit policy will have on stemming inflation.

"Ensuring the stability of the U.S. economy is the basis on which stable foreign exchange rates can be ensured," the central banker said.

He expressed hope that the U.S. Government would implement measures to whittle the budget deficit and to restrain booming U.S. domestic demand that has long crippled America's ability to cut its trade deficit.

The dollar closed Friday's morning currency trading in Tokyo at 125.75 yen, a drop of more than 5 yen over the past month. The morning rate was down 0.58 yen from the previous day's finish here.

Daily Interviews Foreign Minister Uno

SK1502010989 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
15 Feb 89 pp 1, 2

[Text] Japanese Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno said his government fully supports Seoul's dialogue efforts with North Korea, making it clear that the Korean peninsula question should be resolved primarily through dialogue between the two divided halves.

Japan has no intention whatsoever of supporting the perpetuation of the division desired neither by South nor North Korea, he said.

In a written interview with THE KOREA TIMES, Uno said, however, Japan is prepared to enter into dialogue with North Korea out of a conviction that it is worthwhile for both the South and North to maintain normal contacts and exchanges with neighboring countries to create a climate conducive to South-North dialogue.

It is the first time for a Japanese foreign minister to respond to a questionnaire from any foreign media since the death of Emperor Hirohito.

He also said Japan will never become militaristic, dismissing the worries of some nations as being totally unfounded.

He also said Japan will continue to negotiate with the Soviet Union to facilitate free departure of Koreans living on the Soviet-held Sakhalin Island, so they can return to their hometowns for family reunions.

As to the improvement of the legal status of Koreans living in Japan, Uno said work has already been done and will be pursued on the principle that these people's livelihoods are now based in Japan.

As to the "third generation Koreans," he said, "We think it sensible to take into account that those Koreans have stronger ties with the Japanese society than the older generations."

As to the past atrocities of Japan, Uno said Japan fully recognizes that it caused much pain in the past and damage to the people in Asia and other parts of the world.

And Japan has adopted and been pursuing a policy committed to peace and the firm determination never to repeat such unfortunate experiences again.

Following are his answers.

Question: What is the Japanese Government's policy on the promotion of Korean residents' status in your country?

Answer: In reference to the status of Koreans in Japan, the Government of Japan in view of the historical circumstances and reality circumstances and reality accounting for the fact that these people's basic livelihoods are in Japan, believes it important to stabilize their legal status and enable these people to lead a social life in a similar way as the Japanese do.

Based upon such belief, the Government of Japan has been making every possible effort in this regard. Specifically, the Koreans in Japan were granted the right to acquire permanent resident status as a result of the Agreement on the Status of Republic of Korea Nationals Residing in Japan of 1965.

We also took special legal measures in 1981 in which those who had not been able to apply for permanent residence under the above-mentioned Agreement were given similar status.

With regard to the status of the so-called "third generation Koreans", the first high-level consultative meeting was held in Tokyo between the two governments last year.

Q: The expanding relations between South Korea and the Soviet Union heightened Korea's hope for the return of the Koreans living on Sakhalin Island who were taken there for forced labor during World War II. What will the Government of Japan do to help these people?

A: From the humanitarian viewpoint, the Government of Japan has conducted negotiations with the Soviet Union over many years so that those Koreans could come to Japan or Korea to reunite their relatives, or return to the Republic of Korea.

As a result, and thanks to the recent change of policy on the part of the Soviet Union, recently the situation has improved to the point where more than 100 Koreans in Sakhalin Island were allowed to travel to Japan or Korea.

Q: In parallel with the current of detente in Northeast Asia as well as the world, rapid changes are taking place surrounding the Korean peninsula. What is the Japanese Government's basic response to such moves and the Korean Government's "northern policy"?

A: As has been reiterated on many occasions, the underlying principle in Japanese policy is that the Korean Peninsula question should primarily be resolved through dialogue between North and South. Japan has no intention whatsoever of supporting the perpetuation of the division desired by neither North nor South, and we hope that a peaceful unification will be achieved through dialogue between North and South.

At the same time we feel that having both North and South maintain normal contacts and exchanges with neighboring countries and the rest of the international community can contribute to the process leading to peaceful unification by facilitating the creation of a climate conducive to such North-South dialogue.

In this sense, we support the so-called "northern policy" by the Republic of Korea.

Q: Recent reports said that the Government of Japan is ready to begin unconditional talks with North Korea in order to improve relations with Pyongyang. Would you clarify this matter?

A: As I stated earlier, in order to create a climate conducive to the North-South dialogue, it must be worthwhile for both North and South to maintain normal contacts and exchanges with neighboring countries.

In this context, we recognize that it will be appropriate for us to move positively toward improved relations between Japan and North Korea, with all due regard for maintaining the international political balance as it affects the Korean Peninsula, if North Korea so desires.

Q: There have been strong U.S. demand for greater Japanese defense spending and for this reason and others, your country strengthened its military power in recent years. On the other hand, many experts argue that a major military buildup by Japan would cause problems, for instance, regional unrest, particularly among neighboring nations such as China and Korea. What is your perspective on this question?

A: Japan is aware of some concern expressed by certain Asian countries about the recent increase of Japan's defense budget.

However, the basic defense policy of Japan under its Peace Constitution has been to maintain an exclusively defensive posture and not to become a military power.

In accordance with this policy, Japan has developed over the recent years moderate defense capabilities on its own initiative, secured civilian control and observed the three non-nuclear principles, firmly adhering to the Japan-U.S. Security Arrangement.

Government Officially Recognizes Burma

OW1702013689 Tokyo KYODO in English 0020 GMT
18 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 17 KYODO—Japan on Friday recognized the Burmese Government led by Prime Minister and former General Saw Maung, who took power in a coup on September 18 amid large street demonstrations throughout Burma demanding the end of military rule.

Kazutoshi Hasegawa, director general of the Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau, met Burma's Ambassador to Japan U Ba Thin and expressed Japan's intention of maintaining friendly relations with Burma, according to ministry officials.

Hasegawa also said Japan strongly hoped that Burma would settle its internal political problems with respect to the will of the Burmese people and stabilize the nation through economic reform.

A similar message will be conveyed to the Burmese Government in Rangoon by Japan's Ambassador to Burma Hiroshi Otaka.

Japan had suspended recognition of the Saw Maung government because of continuing instability in Burma.

Foreign Ministry officials cited the restoration of security and public order as reasons for now recognizing the Saw Maung government.

With recognition of the Rangoon government, Japanese official development assistance (ODA) to Burma, which had been virtually frozen, will be partially resumed, the officials said.

Japan will provide a total of some 100 billion yen in grants and loans, which it already committed to giving, and emergency aid based on humanitarian considerations.

The officials, however, said Tokyo would wait and see how matters in Burma progress before deciding whether to provide new financial assistance to the impoverished Southeast Asian country.

Japan's ODA to Burma in 1986 amounted to about 244 million dollars, accounting for some 80 percent of total foreign aid to Burma in that year.

Plans To Lift Freeze on Aid
OW1702032489 Tokyo KYODO in English
0218 GMT 17 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 17 KYODO—Finance Minister Tatsuo Murayama on Friday said Japan will shortly lift a freeze on its foreign aid disbursements to the Government of Burmese leader Saw Maung.

Murayama told a press conference after the morning's cabinet that Japanese economic aid "will be resumed at an appropriate time in accordance with the Japanese Government's policy of hoping for the stability of the (Burmese) people's livelihood."

The disbursements of Japanese yen loans and grants to Burma were suspended last July, when former Burmese strongman Ne Win was ousted amid a massive popular revolt and anti-government rallies.

Former armed forces commander Saw Maung took power on September 18 in a military coup that quashed civilian unrest.

Murayama's remark came as the Japanese Government announced its recognition of the Burmese Government.

Earlier, Aung San Suu Kyi, one of Burma's opposition leaders and the daughter of Aung San, founder of Burmese nationalism, criticized Japanese economic aid as giving support to the Military Government and asked for a continuation of the present aid ban until civilian control is restored.

Government To Provide Over \$11 Billion in ODA
OW1602151589 Tokyo KYODO in English 0955 GMT
16 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 16 KYODO—Japan's total official development assistance (ODA) for Fiscal 1989 will amount to 1,369.8 billion yen (11.1 billion dollars at an exchange rate of 123 yen per dollar), the Foreign Ministry said Thursday.

According to the budget draft for Fiscal 1989 starting April 1, Japan's total ODA expenditure, including that allocated in its general account and in a companion budget known as the investment and loan program, will far exceed the 9.5 billion dollars requested for the fiscal 1990 U.S. budget by the U.S. Administration.

In the budget draft, 159.6 billion yen will be for bilateral grants for economic development and 223.7 billion yen will be allocated for bilateral technical cooperation, aimed at training people in developing nations.

A total of 284.6 billion yen will be used as donations and investments in international organizations such as the United Nations and the World Bank.

To the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), a major government body which implements ODA programs, a total of 753 billion yen will be given.

Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita pledged at the summit meeting of seven industrialized democracies held in Toronto last June that Japan would double its ODA to over 50 billion dollars between fiscal 1988 and 1992.

Government To Forgive Overdue Rwanda Debt
OW1702102989 Tokyo KYODO in English 0944 GMT
17 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 17 (KYODO)—Japan on Friday agreed to dismiss 84 million yen in overdue payments owed by the African nation of Rwanda, Foreign Ministry sources said.

The two countries exchanged diplomatic documents on the debt relief agreement in Rwanda's capital of Kigali the same day ministry sources said.

Mission Begins Probe of Brazilian Economy
OW1702072189 Tokyo KYODO in English 0633 GMT
17 Feb 89

[Text] Rio de Janeiro, Feb. 16 (KYODO)—A Japanese Government mission which entered Brazil Thursday, plans to study the economy and Japanese firms operating here, Japanese officials said.

The 29-member mission, led by Bank of Tokyo's Vice President Eiichi Matsumoto, includes both private-sector businessmen and government officials, including the Export-Import Bank of Japan. It has the backing of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry.

The mission will be divided into two groups here. Each group will tour such major cities as Rio de Janeiro, Manaus, Belo Horizonte, Sao Paulo and Porto Alegre to probe the economic situation in each region, they said.

The mission, the second of this kind to Brazil, will later get together in the capital of Brasilia to meet Finance Minister Mailson Ferreira da Nobrega and other cabinet ministers in charge of economic policies.

The mission will leave for Mexico, its next destination, on February 22, the officials added.

Government Approves Euratom Nuclear Fusion Pact
OW1702030889 Tokyo KYODO in English 0151 GMT
17 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 17 KYODO—The Japanese Government Friday approved the conclusion of a nuclear fusion cooperation agreement with the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom), officials said.

The agreement, enabling promotion of exchanges of information on nuclear fusion tests and personnel between Japan and Europe, will be signed in Brussels next Monday local time, they said.

Foreign Officials To Attend Hirohito Funeral
OW1702101389 Tokyo KYODO in English 0903 GMT
17 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 17 (KYODO)—Thailand's Crown Prince Maha Vajirakongkorn will attend the February 24 state funeral for Emperor Hirohito, the Foreign Ministry said Friday.

Haiti will send its Information and Coordination Minister Antony Virginie Saint-Pierre. Gerard Lacrete, chief of the Army General Staff, will accompany the minister, Japanese officials said.

Chad will send its Ambassador to Japan Issa Abbas Ali who is stationed in Beijing, and Equatorial Guinea will dispatch Cancido Oyono, charge d'affaires at its embassy in Beijing.

The number of countries represented at the funeral now stands at 151, including nine represented by locally stationed diplomats.

Sixteen international organizations will also send their representatives to the funeral at Tokyo's Shinjuku Gyo-en National Garden.

Meanwhile, Prince Norodom Ranariddh will also attend the funeral as the personal representative of his father, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, president of the three-party anti-Vietnamese Government of Democratic Kampuchea, officials said.

JSP Demands Summoning Nakasone to Diet
OW1602101189 Tokyo KYODO in English 0843 GMT
16 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 16 KYODO—The Japan Socialist Party [JSP] demanded on Thursday that former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone be summoned to the Diet to answer questions under oath about his suspected role in the controversial resale by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. [NTT] of two U.S.-made supercomputers to Recruit Co., an information conglomerate and the key company in the Recruit Cosmos stock scandal.

Tsuruo Yamaguchi, secretary general of the largest opposition party, made the demand at a session of House of Representatives' Budget Committee.

Yamaguchi also demanded that former NTT Chairman Hisashi Shinto, his personal secretary Kozo Murata, and NTT President Haruo Yamaguchi be summoned to testify in the Diet.

Akira Ono, chairman of the committee, promised to take up Yamaguchi's demand at a meeting of executive members of the committee.

The JSP secretary general pointed out that the easing of trade frictions between the United States and Japan was a main topic at the summit meeting between Nakasone and then U.S. President Ronald Reagan in April 1986.

NTT resold the first supercomputer purchased from Cray Research Inc. to Recruit in December 1986 and purchased a second Cray supercomputer in June 1987, also reselling it to Recruit in December 1987.

Yamaguchi said 12 U.S. Congress members sent a petition to Nakasone in April 1987 calling on Japan to buy supercomputers from the United States.

Nakasone promised Reagan at a summit meeting in May 1987 that he would instruct those concerned to buy U.S. supercomputers, Yamaguchi said.

The JSP leader asked Posts and Telecommunications Minister Seiichi Kataoka whether there was a definite instruction from Nakasone.

Kataoka replied that the government decided in April 1985 to provide opportunities to foreign firms to participate in government projects and conveyed its decision to NTT and that he knows nothing more than that.

The Tokyo district public prosecutor's office has arrested six persons, including former Recruit Chairman and founder Hiromasa Ezoe, 52, and two former NTT executives.

The two former executives, Hisahiko Hasegawa and Ei Shikiba, are accused of accepting bribes when they were offered and purchased unlisted shares of Recruit Cosmos, a real estate subsidiary of Recruit, in 1986. The shares shot up in value immediately after the stock went public in the over-the-counter market.

Shinto resigned as NTT chairman last December when it was revealed that 9 million yen of the profit from the stock resale by Murata, Shinto's secretary, had been deposited in Shinto's personal bank account.

Three former secretaries of Nakasone were among the 159 purchasers of unlisted Recruit Cosmos shares. Three cabinet ministers have resigned in the stock scandal.

Yamaguchi demanded that the Takeshita cabinet resign or Takeshita dissolve the lower house for a general election to take responsibility in the Recruit case.

The prime minister rejected Yamaguchi's call and said, "I should make my own decision whether to resign or remain in office rather than being pressed to resign by other persons."

Komeito, JSP Demand NTT Officials Testify
OW1702064989 Tokyo KYODO in English 0553 GMT
17 Feb 89

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 17 KYODO—The No. 2 opposition party Komeito on Friday joined the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) in demanding that Hisashi Shinto, former chairman of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp. (NTT), and three other officials be summoned to the Diet to testify on the controversial resale by NTT of two U.S.-made supercomputers to Recruit Co.

Komeito Secretary General Naohiko Okubo told a session of the House of Representatives' Budget Committee that his party may also demand that former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and his key cabinet ministers be summoned to the Diet, if necessary.

Akira Ono, chairman of the committee, promised to take up Okubo's demand at a meeting of executive members of the committee.

JSP Secretary General Tsuruo Yamaguchi demanded on Thursday that Nakasone and the four officials, Shinto, his personal secretary Kozo Murata, NTT President Haruo Yamaguchi and Yutaka Hayashi, chief of the NTT President's Office, be called to the Diet to answer questions on the scandal.

Okubo asked how the procurement of U.S.-made supercomputers by the Government was treated at meetings between Nakasone and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in January 1986 and May 1987.

Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno replied that the question of procurement of supercomputers was not discussed at the meeting on January 1986 but that in the 1987 meeting Nakasone told Reagan he knew NTT would purchase one supercomputer from the United States.

Uno said Nakasone conveyed NTT's decision to Reagan because it was favorable to bilateral relations since NTT and Cray Research Inc. had signed a contract in March of the same year.

Okubo said there were too many unclear things in the resale of supercomputers by NTT to Recruit and demanded the summoning of Shinto and three other officials.

NTT resold the first supercomputer it bought from Cray to Recruit in December 1986 and purchased a second Cray supercomputer in June 1987, which it resold to Recruit in December 1987.

Meanwhile four major opposition parties, the JSP, Komeito, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the Japan Communist Party, decided on Friday to demand the holding of sessions on February 20 and 21 concentrating on the Recruit scandal.

Okubo said his party will demand that the cabinet of Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita resign if the government tries to cover up the scandal.

Prime Minister Takeshita replied he will cooperate with the Diet as much as possible in the investigation of the scandal.

Prosecutors have arrested six persons, including former Recruit chairman and founder Hiromasa Ezoe, and two former NTT executives.

The two former executives, Hisahiko Hasegawa and Ei Shikiba, are suspected of accepting bribes when they were offered and purchased unlisted shares of Recruit Cosmos Co., a real estate subsidiary of Recruit Co., in 1986. The shares shot up in value immediately after the stock went public in the over-the-counter market.

Shinto resigned as NTT chairman last December when it was revealed that 9 million yen, part of the profits from the stock resale by Murata, had been deposited in Shinto's personal bank account.

Nakasone's three aides also obtained unlisted shares of Recruit Cosmos in 1986.

Launching of Observation Satellite Postponed
OW1602110289 Tokyo KYODO in English 0911 GMT
16 Feb 89

[Text] Kagoshima, Feb. 16 KYODO—The launching of a magnetosphere observation satellite scheduled for next Monday will be postponed at least two days, officials said Thursday.

The launch was postponed due to trouble with instrumentation controlling the attitude of the rocket meant to carry the satellite into space, the Education Ministry's Institute of Space and Astronomical Science said.

The rocket was planned to be launched from the Kagoshima Space Center in Uchinoura next Monday.

Financial Officials Share Inflation Concern
*OW1702034489 Tokyo KYODO in English 0318 GMT
17 Feb 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 17 KYODO—Finance Minister Tatsuo Murayama said Friday he can "understand the concern" of Bank of Japan Governor Satoshi Sumita about a possible overheating of the economy.

"I can understand the governor's deep apprehension about the overheating of the economy and (its impact on) the price situation," Murayama said at a press conference held at the Diet.

Sumita has repeatedly warned that overheating of the Japanese economy might lead to inflation if combined with a tight labor supply and "price gouging" stemming from the new consumption tax.

Murayama tried to deflect rising concern, however, by assuring that the Japanese economy has not begun overheating.

Murayama said such signs "have only showed up in an economic index measuring the labor supply-and-demand situation."

He also hinted that the government has no immediate intention of tightening its current easy credit policy as a preemptive attack on inflationary pressure.

Central Bank Not To Change Credit Policy
*OW1602114489 Tokyo KYODO in English 0951 GMT
16 Feb 89*

[Text] Tokyo, Feb. 16 KYODO—Bank of Japan (BOJ) Governor Satoshi Sumita said Thursday he sees no need to change the present monetary policy due to sustained stability on the domestic inflation front.

Sumita added, however, that the central bank would not hesitate to tighten credit if price stability is jeopardized.

Testifying before the lower house budget committee, he said it is Japan's international responsibility to ensure continued economic growth led by domestic demand.

But he warned of growing potential inflationary pressures such as a tightening labor supply, fast growth of the nation's money supply and ample credit available to businesses as the domestic economy is in its third year of expansion under the central bank's easy money policy.

The Japanese economy is in a climate where caution must be exercised in terms of price stability, Sumita said.

Mongolia

Batmonh Addresses Constitution Commission
*OW1602105189 Ulaanbaatar MONTSAME in Russian
1440 GMT 14 Feb 89*

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 14 Feb (MONTSAME)—In accordance with the resolution of the party Central Committee 1988 December plenum, a session of the Commission for a New Edition of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR] Constitution, was held in Ulaanbaatar. Members of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party [MPRP] Central Committee Politburo, leaders of central and local party and state organizations, research economists, philosophers, and historians, and representatives of workers and animal breeders make up the membership of this commission.

Jambyn Batmonh, general secretary of the MPRP Central Committee and chairman of the MPR People's Great Hural, who is also the chairman of the Commission for a New Edition of the MPR Constitution, spoke at the session. He emphasized that implementation of restructuring in the country is impossible without perfecting its existing laws and that this matter should be started primarily with a new edition of the basic law of the country—the MPR Constitution. Comrade J. Batmonh indicated the need to improve the content of the Constitution in accordance with the process of restructuring and renewal which is developing in the country, and to perfect existing laws and legal acts on this bases. He emphasized the importance of taking into consideration the traditions of the country's basic laws adopted in 1924, 1949, and 1960. At the same time, it is necessary to reflect the achieved level of the country's development, tasks of restructuring and renewal, strengthening socialist democracy, and perfecting the system of the state government, J. Batmonh noted.

The commission chairman noted the importance of studying and using the experience of organizing similar work in the USSR and other socialist countries. He indicated the expediency of completing the work on the new edition of the Constitution in 1989 and proposing it for nationwide discussion next December.

Cooperation Accord Concluded With USSR
*OW160213489 Ulaanbaatar International Service
in English 0910 GMT 14 Feb 89*

[Text] The cooperation plan between the Foreign Ministries of Mongolia and the Soviet Union has been signed in Ulaanbaatar. It was initialed by First Deputy Foreign Minister of Mongolia Yondon and the visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Rogachev.

North Korea

* Paper Comments on Seventh Panmunjom Talks 41100007 Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean 30 Dec 88 p 4

[Unattributed report: "The Delegates from the North and the South Hold Their Seventh Meeting in Panmunjom Preparatory to a North-South Joint Parliamentary Meeting"]

[Text] Panmunjom, 29 Dec (KCNA)—The seventh meeting of the delegates from the North and the South was held on 29 December at "Tongilgak [Unification Pavilion]," in our area of Panmunjom, in preparation for a North-South joint parliamentary conference.

Representing our side were Chon Kum-chol, senior delegate; and An Pyong-su, Yi Tong-chol, Yi Chu-ung, and Pak Mun-chan as delegates—all of them are Supreme People's Assembly [SPA] deputies. Representing the South were five delegates including the senior delegate, Chae Mun-sik.

At this meeting, the delegates of the two sides continued to discuss the question concerning the structure of the formal talks which will deal with basic issues, as well as the question of the agenda—the two questions on which they had failed to reach agreement in their sixth meeting.

The head of our delegation, Chon Kum-chol, was the first to speak at the meeting.

He reviewed the points of agreement reached at that sixth meeting, and the other points on which the two sides were close to agreement, though not fully agreed upon, the question concerning the structure of the formal talks to discuss the basic issues and the question concerning the agenda. He then said that on the basis of the results produced so far, the two sides should wind up their discussions on the matters which remain unsettled, to report to our fellow countrymen as they prepare to usher in the new year, the happy news that a North-South joint parliamentary conference will soon be held. He clarified our side's position with regard to the question concerning the structure of the formal talks by saying that the pivotal questions that should be settled at the seventh meeting are: Should the formal talks to discuss basic issues be in the form of a congress or across-the-table bilateral talks, and how to set the agenda in a reasonable manner.

He said: In settling these questions, our main concern should be what is the best way to promote national unity.

When viewed from the standpoint of one and the same nation, leaving the idea of the North and the South aside, it is beyond dispute that a meeting in the form of a congress is superior to that of bilateral talks, with the two delegations talking to each other across the table.

If parliamentarians from the North and the South are to participate in the discussion of the issues with foresight, and equal obligations and rights as parliamentarians, then instead of sitting separately on opposite sides of the table, with the group from the South facing the one from the North, they should meet as a congress, and this in itself will serve as a forum for national unity.

The division of our country still pains our hearts, and at a meeting in which the parliamentarians from the North and the South are supposed to strive for national unity and reunification, it should not appear that they are parliamentarians from two different countries.

The reason we are calling for a meeting in the form of a congress is that we want to make the best use of the unique parliamentary method of conducting meetings as we discuss the question of national reunification and other problems concerning our nation.

Our senior delegate, Chon Kum-chol, revealing that the prospect of settlement is also in sight on the question of the agenda, clarified the position of our side as follows:

First, with regard to the question of nonaggression, an important issue, he said that at the last meeting, the South agreed to reduce this issue to the question of making a nonaggression declaration, so it will be possible for both sides to agree to include the question of disarmament and the step-by-step withdrawal of foreign troops in the nonaggression issue. In this way, the agenda can include "the question of issuing a joint declaration on nonaggression between the North and the South."

Speaking about whether or not to clearly spell out the question of resuming Red Cross talks and including economic talks on the agenda, he said: This question is included in the agenda item our side previously suggested under the rubric "The Question of Realizing Multifaceted Cooperation and Exchange Between the North and the South." The South Korean side, for its part, taking note of this, withdrew its demand at the second meeting; and subsequently, at the sixth meeting, expressed its basic understanding, with regard to this proposal, and suggested that the matter be disposed of by agreeing that it is covered by the agenda as proposed by our side. For this reason, I think all we have to do is just to settle the matter according to our proposal.

As a matter of fact, he said, multifaceted cooperation and exchange between the North and the South presuppose extensive negotiations and dialogues, the resumption of Red Cross and economic talks included, and it is anticipated that not merely simple personnel and material exchanges will take place, but also there will be a realization of such cooperation and exchange between the North and the South.

Therefore, he said, if the question of realizing multifaceted cooperation and exchange is set as an agenda item, naturally, the question of resuming Red Cross and economic talks will be dealt with as part of this agenda item without having to make it a separate item.

Another question over which the two sides are divided is that of whether or not to include the question of "summit talks" proposed by the South on the agenda.

We recognize no need to trouble ourselves to set this question on the agenda at a time when both sides, realizing the importance and necessity of summit talks, are making various efforts to realize these talks, and when in particular, high-level North-South political and military talks are to be held in which the preconditions for such summity will be set forth.

Chon Kum-chol continued: I think it is possible for us to wind up today the discussion on the question concerning the structure of the conference and the question of the agenda, paving the way for holding the opening session of the North-South parliamentary conference in the near future.

Senior delegate Chon Kum-chol then recalled that some time ago our side proposed that the North and the South hold high-level political and military talks to discuss the immediate problem of defusing the political and military confrontation between the North and the South. We also proposed to the South that the two sides hold talks to discuss the question of sending a single team to the 11th Asian Games opening in 1990, and that our side send a letter to the South inviting South Korean university students to attend the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students opening in Pyongyang next summer.

He said that thanks to these proposals from our side, we see brighter prospects for holding multichannel talks between the North and the South beginning next year. He added that both sides should make joint efforts to prevent these multichannel talks from taking all kinds of twists and turns.

He pointed out that one factor that could be a stumbling block to the opening session of the North-South joint parliamentary conference, or multichannel talks between the North and the South expected to be held next year, is "Team Spirit," a joint military exercise staged by the South Korean authorities jointly with U.S. forces in the early part of each year. He stressed that this exercise aggravates tension in the country and constitutes the greatest single immediate factor obstructing the improvement of North-South relations and blocking North-South dialogues. This exercise is directed at us as the potential enemy, and it is conducted as an offensive maneuver from beginning to end, with hundreds of thousands of troops participating.

He pointed out that if multichannel North-South talks, expected to be held after much complication, should again have to go through many twists and turns, or should not open at all on account of the "Team Spirit" military exercise staged in South Korea, then the settlement of the unification issue would be delayed accordingly, with North-South relations getting worse than ever. He then stressed that the responsible politicians in the North and the South, namely, our SPA deputies and the South Korean National Assembly members, should not look away from problems like this affecting the future of North-South dialogues.

Senior delegate Chon Kum-chol said: From this point of view, our side recognizing that the North-South parliamentary conference should naturally take up and discuss the question of suspending "Team Spirit," proposes that the question of suspending the joint "Team Spirit" military exercise be placed at the top of the agenda for the North-South parliamentary conference.

He pointed out that the demand of our side for placing this question on the agenda for the North-South parliamentary conference stems from our sincere desire to make the talks proceed smoothly and to improve North-South relations in a substantive manner. He said he earnestly hopes that the South Korean side will fully realize the purport of this proposal and come forward and agree to it in good faith.

However, in his keynote statement at the meeting, the senior delegate from the South went so far as to reverse the South's previous position which had allowed the reaching of an agreement at the sixth session, and created new serious obstacles to the discussion of the basic issues, thus bringing the talks back to square one.

With regard to the question concerning the structure of the formal meeting to discuss basic issues, he, again, mentioning "efficiency," "effectiveness," and "precedents," demanded that the structure of the talks be across-the-table bilateral talks. With regard to the question of the agenda, he said he was proposing an amendment, and again demanded that "the question of multifaceted exchange and cooperation between the North and the South, including the resumption of Red Cross and economic talks," "the question of a nonaggression declaration," and "the question of a summit meeting" be placed on the agenda.

In rebuttal to the reasoning of the South Korean side, insisting that the inter-Korea parliamentary conference take the form of across-the-table bilateral talks because the North and the South have different systems and ideologies, our senior delegate stressed that the South Korean side should strive to bring the nation, not the different systems and ideologies, to the fore. He also pointed out that the South's demand is out of accord with its recently professed policy to strive to turn from confrontation between the North and the South to the idea of "national community" and "national concord."

Stating that the demand of the South amounts a reversal of the previously reached agreements, he pointed out that an executive council and a joint steering committee are necessary only in the setting of a congress, and not in face-to-face talks between two delegations, that is, bilateral talks.

He stressed that the South should withdraw its unreasonable demand and use common sense.

Our delegates even told the new senior delegate from the South that before coming to the meeting, he should systematically study the points of understanding and agreement previously reached in the course of discussions between the two sides.

However, the South Korean side could not answer our questions; and with regard to our proposal that the question of suspending "Team Spirit" be placed at the top of the agenda for the formal meeting, it refrained from discussing it by saying it is a matter that should be discussed at the National Assembly.

In response, our senior delegate, Chon Kum-chol, explained the reason why our side has proposed for the first time that the question of Operation "Team Spirit," a joint military exercise, be placed at the top of the agenda for the North-South parliamentary conference. We had previously expected that the South would not stage this joint military exercise next year, but the South recently announced its plan to continue with the exercise next year. This is the reason we have made this new proposal, out of our deep desire to save the opportunity for North-South interparliamentary negotiations, and make them a reality.

He said that at a time when a formal North-South parliamentary conference is about to be held, the South Korean side, contrary to the expectation of the whole nation, intends to go ahead with "Team Spirit" as has been customary in the past, and this is a serious matter involving the fate of the conference. In order to save the negotiations, he said, we have no alternative but to make this proposal.

He then stated that in view of the changed reality, it is quite natural that we have proposed the question of suspending "Team Spirit" as a new agenda item. These days, he said, with multichannel North-South talks, such as high-level political and military talks, sports talks, and student talks, placed on the agenda, a clear prospect for holding them is in sight. To realize these goals, suspending large-scale military exercise like "Team Spirit," which stands in the way, arises as an urgent problem.

He also said that in view of the problems involving North-South interparliamentary negotiations, as well as in view of the responsibility of politicians, it is appropriate that the question of suspending "Team Spirit" be discussed at the interparliamentary conference on a priority basis.

"Team Spirit," he said, is dangerous, like playing with fire, and the people are demanding its suspension. He stated that it is quite natural that the parliamentarians responsible for the fate of the nation should direct their attention to this matter. Precisely for this reason, he said, we are proposing that this question be taken up and discussed as the first item on the agenda when the discussion of the basic issues begins.

Faced with the cogent logic of our side, the South Korean side has admitted that the "Team Spirit" exercise hangs heavy over the conference, and yet it has marked time by making all sorts of clumsy explanations.

To this, our side questioned the South Korean side closely about why it is planning to stage "Team Spirit," which is a joint offensive military exercise with us as potential "enemy." It is doing this while giving lip service to "peace" and the "relaxation of tension." He stressed that staging a war exercise jointly with foreign troops against their brothers is a national shame and it is high time to cease such behavior.

Rebutting the untenable demand of the South Korean side, our senior delegate clearly pointed out that in the past, our side had, time and time again, proposed to the South that talks be held to discuss the question of suspending "Team Spirit," but each time the South failed to respond.

Under these circumstances, he declared that to achieve peace and peaceful national reunification, our side, long ago, unilaterally suspended large-scale military exercises. Two years ago, it took a positive measure and detached 150,000 troops from the front line and military posts, and mobilized them into peaceful construction. Last year it unilaterally reduced its troop strength by 100,000. In saying this, he stressed that "Team Spirit" is a grave act of military provocation outraging the dignity of our nation, and precisely for this reason, our side will unwaveringly hold fast to its principled stand against this kind of military provocation.

After all, at today's meeting, no further agreement was reached on the question concerning the structure of the talks and the question of the agenda due to the untenable position and posture of the South Korean side.

It was agreed, however, that the eighth session will be held in the South's area of Panmunjom on 10 February.

Following today's meeting, our senior delegate Chon Kum-chol held a press conference at Tongilgak for domestic and foreign reporters.

Writers Seek Meeting With South Counterparts
SK1702051589 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean
0300 GMT 17 Feb 89

[“Open letter” from the Korean Writers League Central Committee to South Korea’s National Literary Writers Society]

[Text] An open letter to the South Korean National Literary Writers Society:

The news has reached us recently that after putting forth a proposal for convening a meeting of writers from the North, the South, and abroad for national reconciliation and reunification, your society has been making efforts to realize the meeting.

All the writers in the northern half of the Republic wholeheartedly welcome this proposal of your society's and rate it as an expression of patriotic will to contribute to national reconciliation and reunification.

Your society's proposal fully corresponds to our aspirations and efforts to have the writers from the North, the South, and abroad sit together and jointly explore ways of developing national literature and promoting national reunification.

As is widely known, driven by the conscience of writers who cannot ignore the tragic realities in which the period of division has been accumulating year by year, we have long proposed that writers from the North and South hold a meeting. In particular, in the second congress of Korean writers in 1956 and the inaugural meeting of the federation of Korean literary writers held later we put forward a concrete proposal on realizing talks between writers of the North and South.

However, our meeting has not been realized to date as a result of the aggravated tension and confrontation between the North and South across a wall of division.

Writers are the forerunners and guides of their own times and people. At a time when the entire population's ardent hope for national reunification is rapidly surging ahead and the situation at home and abroad is developing in favor of our national cause of reunification, strengthening national ties in keeping with the fellow countrymen's march toward reunification and blazing the path leading to reunification has emerged as a pressing demand for our writers that cannot be delayed.

We are convinced that now is the time for all the writers from the North, the South, and abroad, keenly aware of their mission borne before the nation, to sit together in a venue of talks to provide common guidelines for action.

Proceeding from such a point of view, we regard your society's proposal for convening a meeting of writers from the North, the South, and abroad as an appropriate one in terms of timing and express our full assent to it.

Hoping that the day when we can sit together with writers of the North, the South, and abroad will come sooner, we find the choice of either Japan or Panmunjom as a venue for a preliminary meeting and a full-dress meeting to be good.

If your society comes up with a detailed proposal concerning the working procedures arising in arranging a meeting of writers, we will be affirmative toward it.

The historic meeting of writers from the North and the South and the overseas compatriotic writers will be a significant meeting that contributes to developing national culture and to the cause of national salvation for reunification.

Respectfully yours,
[Signed] The Korean Writers League Central Committee
[Dated] 17 February 1989

South Students Attack Kwangju U.S. Center
SK1602115189 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1045 GMT 16 Feb 89

[Text] Pyongyang February 16 (KCNA)—More than 200 students today attacked again the "U.S. Cultural Centre" in Kwangju, a disgusting institution of the U.S. imperialists for ideological and cultural aggression, according to foreign press reports from Kwangju.

They thronged to the "U.S. Cultural Centre" in Kwangju with burning hatred for the U.S. imperialists and their stooges who turned Kwangju into a bloodbath, and briefly occupied the center's compound, smashing windows with rocks after driving off police, shouting "Drive out Yankees," "Down with No Tae-u," "Oppose Bush's visit to South Korea," and "Stop 'Team Spirit 89' joint military exercises." They clarified their stand of fight to citizens who were standing around, encouraging them. A student spokesman was reported to have said that they attacked the "U.S. Cultural Center" again to punish the United States, which masterminded the Kwangju massacre. "The United States must stop meddling in our affairs and close its cultural center here," he added. He demanded "Bush cancel his planned visit to Seoul," contending his planned visit to South Korea is designed to bolster what they call eroding support for the No Tae-u fascist "government".

In anti-U.S., anti-"government" leaflets exciting citizens scattered around the Kwangju cultural centre, while students' action was under way they demanded "Fall of No Tae-u 'government'" and "an end to the 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises".

It was reported that protesters have claimed the 'Team Spirit' joint military exercises heighten tension on the Korean peninsula and have urged the United States to close its military bases in South Korea.

This is the third attack on the "U.S. Cultural Centre" in Kwangju in the wake of the attacks on January 18 and 31 this year. The attack this time which took place right after the traitor No Tae-u, one of the main culprits of the Kwangju massacre visited Kwangju shows the firm determination of the Kwangju citizens and South Korean people not to pardon murderers of people in Kwangju and manipulators behind the scene, which made the blood of the U.S. imperialists and their stooges run cold.

No Tae-u's 'Suppressive Offensive' Denounced
SK1702091389 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0829 GMT 17 Feb 89

[“Reckless Sabre-Rattling of Military Gangsters”—KCNA headline]

[Text] Pyongyang February 17 (KCNA)—The traitor No Tae-u on February 14 cried that the rally and protest of over 15,000 peasants and students of South Korea held at the Yido Square in Seoul were an “illegal act” and “violent seditious demonstration” and that those who took the lead in the struggle and the “background forces” as well should be “searched out and dealt with by law.”

This shows that the No Tae-u group has embarked upon a brutal suppressive offensive to block the righteous struggle of the South Korean people, stresses NODONG SINMUN today.

The news analyst says:

The No Tae-u group which had resorted to appeasement under the veil of “democracy” fully revealed its true color as a military fascist dictatorial fanatic.

It is ill-boding that the puppets are concentrating the suppression on the dissident and student organizations such as the “National Alliance of the Movement for the Nation and Democracy” (“Chonminnyon”) and the “National Council of Student Representatives” (“Chondaehyop”), talking about “backstage relations” of the rally and protest of peasants in Yido. This tells that the puppets intend to prevent people from being united through fighting organizations of people of various strata such as “Chonminnyon” and “Chondaehyop” which the puppets regard as a thorn in their flesh, obliterate these organizations and “totally block” their progressive activities.

What is ridiculous is that the traitor No Tae-u said that he had “controlled himself as much as possible” and that he would not be a “moderate president any longer,” while mobilizing the suppressive forces in the sanguinary suppression of the people.

No Tae-u, who had run more wildly in suppression from the beginning of the year, said he would not be a “moderate president any longer” because his ugly color as a dictator was put out of the veil of “democracy” and brought to light. It means a declaration that he would openly mount an allout suppression, taking off an unbecoming veil.

The traitor’s fascist act is a last-ditch effort of a dictator driven to the corner.

South’s Interference in Chondaehyop Denounced
SK1502054089 Pyongyang KCNA in English
0526 GMT 15 Feb 89

[Text] Pyongyang February 15 (KCNA)—Papers here today denounce the South Korean puppets for interfering in the activities of the “National Council of Student Representatives” (Chondaehyop) which is independently pushing ahead with preparations for participating in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students.

A signed commentary of NODONG SINMUN says:

The “Committee for the Promotion of the Exchange of Visits Between Students” said that Chondaehyop’s participation in the Pyongyang festival should pass through a sort of gateway to “consultation”. Originally, the question of participation in the festival is a matter which should be decided by Chondaehyop, the party concerned, which received an invitation from the preparatory committee of the festival.

As for the “committee for the promotion of the exchange of visits between students” hurriedly organized after Chondaehyop’s participation in the Pyongyang festival is confirmed, it is a “government”-run reptile tool strongly opposed and rejected by students from the outset. Hence, it is not qualified to deal with the problem of patriotic students’ participation in the festival. This notwithstanding, it is taking issue with students’ participation in the Pyongyang festival under this or that pretext, poking its nose into this matter. This was manipulated by the South Korean authorities to insult and ignore patriotic students who are in the van of the anti-U.S. struggle for independence and the movement for peaceful reunification.

The South Korean authorities and their underlings should stop at once dastardly act in blocking the march of Chondaehyop towards the North to participate in the Pyongyang festival.

A commentary of MINJU CHOSON says:

It is an absurd act that puppets set a reptile tool in motion to obstruct Chondaehyop embracing broad South Korean students from participating in the Pyongyang festival.

No Tae-u ‘Fascist Clique Splittist Scheme’
SK1502154089 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1501 GMT 15 Feb 89

[Text] Pyongyang February 15 (KCNA)—NODONGJAUI KIL (ROAD OF WORKERS), a publication of the Inchon district federation of workers, carried an article exposing the splittist scheme of the No Tae-u fascist clique.

Noting that the fascist clique made much ado as if it were interested in “reunification”, talking about “reunification” and “dialogue” these days, the article says:

The No Tae-u "government" has no intention of taking practical steps for reunification, ceasing from the political and military confrontation between the North and the South. What it does seek is to invent topics through "finding out whereabouts of separated families" and "exchange" of culture and sports and to carry on trade under the pretext of "economic exchange".

The No Tae-u "government" is trying to realize "cross recognition" and "entry into the United Nations", while maintaining the structure of political and military confrontation for a long time.

The present "government" is, after all, seeking to perpetuate division.

Branding the "northern policy" advertised by the puppets as a product of the splitist policy aimed at "cross recognition", the article said that it would give rise to greater resistance of people with the passage of time.

Various Chongnyon Delegations Arrive in DPRK
SK1402152889 Pyongyang KCNA in English
1522 GMT 14 Feb 89

[Text] Pyongyang February 14 (KCNA)—A delegation of Chongnyon functionaries headed by Kwon Sun-hwi, director of the General Secretariat of the Central Standing Committee of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongnyon), a home-visiting group of the creative staff of the Kumgangsan Opera Troupe of Chongnyon headed by Yi Kap-chun, and a home-visiting group of Koreans in Japan headed by Kim Kwang-sik arrived in Wonsan by the ship "Mangyong" on February 13 for a visit to the socialist homeland.

They were met by officials concerned at the wharf.

*** S&T Research Essential for Development**
41100006 Pyongyang NODONG SINMUN in Korean
14 Dec 88 p 1

[Text] (Seoul, Naewoe Tongsin) North Korea recently paid policy attention to the development of electronics and automation industries, while adopting new measures to expedite these policies.

A Pyongyang broadcast reported that following the 14th plenum of the 6th party Central Committee held in late November, where a policy on the development of electronics and automation industries was introduced, the Government of North Korea on 15 December established the "Committee on Electronics and Automation Industries," an independent agency within the State Administration Council.

Following the party plenary session, North Korea held a series of rallies at plants and enterprises and published numerous articles in NODONG SINMUN, as well as

other propaganda media, emphasizing both the need for developing these industries, and the importance of achieving the announced party objectives.

North Korean news media reported that there was a serious discussion on the issue of electronics and automation industries at the party plenary session, where a policy decision regarding the details on promoting development of these industries was reached.

At this meeting, the need for increased production of consumer products such as televisions and tape recorders was pointed out, in light of increasing demand for domestic consumption.

It was reported that by recognizing the need for a reliable supply of computer parts such as integrated circuits and semiconductors as the main task for the development of electronics and automation industries, North Korea emphasized investment and technological advancement in these fields.

The North Korean broadcast further noted that in close connection with the machine tool industry, there was a concerted discussion on the training of needed technicians, while calling for improvement in the standardization, specialization, and regulation of designs.

Having pronounced a policy goal at the party plenary session, North Korea encouraged major plants and research units to hold mass rallies for achieving the announced objectives."

Mass rallies of this nature were held through mid-December at some 10 manufacturing or district plants, including the Mangyongdae Machine Tool Plant and the Unsan District plant and research units such as the Kim Il-song University and the Academy of Sciences. The rally at the Academy of Sciences held on 10 December was the most noteworthy.

Attending this rally were senior administrators and researchers from the machine control, the electronic computer, and the mechanical engineering research centers, including the director of the academy. At this rally, an appeal was made to actively promote research projects on economic automation, robotization, and computerization.

Specific direction and objectives were provided regarding research projects on manufacturing machine tools, electronics parts and materials, electronic computers, automated control devices, and robots for export. According to the North Korean broadcast, the "17 February scientist assault troop" and the "17 February scientist technician assault troop" were formed to achieve the announced objectives.

Through NODONG SINMUN and other propaganda media, North Korea encouraged increased investment in the development of electronics and automation industries while repeatedly emphasizing the importance of progress in these fields.

For example, NODONG SINMUN of 3 December reminded the readers of the Kim Il-song directives that high-tech industries should be operating on par with the world standard in the "next few years," while emphasizing the following: improvement of manufacturing processes and technology; establishing the manufacturing basis for integrated circuits used in computers and improving the existing facilities; accelerated training of scientists and technicians.

The editorial of this newspaper, dated 7 December, called for establishing measures to implement the objectives set forth at the party plenary session while promoting the construction of industrial facilities in these fields through increased investment. On the 14th, NODONG SINMUN published articles calling for renewed effort by the workers in related fields.

Subsequent to the pronouncement of policy objectives at the party plenary session, a series of coordinated steps such as mobilization of workers through rallies and establishment of an independent agency in the State Administration Council have been adopted to develop electronics and automation industries.

Reliable sources assume that the purpose of the "Committee for Electronics and Automation Industries" is to improve management of these fields, to execute investment and assistance projects effectively, and to actively encourage overseas capital and technology importation.

This new agency established in the State Administration Council is closely related to the recently established Ministry of Industrial Joint Ventures.

The Ministry of Industrial Joint Ventures established in the State Administration Council on 26 November (director Chae Hi-chong) is a reorganized expansion of the Bureau of Joint Ventures in the Department of Overseas Economic Projects. It is expected that this new agency will assume the overall control of all joint ventures and joint management projects with foreign nations.

In 1986 North Korea published an article in its promotional magazine, FOREIGN TRADE, which encouraged investment in North Korea in such high-tech fields as electronics (semiconductors and small computers), industrial robots, remote control devices, and machine tool industries. This article further requested that all inquiries regarding investment and other business aspects be directed to the Bureau of Joint Venture Projects.

In this investment guide, North Korea listed the following high-tech fields as appropriate for foreign investment: semiconductor industry including manufacturing plants for diodes, integrated circuits, condensers, and insulators, and the computer industry including the manufacture of electronic calculators and small computers; manufacture of consumer products such as electronic watches, tape recorders, videotape recorders, and remote control toys; and industrial robots, remote and automated control devices, and automated conversion devices.

Therefore, it can be concluded that the expanded reorganization of the Ministry of Industrial Joint Ventures which serves as a conduit for high-tech related foreign investment, along with the establishment of the Committee for Electronics and Automation Industries reflects the underlying desire and dramatic effort of North Korea to motivate and promote development in these fields.

Put another way, North Korea is making every effort, with strong administrative support, to induce importation of foreign capital and technology in electronics and automation industries.

Although North Korea at present is manufacturing semiconductors, integrated circuits, and automation parts and devices at the Pulryu-kang Electric (Song-chon, Pyongyang), the Moranbong Automation Devices (Pyongyang), and the 5 October General Automation Plant, it was only in 1985 that it first produced a prototype integrated circuit. In this area North Korea is still in an early stage of development.

Due to the underdeveloped status of the electronics industry, numerical control technology which constitutes the core of automation is lagging in its design and manufacture.

South Korea

Red Cross Spokesman Demands Resumption of Talks *SK1702044589 Seoul Domestic Service in Korean 0400 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] In a statement issued today, the spokesman for the ROK Red Cross expressed deep regret over the North Korean side's refusal of our side's proposal to hold the 11th round of North-South Red Cross talks in Pyongyang on 28 March and urged it to unconditionally respond to talks according to compatriotic love and the humanitarian spirit of the Red Cross if it is genuinely interested in solving the problem concerning dispersed families.

The ROK Red Cross noted that since the North Korean side unilaterally suspended the 11th round of talks scheduled to be held in Pyongyang on 26 February 1986 according to an agreement between the two sides, it has virtually avoided holding talks. The ROK Red Cross also

recalled that the "Team Spirit" exercise, the suspension of which the North Korean side raised as a precondition for resuming talks, is a defensive exercise and that North-South talks have been held even during the period of the exercise.

Along with this, the ROK Red Cross stressed: In view of the fact that Red Cross talks have been suspended for a long period of time, the urgent aspirations of dispersed families should be honored even before talks are resumed. In light of the humanitarian spirit of Red Cross, it is just for the two Red Cross societies to explore their own way for alleviating the sufferings of displaced families.

Lawmakers Question Pak Chol-on on Northern Policy
*SK1602012489 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
16 Feb 89 p 2*

[From the "Press Pocket" column: "Grilling of Pak"]

[Text] Assemblymen from both the ruling and opposition arrays criticized presidential adviser Pak Chol-on's unilateral decision-making on diplomatic orientation toward North Korea, the Soviet Union and China, which has been popularly called the northern policy package, during their interpellations yesterday.

Kim Hyon-uk of the ruling DJP [Democratic Justice Party] asked, "The government has harped on suprapartisan postures on diplomatic issues. But it has handled South-North exchanges and other inter-Korean matters without consulting the opposition. Is this a new style of suprapartisan diplomacy?"

Kim, chairman of the Assembly Foreign Affairs-Unification Committee, stressed that diplomatic policies should be based on the consensus of the people.

Pak Sil of the largest opposition PPD [Party for Peace and Democracy] accused Pak Chon-on, a prosecutor-turned adviser to President No Tae-u, of lacking diplomatic credentials and thus being unqualified to carry out the crucial mission.

Chong Chae-mun of the RDP maintained that domestic politics should be given a higher priority than rapprochement with the East bloc, viewing that diplomatic overtures would lose international trust without the support from the people at home.

The oppositionists claimed that the administration's aggressive northern policy is aimed at diverting public interest from knotty domestic political issues to foreign relations.

Yi Sang-ha, a journalist-turned government party lawmaker, also showed concern about rapid appeasement with socialist countries which he said is drastically melting down the hitherto strong anti-Communist sentiment. Anti-communism is still a valid top state policy.

Caution Urged in North Festival Participation
*SK1502005889 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
15 Feb 89 p 6*

[Editorial: "Student Bid to Pyongyang Rally"]

[Text] A student delegation is expected to visit North Korea for the first time since the Korean division following the end of World War II, now that the authorities concerned have decided to send the delegation to participate in the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students slated for mid-July in Pyongyang.

This is indeed a noteworthy development since the students' visit to the North became a grave issue with regard to the opening of discussion of the national unification problem.

However, we should not overlook the reality that the nation is split over the pros and cons of the students' visit. True, there are positive and negative sides to student exchanges with North Korea.

Though the controversy as to whether or not to send the student delegation is likely to terminate due to the latest decision, another round of squabbling is expected to be touched off over the size and formation of the delegation as the Committee for Promotion of South-North Student Exchanges and Chondaehyop, the National Council of Student Representatives, are reportedly at odds on the matter.

Reports have it that the national promotion committee, largely representing the government authorities is considering sending some 200 students to the Pyongyang rally, while Chondaehyop, one of the largest radical student organizations, insists on its own 500-strong delegation.

In principle, inter-Korean relations can be improved through the promotion of dialogue and exchanges in a variety of areas, not just on political, military, economic and social problems. This is because mutual exchanges provide opportunities to promote understanding of each other so as to ease mistrust and conflict, the first step in a farsighted approach to the achievement of national reunification.

However, the minimum requirement is that our side should be aware of the real feature and purpose of the Pyongyang festival. The North Korean festival features political forums, cultural and artistic as well as sports events with major focus on political forums.

Needless to say, apparently greatly envying the successful Seoul Olympic games, the North Korean regime is bent on attempting to eradicate North Korean inferiority by successfully hosting the July festival in Pyongyang.

We must take note of the fact that the Pyongyang rally is aimed at solidifying the global struggle by socialist organizations against what they call imperialism as long propagandized by Pyongyang itself.

This alone eloquently speaks of the real color of the Pyongyang festival, indicating that it is nothing but a political and ideological world event, far different in nature from the Olympics, Universiad and other non-political sports and cultural events that take place transcending all differences in ideologies and systems.

In this context, we should realize clearly that Pyongyang is fully abusing what should be a festival as an opportune arena to trumpet socialism in an offensive denunciation of capitalist states.

The North Korean rulers are likely to propose their hackneyed calls for the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea, a Koryo confederation of the two Koreas and the discontinuing of Team Spirit, the annual Korea-U.S. defensive military exercise in a sustained attempt to cause sociopolitical unrest in the South.

The sponsors of the Pyongyang festival are also expected to initiate the adoption of a communique proclaiming anti-Americanism and anti-Seoul policies for purposes of political maneuvering.

As to the formation of our delegation, Chondaehyop, though it is the only student body explicitly invited by North Korea, must abandon its prejudicial demand for exclusive representation of South Korean students, because they cannot deny there are many other student organizations in the country.

Our students who will visit Pyongyang as members of the delegation to the youth and student festival must be astute and circumspect so that they are not used as mere tools of Pyongyang's political propaganda but prove themselves to be fair-minded intellectuals critical of the reality in both the South and North.

They will hopefully advocate the crucial need for territorial reunification of the divided fatherland and attest to the superiority of free democracy over socialist systems. In addition, it is our hope that they will get access to the true picture of North Korea by witnessing the falsehood of communism, a system adopted in the North.

DJP official on North's 'Psychological War'
SK1402011289 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 14 Feb 89 p 2

[Report by staff reporter Sim Yong-su on "recent" interview with Pak Chong-su, member of the DJP Central Executive Committee, by THE KOREA HERALD: "Hopes of Early Improvement in South-North Ties Premature, DJP (Democratic Justice Party) International Affairs Expert Opines"—place of interview not given]

[Text] Seventeen years ago, Yi Hu-rak, then head of the Central Intelligence Agency jolted the nation with a bomb shell announcement that he secretly visited Pyongyang to meet Kim Il-song.

This first-ever known contact between south and north Korea had a megaton effect stirring up the entire nation with expectations that the cold war era might be ending on the Korean peninsula.

Yi was the first known south Korean government official to set foot on the frozen land of archrival north Korea since the peninsula had been divided into the democratic south and communist north in 1945.

Nurturing popular expectations, Red Cross officials on both sides met in Seoul and Pyongyang over several months to discuss mail exchanges and visits by families who had been separated in the Korean war.

But the excitement was short-lived and the north unilaterally called off the talks.

The incident made clear to the south that north Korean leaders could not be trusted.

With emotions high, the south vented its anger proclaiming that they had been cheated by the north.

Seventeen years later, similar hopes of unification prevail following Chong Chu-yong's recent visit to Pyongyang to discuss economic cooperation.

Effectively fanning popular passions in the south the north has made numerous peace gestures, one after another in recent months, though its true intentions should be naturally questioned in view of its past practices.

Contrary to the public's expectations about current inter-Korea relations, many government officials well informed on north Korean affairs look at the latest developments with cautious eyes, refraining from being outspoken in order not to dampen the popular excitement.

Pak Chong-su, a leading ruling party lawmaker, is among those who refuse to hold onto optimism about the prospect that both Koreas will significantly improve relations, except maybe economically.

A member of the ruling party's Central Executive Committee, the 56-year-old Pak diagnosed the north's latest peace initiatives as part of its psychological war to expel American troops from the country.

The north has bent on deceiving the south with the illusion that "unification is just in sight and the only obstacle is American troops stationed in the south," Pak told The Korea Herald in a recent interview.

Pyongyang's psychological war is primarily directed at radical youths who claim that ideology would not matter if the peninsula were united, said Pak, also head of the party's national Policy Evaluation Committee.

The north apparently has decided that its long-cherished goal of unifying the peninsula by force is no longer feasible, the ruling party's north Korean affairs expert said.

But Pyongyang has yet to give up hope that the southern government will break down through internal conflicts, such as those between workers and employers, and the government and radical college student activists, Pak said, adding that the north will soon find its hope misplaced.

The north's strategy is evidenced by its sudden suspension of talks to arrange the first meeting of prime ministers and lawmakers of both sides, said Pak.

Pyongyang boycotted Friday's scheduled talks at Panmunjom to discuss the first full-scale lawmakers' conference, demanding that Team Spirit, the annual ROK-U.S. military exercise, be cancelled.

"The north wants to bide its time to await what it hopes will happen in the south," Pak told the interview.

Pak said that the north should reconsider its strategy.

"From a long perspective, relations between the south and north should be bettered. It will be an inevitable phenomenon," Pak said.

Pyongyang, he said, will soon find it hard to maintain its status quo of confrontation with the south, because of its economic troubles and international pressure.

Pyongyang's two key allies, the Soviet Union and China, are becoming increasingly intolerant of the north's isolationist policy and militaristic posture against the south, Pak said, citing his talks with Soviet leaders during his visit to Moscow last September.

Pak said that he visited Moscow for four days on his way back home from attending the 1988 general meeting of the International Parliamentary Union in Sofia.

However, he said, it will take time to improve political relations, though burgeoning economic exchanges will eventually spill over to the political arena.

Pak said that economic exchanges between both sides will become very active within two to three years.

"The south has little to gain from economic exchanges with the north, but we should promote it in the spirit of helping the north," the ruling party lawmaker said.

On the prospect of a summit meeting of south-north leaders, Pak said that it is certainly the best way for a breakthrough in inter-Korea relations but it is hard to predict when it will happen at this stage.

If the meeting is to be successful, he said, both sides should make thorough preparations.

Pak said that the south needed to bargain and compromise with the north to improve the relations, but withdrawal of American troops should never become a subject of bargaining.

"We cannot and should not bargain our security and survival with the north under any circumstances," Pak said.

The north's demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the south, Pak said, is aimed at severing the relations between the south and the United States.

Once American troops leave here and the ROK-U.S. defense alliance shakes, Pak said, it will have a profound impact on the south's security as well as foreign policy, not to mention its "northern policy."

Pak said that Seoul's that Seoul's northern diplomacy, referring to its effort to improve relations with socialist countries, is firmly based on its defense alliance with the United States.

"If our relations with Washington weaken, the East-bloc nations will have no reason to regard us as important as at present," the ruling party's Central Executive Committee member said.

Contrary to widespread concern, Pak said, the government's northern policy has helped the south build a closer alliance with Washington.

But, he admitted that Washington was somewhat weary of Seoul's "hasty" moves to open relations with socialist nations.

"Washington's worry is that Seoul's fast moving relations with the East bloc might lead to a breakdown in the balance of military power between the West and the East," he said.

Pak also played a role in improving relations between Seoul and the East bloc.

He is to visit Budapest on March 13 to attend the 1989 meeting of the IPU and to inaugurate the friendly co-parliamentary council of south Korea and Hungary.

Police Seek Four Dissidents for Yoido Violence
SK1702010289 Seoul *THE KOREA TIMES* in English
17 Feb 89 p 3

[Text] Prosecutors and police probing Monday's massive violent protest by farmers intensified their investigation into 50 farmers who were booked on charges of organizing the rally and instigating the violence.

Police interrogated about 370 farmers across the country. Of them 50 were still in police custody for questioning on how they organized farmers' rally, prosecutors said yesterday. The other 320 were released.

The number of farmers detained by police breaks down to 24 in Chollapuk-to, eight in Chungchongnam-to, six in Kangwon-to, and three each in Kyonggi-to, Chungchongpuk-to, Chollanam-to and Kyongsangpuk-to.

Among the 28 farmers taken away by police at the scene of the violence, only Ki Ung-so, 29, of Asan, Chungchongnam-to, and So Yong-tae, 24, of Kwangju were arrested.

An arrest warrant for Yi Chae-yol, 22, was refused by a judge at the Seoul District Criminal Court as he turned out to be a mere participant in the rally with no previous criminal record.

Seventeen were referred to summary courts yesterday and two were booked without physical detention. Four others were sent to the Yimsil Police Station.

Senior Prosecutor Kim Ki-su said that about 20 would be arrested on charges of violence. "Our effort is focused on arrest of four dissent leaders, alleged masterminds of the Yoido rally."

The four wanted by prosecutors are Ms. Yi Yong-sun, 40, co-chairwoman of Chonminnyon (National Alliance for Democratic Movement); Yim Chong-sok, 21, acting chairman of Chondaehyop (National Council for Student Representatives); Yun Chi-yong, 51, chairman of the Catholic Farmers Association, who also leads farmers' groups opposing irrigation tax; and Yi Yu-nin, leader of red pepper farmers' groups.

Three of the four are presumed to be taking refuge at the office of an opposition political party in Seoul, said prosecutors.

The prosecution is also seeking 16 militant farmers who get together at the Taejon office of the Catholic Farmers Association for the rally planning.

Kang Cha-chung, 42, of Yimsil, Chollapuk-to, is also sought after by police on suspicion of providing about 200 bamboo spears for the rally. Police sought the delivery of Kang from the Catholic Cathedral in Yimsil as he is taking refuge there.

Prosecutors said Kang directed village farmers to make about 300 bamboo spears and he himself carried 200 to the Monday rally.

After questioning leaders of local chapters of the Catholic Farmers Association which was responsible for the mobilization, prosecutors said about 80-100 million won was used for the rally.

Sources of financial support have not been revealed yet, and prosecutors suspect that most of the expenses came from "outside forces."

It was also learned that 927 members of the Catholic Farmers association and 182 members of the Christian Farmers Association took part in the rally.

Editorial on Yido, Northern Policy
*SK1702014089 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 17 Feb 89 p 8*

[Editorial: "Challenges in Our Midst"]

[Text] We face many grave challenges that require our sagacity, insight and resolve for their solution; fundamentally interwoven, miscarriage of any one of them could impair the nation's viability.

The violent farmers' protest rally in Yido a few days ago added to the already confused political spectrum bogged down in the liquidation of the previous administration's legacies and President No Tae-u's interim evaluation. All this seems pushed aside in the nation's giddiness over the rapid implementation of the government's northern policy.

Labor disputes, conspicuous since the liberal outcries of 1987, remain ripe for another outburst this spring. The specter of real estate speculation looms in the frantic search for apartment houses in urban areas. Fear of inflation is growing, creating a risk to economic stability.

In a sense, these challenges follow the nation's divorce from the authoritarian inertia which gripped it for so long. The term "growing pains" may be applied to explaining our present situation. Certainly, such pain, if well treated, promises improvement. Yet it could prove fatal, if not dealt with properly.

Invariably, the surging movements are one in demanding, in the advocates' words, warranted rights intrinsic in democratic values. Herein lies the question of how to harmonize those idealistic demands with existing requirements in a non-egoistic manner. This is to say, the question lies in how to make the most realistic choice, not out of paranoia, but using a balanced approach.

The government seems determined never to allow such a violent protest as the Yido rally again. Indeed, few people, though sympathetic with the farmers' motives, agreed with their resort to violent extremism. Nonetheless, radical supporters of the Yido protest say that the righteous demands of the farmers have long gone unnoticed and, therefore, they had no choice but to become violent to draw attention.

Whatever their real motives, disrupting social order in a breach of the laws of land cannot be justified so long as they believe in the value of democracy. At the same time, we wonder if the government has done its best to take care of the rural people, who have been somewhat overwhelmed by the rapid pace of industrialization. The

government's resolute crackdown on violent, unlawful demonstrations must be accompanied by better efforts to work out more practical agricultural policies.

Any political party, unless it favors a farmers' revolution, should become less ambiguous: catering to all sides could result in losing all. We understand the ruling Democratic Justice Party's situation; the National Assembly could be controlled by the combined opposition parties. However, this does not mean the ruling camp should try and avoid its responsibility, passing the buck to the rival camp. The opposition, too, should be aware of their responsibility when they hold the parliamentary floor.

The Assembly is currently in a session which will prove crucial to setting the pace of the nation's future. A renewed sense of accountability is required of all parties. It is the time for them to display political capability and maturity to make the Assembly a real forum in solving the nation's problems.

All parties, even taking into account their specific political positions, appear to be exceedingly partisan. The opposition parties, despite their rhetoric of devotion to caring for the people's welfare, seem inclined to politicizing issues. The ruling camp, some suspect, lacks far-sighted strategic goals and the resolve to undermine the politicking. Safeguarding the safety and well-being of our society is the paramount responsibility of the government. However, this does not simply mean using force to crack down on nuisances. Keeping public confidence in its aims is the fundamental ingredient. To this end, the ruling camp needs to enlist broader popular support for its ruling philosophy, not its style.

Undeniably, the government's northern policy, as well as its positive approach toward north Korea, have provided a fresh front in its diplomacy tailored for East-West detente. In actuality, however, this has brought about new challenges: how to keep the people aware of the need for national security; and keeping in check fantastic expectations which may not necessarily bring about substance to match.

At this juncture, we need to pause to see if we have not somewhat neglected developing more practical relations with our traditional allies while riding on the Nordpolitik bandwagon. While we have been engrossed in domestic conflicts, other countries have taken this opportunity to overtake our industrial advantage.

None of these challenges should be allowed to go unmet. A suprapartisan consensus, possible despite pluralistic diversity, will surely lead to solutions. A fresh approach fitting democratic modus vivendi, not patterned after the old habits, is in order.

Popularity of No Tae-u, 3 Kims Compared
SK0902014389 Seoul *WOLGAN CHOSON* in Korean
1 Feb pp 172-184

[Article by O Su-yong: "Popularity of No and the Three Kims"]

[Text]

Popularity Decline Since Presidential Election

How does popular support for the four political parties and their presidents vary with the whirlpool of changes that have befallen Korean society since the Assembly elections? Surveys designed to monitor the popularity of political party leaders are conducted routinely in democratic countries, and when a government announces a new policy, it is also common practice to quickly conduct a survey to gauge public reaction and then fine tune the policy to reflect the popular will. Over the past 20 years, however, it has been difficult for us to conduct surveys to determine what the people were thinking and how they were reacting, and in any case poll results could not be made public.

We are very lucky that this dark era has passed, that an era has now arrived in this country—however tardily—in which we can freely ask questions about a serving president and his ruling political party, and the people can freely answer. We will now turn to an examination of materials produced by academic institutes and the Gallup organization through objective surveys conducted since the April 1988 Assembly elections. Our purpose will be to determine what changes have occurred in popular support levels for President No Tae-u and party presidents Kim Tae-chung, Kim Yong-sam, and Kim Chong-pil.

In the 1987 presidential election, President No received 36.6 percent of the vote, party president Kim Yong-sam, 28 percent; party president Kim Tae-chung, 27 percent; and party president Kim Chong-pil, 8.1 percent. In an opinion poll conducted seven months later, however, these levels of popular support had fallen significantly. According to a joint poll conducted on 15 July 1988 by the CHOSUN ILBO and the Gallup organization, popular support had dropped for them, to 31.4 percent for President No; 21.7 percent for Kim Tae-chung; 12.4 percent for Kim Yong-sam; and 13.1 percent for Kim Chong-pil.

A number of noteworthy developments influenced popular support levels in the months following the presidential election. President No Tae-u's popular support fell from the 36.6 percent he won in the presidential election to 31.4 percent in July 1988 despite a wide variety of democratic measures introduced by the president. This drop in the president's personal popularity probably was caused by social turmoil triggered by the June 1988 North-South student talks issue, and also by the effects of political disorder as well.

Even more shocking than the drop in President No's popularity was the plunge in Kim Yong-sam's personal support levels, to the extent that Kim's popularity dipped below that of all three of the other political leaders. Reunification Democratic Party [RDP] President Kim Yong-sam won 28 percent of the vote in the presidential election, so it was disastrous when the July poll revealed that Kim's popular support had tumbled to a meager 12.4 percent. Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD] President Kim Tae-chung had won 27 percent of the vote in the presidential election, but the July survey revealed that his support rate had also fallen, to 21.7 percent. In spite of the overall trend—the leaders of all three major political parties had lost general popular support—the July survey revealed that New Democratic Republican Party [NDRP] President Kim Chong-pil's support rate had jumped sharply, to 13.1 percent from the 8.1 percent he had managed to win in the presidential election.

The CHOSUN ILBO and the Gallup organization conducted another joint survey of public opinion on 2 December 1988. The pollsters used the same methods employed in July and again measured levels of popular support for the same four political party leaders. This time, however, the survey came after the Olympic games of September and October and after the subsequent National Assembly hearings and the intense publicity about Fifth Republic scandals. Respondents were asked, "Of the present leaders of the four political parties in Korea, who do you think is the best political leader, No Tae-u, Kim Tae-chung, Kim Yong-sam, or Kim Chong-pil?" The results are shown at figure one. President No's level of support continued to slip after the July poll, reaching 28.7 percent. Kim Tae-chung's support increased slightly, to 23.2 percent, while Kim Yong-sam's support increased significantly, to 15.4 percent, putting him in third place. Kim Chong-pil's support level remained virtually unchanged, at 13.3 percent.

**Figure One: Popular Support for the Four Party Leaders
(in percent)**

Dec 87	Jul 88	Dec 88
No—36.6	No—31.4	No—28.7
KYS—28	KTC—21.7	KTC—23.2
KTC—27	KCP—13.1	KYS—15.4
KCP—8.1	KYS—12.4	KCP—13.3

Dec 87 ; Presidential election on 16 December 1987.

Jul 88 ; 15 July CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup poll.

Dec 88 ; 2 December CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup poll.

No; No Tae-u

KTC; Kim Tae-chung

KYS; Kim Yong-sam

KCP; Kim Chong-pil

24.9 Percent Say "We'd Vote for a New Face."

The most striking characteristic of the 2 December poll was that President No's support fell precipitously even as popular support for the leaders of the three opposition parties was increasing. The reasons why support for the opposition leaders rose while support for a sitting president plunged included the influence of the Fifth Republic scandals issue, the problem of former President Chon Tu-hwan, and the airing of various improprieties at the National Assembly hearings.

Another survey was conducted to gauge the levels of popular support for these same four leaders but using questions which differed somewhat from those used in the CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup joint polls. The methodology produced different results. Sogang University's Media Culture Research Center conducted a survey on 10 December 1988 of a selected specimen of 1,500 registered voters from across the nation. The following question was asked to measure popular support for the four political party presidents. "In the event that a presidential election were held under present circumstances, for whom would you vote?" The five choices listed for this question were 1) No Tae-u, 2) Kim Tae-chung, 3) Kim Yong-sam, 4) Kim Chong-pil, and 5) someone else. Of the respondents, 22.7 percent chose No Tae-u; 21.5 percent, Kim Tae-chung; 16.5 percent, Kim Yong-sam; 13.2 percent, Kim Chong-pil; and 24.9 percent chose someone else.

The surprising characteristics of this survey were first that no political leader won all that much support from the respondents for the highest office in the land and that, in fact, the highest response rate, 24.9 percent, was given not to any of the four leaders at all, but amounted to a vote for a new political face, someone else. This was a significant change.

Although only 22.7 percent of respondents in the 10 December survey said they would vote for the incumbent president, there are a number of explanations for President No's low rate. First, and most convincing, respondents who were dissatisfied with President No's policies or the results of his administration could have refused to vote for him again. Secondly, however, part of the low rate of support may have resulted from the psychological impact of an existing constitutional prohibition against a second presidential term. Many of the respondents, of course, were aware that the Constitution barred voting for a sitting president.

As we saw above, the joint poll conducted by the CHOSUN ILBO and the Gallup organization on 2 December 1988 revealed a 28.7 percent support rate for President No, yet Sogang University's Media Culture Research poll conducted only eight days later revealed a much lower 22.7 percent support level. The variance between these two figures may be blunt evidence that significant divergence in survey outcomes can result from the different ways questions are put to respondents.

One urgent concern is that the popular support rates for the three opposition leaders were exceptionally low. The chances are good that four years from now Kim Tae-chung, Kim Yong-sam, and Kim Chong-pil will challenge for the presidency. The survey revealed, however, that Kim Tae-chung received a mere 21.5-percent support rating from the Korean people, and yet his was the highest rate of the three.

And even more significantly, 24.9 percent of the citizens polled prefer an entirely new political face. The three opposition leaders must look squarely at what the people want, and in the future they must formulate policies that will boost their support from the people, and they must undertake to buff their images, or if neither of these, then they would appear to be in need of some kind of grand, dramatic political move.

President No Popular With Women

Where is the support base of the four political leaders? Who, from what segment of society supports these men? What is the regional distribution of their support? Let's first review support levels among males and females.

Based on the data in Table One, President No enjoys a much greater degree of support from females than from males. Although President No's support among men dropped significantly between the survey conducted on 15 July and the poll conducted on 2 December, his support rate among women changed very little. This clearly reveals the strong confidence and continuing support President No enjoys among women.

Table One: Changes in Support for the Four Leaders, by Sex (Gallup polls, in percent)

	No Tae-u		Kim Tae-chung	
	15 Jul	2 Dec	15 Jul	2 Dec
Male	26.7	22.1	23.7	24.6
Female	36	35.1	19.7	21.9
Total	31.4	28.7	21.7	23.2

	Kim Yong-sam		Kim Chong-pil	
	15 Jul	2 Dec	15 Jul	2 Dec
Male	13.7	17.5	15.5	14.3
Female	11.2	13.5	10.8	12.3
Total	12.4	15.4	13.1	13.3

This pattern emerged from the 10 December 1988 survey conducted by Sogang University's Media Culture Research Center, and suggests that President No's charm (his softness) appeals more to females than to males.

President Kim Tae-chung enjoys more support from men than from women. When his support rate climbs, for example, it increases at about the same rate among

both men and women. President Kim Yong-sam's case is very similar. His support rate is higher among males, very much higher in the December poll than in the July poll. President Kim Chong-pil's support rate is also higher among men than among women. When his popularity falls, it drops at about the same rate among both sexes, and when it rises, it climbs at about the same rate with both sexes. These data suggest that President No is the only one of the four leaders to have a higher proportion of female fans.

How does support for the four political leaders differ among citizens of divergent age groups? Which leader do young people prefer? At Table Two are displayed support rates for the four leaders, broken down by age group. The PPD's Kim Tae-chung enjoys a very high rate of support among young people in their 20s.

Table Two: Support for the Four Party Leaders, by Age Group (Gallup polls, in percent)

	20s		30s	
	15 Jul	2 Dec	15 Jul	2 Dec
No Tae-u	26.7	19.7	30	30.6
Kim Tae-chung	25.3	30.1	21.8	25
Kim Yong-sam	15.1	22.3	13.6	15.5
Kim Chong-pil	11.9	12.3	17.4	15.3
	40s		50s	
	15 Jul	2 Dec	15 Jul	2 Dec
No Tae-u	34.6	31.8	37.5	32.8
Kim Tae-chung	17.8	16.9	19.1	19.8
Kim Yong-sam	9.8	13	9.3	10.7
Kim Chong-pil	14.5	15.8	9.5	10.1

In the July poll, only a single percentage point separated the rate of support among respondents in their 20s for President No (26.7 percent) and for Kim Tae-chung (25.3 percent). But in the December poll, Kim Tae-chung had emerged as the clear leader among citizens of this age group, with a 30.1 percent support rate, more than any of his rivals.

The RPD's Kim Yong-sam came in second, polling a 22.3 percent support rate among those in their 20s. NDRP president Kim Chong-pil's support among this group increased modestly between the July and December polls. Although support for all three opposition leaders increased among respondents in their 20s because of the Fifth Republic scandals issue and the political heat generated by the Assembly hearings, the survey revealed that only President No lost ground with this age category.

A different pattern emerges as we turn to examine results of that segment of the population in its 30s. President No enjoys the highest support rate among respondents in this category. Moreover, he managed to sustain virtually the same support rate—about 30 percent—in December that he had received in July, despite the fact that the

Fifth Republic scandals issue and the National Assembly hearings whirlwind intervened between the two surveys. Kim Tae-chung enjoyed the next highest level of support from those in their 30s. He earned 21.8 percent support from them in July, but by December this had risen sharply, to 25 percent. Kim Yong-sam's support in this category was extremely low. In July his rating among respondents in their 30s was 13.6 percent, lowest of the four political party leaders. By December, his rate had inched up, to 15.5 percent, allowing him to break out of last place. Even so, he only just managed to nose ahead of Kim Chong-pil's 15.3 percent.

The "Fifth Republic Scandals" Exert Immense Influence on Popularity

What relationship exists between educational levels and support for the leaders of the four political parties? Which leader does the best educated segment of society support? Table Three data reveal changes in popular support rates for the leaders of the four political parties, broken down by the educational level of respondents. In general, the less educated citizens were more likely to support President No. By contrast, the more educated citizens tended to support Kim Tae-chung.

Table Three: Support for the Four Leaders, by Educational Level (in percent)

	Primary school		Middle school	
	15 Jul	2 Dec	15 Jul	2 Dec
No Tae-u	34	36.4	35.7	25.4
Kim Tae-chung	21.7	20.4	21.8	24.3
Kim Yong-sam	9.3	10.1	9.7	18.1
Kim Chong-pil	10.2	11	13	15.4
	High school		College	
	15 Jul	2 Dec	15 Jul	2 Dec
No Tae-u	31.2	27.7	19.4	16.1
Kim Tae-chung	19.6	24.2	25.7	26.7
Kim Yong-sam	15.3	18.2	18.5	18.8
Kim Chong-pil	17.1	14.6	12.3	13.5

Among those with less education, respondents who graduated only from primary school, survey results suggest that political developments, such as the Fifth Republic scandals issue or the National Assembly hearings, did not appreciably affect preferences. Those who comprise this category can be said to have little interest in politics.

In the July poll, respondents with only a primary school education gave President No a 34-percent support rating, and despite the intervening Fifth Republic scandals and the hot winds howling out of the Assembly hearings, the December poll revealed that this group's support for President No actually increased, to 36.4 percent. Among all other educational categories, however, support for the

president plunged significantly between July and December. After President No, more of the least educated citizens support Kim Tae-chung, while Kim Chong-pil enjoys the lowest level of support from this category.

We note with interest that political issues like the heat from the Assembly hearings and the Fifth Republic scandals do not exert appreciable influence on the least educated category of citizens. We believe that non-political factors may influence people in this category to decide to support one or another of the four political leaders.

President No also enjoys more support from among those who graduated from middle school or high school than do the other three political leaders, and Kim Tae-chung receives the second highest level of support from these categories. Among those who graduated only from middle school, the Fifth Republic scandals issue apparently played a significant role in causing President No's popularity to fall even as it caused opposition leaders' support levels to rise. Interestingly, the surveys reveal that Kim Yong-sam's support among these middle-school graduates increased more than did those of the other opposition leaders, probably due to the Assembly hearings and the Fifth Republic scandals issue. In the July poll, support for Kim Yong-sam among middle-school graduates was only 9.7 percent, putting him in the cellar in the esteem of this category, but the December poll revealed that his support among middle school graduates had almost doubled, to 18.1 percent.

Among those who graduated from college, we find a pattern diametrically opposed to the one we've been reviewing. In this category, Kim Tae-chung enjoyed the highest support rate in the July poll (25.7 percent), followed by President No and Kim Yong-sam, with Kim Chong-pil bringing up the rear. But in the December poll, the order had changed significantly. Kim Tae-chung still led, but now he was followed by Kim Yong-sam, with President No in third place, and Kim Chong-pil still dead last. President No's support among college educated citizens fell precipitously in the period between the two polls. Among the college educated, political issues like the Fifth Republic irregularities had the greatest negative impact on the incumbent president. A significant contradiction, however, is that while this educational category withdrew support from President No, it did not increase its support for the opposition leaders.

Severe Political Regionalism

During the 1987 presidential campaign and the ensuing National Assembly elections, the leaders of the four political parties revealed severe regional cant, and friction among the country's various regions deepened. After the elections, the media's various branches expressed deep concern and regret over the situation, and also advanced recommendations for improving rampant regionalism.

Now that a number of months have passed since the elections, concern about regionalism has surfaced everywhere, and many concrete suggestions for improvement have been advanced. Let's review the changes that have occurred in regional support for the presidents of the four political parties to determine how severe political regionalism remains today.

As the data displayed at Table Four reveal, changes in the post-election domestic political situation powered significant changes in regional support rates for Korean political leaders. One of the most obvious changes is that support for Kim Tae-chung and Kim Yong-sam plummeted in the Seoul area just as support for Kim Chong-pil increased dramatically there. President No also lost support in Seoul, but despite a general downward trend elsewhere, President No's drop in popularity in Seoul was not significant.

Table Four: Changes in Support for the Party Leaders, by Region (in percent)

	No Tae-u		
	16 Dec Elec	15 Jul Poll	2 Dec Poll
Seoul	29.5	27.4	25.9
Kyonggi	40.3	42.7	33.6
Kangwon	57.9	35.4	53
Chungchong	32.2	37.3	19.3
Cholla	9.5	7.3	5.1
N. Kyongsang	66.8	44.4	49.8
S. Kyongsang	35.9	30.7	30.1
Kim Tae-chung			
	16 Dec Elec	15 Jul Poll	2 Dec Poll
Seoul	32.1	22.1	23.2
Kyonggi	21.7	15.5	21.3
Kangwon	8.6	8	10.5
Chungchong	11.6	7.6	6.5
Cholla	86.1	86	83.8
N. Kyongsang	2.4	3.5	2.5
S. Kyongsang	5.4	5.5	5.5
Kim Yong-sam			
	16 Dec Elec	15 Jul Poll	2 Dec Poll
Seoul	28.8	14.8	12.7
Kyonggi	27.6	13.6	19
Kangwon	25.5	23.3	8.4
Chungchong	19.5	9.4	14.1
Cholla	1.2	0	1.4
N. Kyongsang	26	10	8.9
S. Kyongsang	52.8	19.1	34.9
Kim Chong-pil			
	16 Dec Elec	15 Jul Poll	2 Dec Poll
Seoul	8	15.9	13.6
Kyonggi	8.5	15.4	10.6
Kangwon	5.3	4.8	16.1
Chungchong	33.7	30.4	37.5
Cholla	0.5	1.6	2.9
N. Kyongsang	2.3	8	8.7
S. Kyongsang	2.5	11.8	11.6

Kim Tae-chung won 32.1 percent of the votes cast in the Seoul area in the 16 December 1987 presidential election, the highest percentage of any of the four candidates in Seoul. In the 15 July 1988 survey, however, Kim's support in the capital region had slipped dramatically, to 22.1 percent. He recovered slightly due to the Assembly hearings, reaching 23.2 percent in the 2 December 1988 poll. Kim Yong-sam's support pattern in Seoul was similar. He won 28.8 percent of the capital's votes in the presidential election, but dropped precipitously in the July survey, to 14.8 percent. Kim's decline continued in the December survey, reaching 12.7 percent and placing him dead last in the Seoul area.

By contrast, Kim Chong-pil's rate of support in Seoul increased sharply. Although Kim won only eight percent of Seoul's votes in the December presidential election, his rate almost doubled, to 15.9 percent, when the July poll was taken. Kim enjoyed a similar Seoul area rating (13.6 percent) in the December poll. President No won 29.5 percent of the votes cast in Seoul in the presidential election, and his support had slipped only marginally, to 27.4 percent, in the July survey, and continued a slow decline, reaching 25.9 percent in the December survey.

Kim Chong-pil Up Everywhere But Chungchong

The numbers clearly reveal that except in Seoul political regionalism is not diminishing, as support for the four main political leaders remain polarized along regional lines. Kim Tae-chung received only a very few votes in North Kyongsang (2.4 percent) and South Kyongsang (6.4 percent) areas in the 16 December presidential election, and in these regions his popularity remained at about the same levels in the July and December surveys: 3.5 and 2.5 percent in North Kyongsang; 5.5 and 5.5 percent in South Kyongsang. In the Cholla region, however, Kim's support remained absolute. Kim Tae-chung won 86.1 percent of Cholla's votes in the 16 December presidential election. At 86 percent, his support rate in the July survey had not budged a whit. Conducted after Assembly hearings had been underway for some time, the December poll revealed that Kim's support was on a downward trend in Cholla but only slightly, falling to 83.8 percent. These data suggest that in the final analysis Cholla bias for Kim Tae-chung since the presidential election has continued unabated.

Regional bias against Kim Yong-sam persists. In the presidential election, Kim won a mere 1.2 percent of Cholla's votes. In the July survey conducted seven months later, amazingly, not a single Cholla person preferred Kim Yong-sam as a political leader, resulting in a zero support rate for Kim in the Cholla region, the only time any of these surveys returned a zero. Happily, Kim Yong-sam's support rate returned to 1.4 percent in the December poll.

In 1987's presidential election more citizens from the South Kyongsang area voted for Kim Yong-sam than for any other candidate. But Kim's support there fell

sharply. He won 52.8 percent of the South Kyongsang area's votes in the presidential election, but the July survey revealed that his support had plunged to a mere 19.1 percent, an astonishing drop. No other leader experienced such a stunning reversal in support from his native region. Luckily the Assembly hearings reversed the trend, as the December survey revealed that Kim had made up much of the lost ground, rebounding to 34.9 percent.

Kim Chong-pil also enjoys a high rate of support in his native Chungchong region, and his support there does not seem to fluctuate with changes in the political situation. In the Chungchong area, Kim's popularity is only marginally higher than it was during the presidential election, but outside Chungchong, Kim is in the enviable position of enjoying a rate of popular support significantly higher than he won in the presidential election.

In contrast to Kim Chong-pil's rising support levels, popular support for President No has fallen everywhere. His support plummeted even in his native North Kyongsang area (to 44.4 percent from 66.8 percent) and also dropped in the Chungchong region as well.

RDP Popularity Up; Democratic Justice Party Popularity Down

Popular support for the four political party leaders has fluctuated sharply with vicissitudes in the political situation. One explanation for this is that variations between survey outcomes and the actual support won by the four leaders in the presidential election were caused by possible sampling aberrations in the two surveys. Another explanation is that residents of the various regions grew disappointed with the policies and performance of the political leaders.

The level of popular support for the four presidents of the political parties is linked very strongly to the role each leader's party plays on the political scene, and especially the roles deputies of each party played in cleaning up Fifth Republic scandals, in maneuvering over the issue of what to do with former President Chon Tu-hwan, in the North-South student talks issue, on the issue of forgiving debt owed by farmers and fishermen, and above all the deputies' performance during the Assembly hearings. If a party's assemblymen performed in the hearings in such a way as to fulfill popular expectations, then the deputies enjoyed media coverage and public praise. In that event, the people naturally bestowed an increased measure of confidence and support on the president of their party. But if a party's deputies did not fulfill popular expectations during the hearings, the survey revealed that the party president forfeited a measure of popular support, even among the residents of his native region.

Ultimately, the popular support and popular prestige a leader enjoys is related to his personal persuasiveness and to the content of his character. But a political leader's popularity and prestige are also greatly influenced by the actions of his entire team, the role played by his party as distinct from himself.

Changes in popular support levels for the four parties are recorded at Figure Two. In the 15 July 1988 poll, conducted just 3 months after the National Assembly elections, the PPD received the highest rate of support, at 24.1 percent. The RDP followed, at 21.1 percent; then the Democratic Justice Party [DJP], at 17.9 percent; and the NDRP brought up the rear, at 15.2 percent. But remarkable changes were under way by the time a new survey was conducted at the end of October 1988 by Seoul National University's [SNU] Social Science Research Center. This poll revealed that support levels were down slightly for all parties except the RDP. In the July survey, the RDP was in third place among the four parties, but in the October poll the RDP jumped into second place (19.7 percent), hotly pursuing the leading PPD (22.5 percent).

Figure Two: Changes in Support for the Four Parties (in percent)

15 July Gallup	20 Oct SNU	2 Dec Gallup	10 Dec Sogang
PPD 24.1	PPD 22.5	RDP 25	RDP 30.1
DJP 21.1	RDP 19.7	PPD 21.2	PPD 23.7
RDP 17.9	DJP 19.6	DJP 14.6	DJP 13.3
NDRP 15.2	NDRP 12.3	NDRP 11.7	NDRP 12.6

In the 2 December 1988 combined CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup survey, the RDP overtook the PPD to move into first place, with a 25 percent support rate. In that poll, the PPD garnered a 21.2 percent support rating, somewhat lower than the party had received in July. In the poll conducted on 10 December 1988 by Sogang University's Press Culture Research Institute, the RDP earned its highest ever rate of support, 30.1 percent. In this poll, the PPD's support level was also up marginally over the 2 December results, but not nearly as much as the RDP.

In direct contrast to the rising level of popular support for the RDP and PPD over the last few months, the NDRP's and DJP's support levels have trended generally downward, although at somewhat different rates. The DJP suffered the most extreme decline in support. Each poll conducted since April 1988's Assembly election revealed a sharp drop in the DJP's popular support.

The surveys conducted on 2 and 10 December, when the 1988 Assembly hearings were nearing an end, revealed that DJP popular support had fallen to levels difficult for a ruling party to accept, to 15.6 and 13.3 percent respectively. Without fear of overstatement, it seems fair

to say that these rates are the worst imaginable. The NDRP was also unable to rally support levels significantly higher than those of the DJP. This is not as serious a problem for the NDRP, of course, since it is not the ruling party. The DJP, however, is the ruling party and because the party is faced with President No's impending interim assessment, such low support levels can only serve to further dishearten the party.

In July 1988, before the Assembly hearings on issues like the rapacity of former president Chon Tu-hwan's relatives and the larger problem of general corruption in the Fifth Republic, no significant difference existed among the popular support enjoyed by the four political parties. Of course, one party was on top and another was on the bottom in a clear order of preference, but no extreme differences prevailed. But after Fifth Republic scandals began to be considered in the Assembly hearings and relayed throughout the country on live television, the impact hit the ruling party with all the swirling impact of a gale, sending popular support for the DJP plunging downward. By contrast, the RDP and PPD played the role of spokesmen for the people's pent-up discontentment and began to enjoy increasing popularity for their trouble. The PPD expected that the Kwangju issue would boost its popularity significantly, but RDP Assembly deputies stole the show during televised hearings aimed at exposing Fifth Republic scandals, triggering a very broad increase in popular support for the RDP.

President Kim Yong-sam Fusses Most

Two salient facts emerge as changes in the domestic political situation over the last year have triggered corresponding changes in popular support levels for the political parties.

First, the DJP suffered a heavy blow, as the Fifth Republic scandals issue gouged heavily into its popular support. DJP President No Tae-u's personal popularity, however, did not drop comparably. His levels are down, to be sure, but President No has maintained his position at the front of the other three party leaders, and scored a 28.7-percent support rating even in the 2 December survey, which was conducted at a moment when the Assembly hearings had continued for weeks. That same poll revealed, however, that the DJP had plunged from first place to third among the four parties, with a terrible 14.6 percent support rating.

Even as the people withdrew confidence and support from the DJP, they visited no significant injury on President No. His personal character and charm may have served to insulate him to some degree from the corrosive wind howling out of the Assembly hearings. And perhaps the office of the presidency itself may screen the incumbent from such onslaughts. Part of the explanation may be that President No's measures for democratization, the success of the northward policy, and the series of successes in the North-South dialogue

may have insulated him from the impact of both the Fifth Republic scandals and the strong onslaught boiling from the Assembly hearings.

The second salient fact to be gleaned from the changes in support for the political parties over the past year is that while the RDP itself has enjoyed the people's support and affection, RDP president Kim Yong-sam, the brains behind the party, has fallen behind his party's popularity. Each survey has shown an increase of popular support for the RDP, with the 2 December and 10 December polls revealing that the RDP had moved into first place among the four parties. Kim Yong-sam's popularity simply has not kept pace with this rise. The CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup joint survey conducted on 2 December 1988 revealed that the RDP enjoyed 25 percent of public support, placing it at the forefront of all the parties. But the same poll showed that Kim Yong-sam's personal popularity reached only 15.4 percent, leaving him in third place among the four party presidents.

Support for the RDP Spread Evenly Among All Age Categories

How must we interpret this situation? President Kim Yong-sam received 28 percent of the vote in the December 1987 presidential election, leading Kim Tae-chung by a single percentage point. Yet after the election, popular support for Kim Yong-sam deteriorated consistently.

The Korean people have continued to support the RDP but not the RDP's president, at least to the same extent. The problems seems to lie in President Kim's leadership style, the management of his image, and policy formulation. In principle, to win high levels of popular support, a political leader must develop personal charm, find forums from which to display leadership ability, and put together an enduring image as a dynamic leader.

The base of support of each political party is identical to the base of support of each party president. Like President No's, the DJP's base of support may be found more among females than among males. The other three parties enjoy much greater support from among men than from among women. This trend holds for each of the three opposition party presidents as well.

Let us review support for the four parties on the basis of educational levels. The DJP has a high level of support from the less educated, but enjoys only six to eight percent support levels from among college graduates.

By contrast, both the PPD and RDP enjoy very broad support from among the more educated segments of society. The RDP garners 30 to 38 percent support from among college graduates. The PPD doesn't do quite as well, but wins 23 to 27 percent support from this category. The NDRP receives the most support from

among those whose educational level is in the middle range, with very weak support levels among those in the lower educational categories and also among university graduates.

Analyzing party support by living standards, the DJP and PPD enjoy support from among those with lower standards of living, while the RDP and NDRP have carved out very wide support among those whose standards of living fall in the middle and at the high end of the spectrum.

Let's now turn to Table Five to review data on how changes in the political situation have impacted on the preferences of the various age groups. Based on the data in Table Five, the DJP's major support lies with those over 40 years old, while the DJP enjoys relatively little support among those in their 20s and 30s. A preponderance of the support for the PPD and RDP, if not the NDRP, in fact, is concentrated in those in their 20s and 30s. BOT

Table Five: Changes in Support for the Four Parties, by Age (in percent)

	DJP			PPD		
	15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec	15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec
20s	15.8	9.1	7.4	30.2	28.9	25.6
30s	16.2	13.5	11.7	24.5	22.7	25.5
40s	22.1	15.2	15.4	20.1	14.1	23.1
50s	33	20.6	21.7	17.5	18.1	19.5
	RDP			NDRP		
	15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec	15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec
20s	22	33.9	33.4	13.3	10.5	9.8
30s	21.8	29.2	31.5	19	15.7	13.8
40s	16.1	22.3	30.8	18	11.7	13.6
50s	9.1	14.4	23.3	11.9	8.7	14.2

15 Jul; CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup joint survey.

2 Dec; CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup joint survey.
10 Dec; Sogang University's Media Culture Research Center poll.

Once the Assembly hearings had begun to divulge Fifth Republic scandals, changes began to appear in the base of support of the four political parties. In the case of the DJP, the 15 July survey showed a 15.8 percent support rate from among respondents in the 20s, but that support began a precipitous decline with the onslaught of the Assembly hearings, falling to only 7.4 percent in the 10 December survey. Those in their 20s held back their support not only for the DJP, but also from the PPD. In the 15 July survey, the PPD enjoyed a 30.2 percent support rate among respondents in their 20s, more than any other party, but this fell to 28.9 percent after the Assembly hearings, and continued to fall, reaching 25.6 percent.

In direct contrast to this pattern, the RDP received only 22 percent support from among those in their 20s in the 15 July poll, but this jumped sharply, to 33.9 percent, after the Assembly hearings.

Support for the DJP among respondents in their 30s, 40s, and 50s also declined as Assembly hearings progressed. At the same time, support from this generation for the RDP continued to increase. The RDP was notably successful in winning broad support from among those in their 40s.

What pattern of regional support undergirds the four political parties? What changes were wrought in regional support rates by the Assembly hearings' investigations into Fifth Republic scandals? Let's look for answers to these questions to the data displayed in Table Six. The data in Table Six reveal a pattern similar to that found at Table Four, "Changes in Support for the Party Leaders, by Region." The asymmetrical regional support behind favorite-son parties which characterized the December 1987 presidential election prevails today. Although the DJP enjoys a high level of popular support in the North Kyongsang area, the party cannot garner more than a very tiny slice of support from the Cholla region (5 to 2.3 percent). By contrast, the PPD maintains an extremely high level of support in Cholla (87.5 to 74.7 percent). The PPD, however, has not been able to win any more than marginal support from the North Kyongsang or South Kyongsang areas (5.6 to 1.7 percent).

Table Six: Changes in Support for the Four Parties, by Region (in percent)

	DJP		
	15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec
Seoul	13.7	7.3	12.8
Kyonggi	28.2	13.5	21.4
Kangwon	28.8	22.8	11
Chungchong	25.1	11.7	7.1
Cholla	5	2.5	2.3
N. Kyongsang	38.1	29	25.4
S. Kyongsang	19.1	22.6	14.3
	PPD		
	15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec
Seoul	28.2	22.1	18.4
Kyonggi	15.7	20.6	26
Kangwon	13.8	14.5	15.9
Chungchong	8.3	5.9	10.9
Cholla	87.5	74.7	77.7
N. Kyongsang	3	1.7	3.7
S. Kyongsang	5.6	3.9	2.4
	RPD		
	15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec
Seoul	22	30.8	34.4
Kyonggi	20.6	26	27.1
Kangwon	18.9	14	31.7
Chungchong	11.3	14.7	27.6

		DJP	
15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec	NDRP
Seoul	13.7	7.3	12.8
Cholla	0.5	3.1	3.6
N. Kyongsang	14.1	19.3	36.1
S. Kyongsang	30.5	49.3	61.4
	15 Jul	2 Dec	10 Dec
Seoul	19.1	11.9	9.6
Kyonggi	19.2	14.5	13.8
Kangwon	14.6	12.7	17.1
Chungchong	32	31.2	33.9
Cholla	0.3	1.1	3.1
N. Kyongsang	13.7	10.5	12.3
S. Kyongsang	9.2	6.3	4

15 Jul; CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup joint survey.

2 Dec; CHOSUN ILBO-Gallup joint survey.

10 Dec; Sogang University's Media Culture Research Center poll.

Neither the NDRP nor the RDP is excluded from this pattern of asymmetrical regional support. The NDRP maintains a very high level of support in the Chungchong area, and the RDP continues to receive a very high rate of support in the South Kyongsang region.

Regional Support Rates Resist Change

Support for the DJP is very weak in the Seoul area. Although the party logged a 13.7 percent support rate there in the 15 July poll, this had fallen sharply in the 2 December survey, to 7.3 percent. The 10 December poll revealed a rebound, to the 12.8 percent level. Whatever the actual numbers, the ruling party enjoys a very low rate of support in the nation's capital, causing many problems for the DJP.

Even in the North Kyongsang region, where the DJP turned in its top performance in the December 1987 presidential election, the Fifth Republic scandals issue triggered a drop in DJP popularity, to the 25.4 percent level in December following 38 percent in July. The same sort of popularity decline occurred in the Kyonggi, Kangwon, and Chungchong regions, dropping the DJP into third place among the four parties.

By contrast, support levels for the RDP have increased in Seoul and every other region of the country. RDP support is up even in Cholla, although the numbers are minute indeed. Happily for the RDP, popular support in the South Kyongsang region, where the party enjoys its highest level of support, has virtually doubled since the 15 July survey, surging to 61.4 percent. This sharp increase in South Kyongsang support may be attributed to RDP Assembly deputies' sterling performance in the Assembly hearings.

In the Seoul area, the DJP suffers the lowest support levels of the four political parties, followed by the NDRP, while the RDP enjoys the highest rate of support. The RDP's performance in the Assembly hearings accounts for its very broad support in Seoul.

Popular support for the political parties and their leaders is bound to vary with changes in the political situation. No political party and no political leader can perpetually maintain a high rate of support. When popularity levels fall, then the question is why, what caused the people to withdraw support. That party and that political leader who always tunes his ears to the people's voice, who respond to what the people want, to the policies they prefer, this is the politician who is a democratic leader, and this is the party in harmony with the Korean people.

When a political leader appears in Korea who reacts to a drop in his own popularity and a plunge in the support rate of his party not with discontent, but instead with a humble pursuit of the cause and then reflects the results of his new grasp of the popular will both in party policies and his personal leadership style, then the time will have arrived in this country when the bud of participatory democracy will fully flower.

NDRP Head Urges 3 Kims Meeting To End Chon Probe

SK1402020189 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
14 Feb 89 p 2

[Text] Kim Chong-pil, president of the New Democratic Republican Party [NDRP], proposed yesterday that the leaders of the three opposition parties, including him, hold a meeting shortly to discuss how to conclude the parliamentary activities of probing evil legacies of the past regime.

He said he hoped the opposition leaders would meet as soon as Kim Tae-chung of the Party for Peace and Democracy returns home (Friday) [17 February] from his European tour.

The president of the smallest opposition party, who came home from his two-week U.S. trip Sunday, however, said that "I see no need to have an exclusive meeting with President No Tae-u at present."

He cited that President No "rejected all demands of the opposition camp during his talks with Kim Yong-sam of the Democratic Reunification Party" on Saturday.

"It is regrettable for President No to have turned down the opposition calls (in the meeting with Kim Yong-sam)," he said.

The opposition forces have called for, among others, the introduction of a special prosecutor system to investigate the irregularities of the past Fifth Republic ruled by Chon Tu-hwan and the testimony of ex-presidents Chon and Choe Kyu-ha before the National Assembly hearings.

He said that the opposition leaders could discuss again their stances on the pending issues following No's unchanged policy.

DJP Says 'Direct Dialogue' With People Sought
*SK1602070189 Seoul YONHAP in English 0649 GMT
16 Feb 89*

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 16 (YONHAP)—The government will seek "dire dialogue with the people" if the opposition refuses to conclude probes into the previous administration's misdeeds at an early date, a top ruling party official said Thursday.

"We should not remain stuck in the past any longer, but should set forward-looking politics on the right track," said Pak Chun-kyu, chairman of the Democratic Justice Party [DJP].

"If the opposition does not agree with us to complete the activities of the National Assembly panels at an early date, we cannot help bringing about a turning point for them through direct dialogue with the people," Pak, the No. 2 man after President No Tae-u in the party's hierarchy, told a meeting of the Korean Human Development Research Institute at a downtown Seoul hotel.

His remarks were construed as an expression of the ruling circle's determination to conduct an interim appraisal of No's presidency linked to his performance in liquidating the negative legacies of the Chon Tu-hwan government.

The interim evaluation, which could force No to step down before the end of his five-year term, is a major political headache for the No government.

Pak hinted that the Nation Assembly may be dissolved if No fails to win the interim appraisal.

"If the people rule in the confidence vote that the government's decisions are wrong, all lawmakers from the ruling party will resign," he said.

Dissolution of the Nation Assembly would be unconstitutional, but the resignation of all ruling party lawmakers would inevitably force the dissolution and necessitate general elections.

Reform Continues With Dissolution of Committees
*SK1602061989 Seoul YONHAP in English 0546 GMT
16 Feb 89*

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 16 (YONHAP)—South Korea, moving ahead with social reforms, is to abolish the Social Purification Committee and the Korea Anti-Communist League.

The Purification Committee, a hallmark of the past regime of former President Chon To-hwan, was set up in 1980 by then military strongman chon to consolidate his power base as well as to handle "purification jobs" such as prohibition of private tutoring.

The Anti-Communist League is being dissolved because of Seoul's improved relations with communist countries, including North Korea, a government spokesman said Thursday.

"The league will be replaced by the tentatively dubbed 'Korea Free General League,' which will consist of almost all civil organizations that support a free democratic society," he said.

Report on Hyundai Workers Occupying Store
*SK1402005089 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 14 Feb 89 p 3*

[YONHAP report]

[Text] Ulsan, Kyongsangnam-to—Hardline unionized workers of Hyundai Heavy Industries Co. occupied the Diamond Hotel and Hyundai Department Store for about one hour yesterday. The two establishments are run by the Hyundai Business Group.

A crowd of about 1,000 Hyundai workers seized first the hotel from the first to the 12th floor at 3:20 p.m.

Foreign and Korean guests were evacuated from the hotel.

Another group of shipyard workers broke into the department store some 200 meters from the shipyard, blocking business.

The protesters prevented other workers from working in the shipyard.

The militant workers dispersed at 4:30 p.m.

No casualties or clashes were reported as police did not intervene.

On Monday, management tried unsuccessfully to resume operations at the shipyard in the face of stiff opposition from about 3,000 workers, who have presented management with several demands, including the reinstatement of fired workers.

Defense Contractor Fires Labor Union Leaders
*SK1502012489 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
15 Feb 89 p 2*

[Text] The Daewoo Precision Industries, a major defense contractor in Yangsan, Kyongsangnam-to, reportedly dismissed three labor leaders including the chairman of the firm's trade union in connection with labor strife yesterday.

The defense contractor, a subsidiary of the giant Daewoo Group, has undergone labor turmoil over the past three months.

The company fired chairman Yi Song-to, Cho Hyon-ho and Kim Pyong-hyon, both deputy chairmen, who had been arrested on charges of violating the labor regulations that apply at defense contractors. The Labor Law allows the workers at the defense-related firms to organize trade unions but not to go on strike.

The firm disciplined two unionized laborers including Yun Myong-won for their involvement in strikes.

Government Seeks To Reform Land System
*SK1502021689 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 15 Feb 89 p 6*

[“News Analysis” by staff reporter Chang Il-yong: “Government Attempting To Reform Land System To Stamp Out Speculation”]

[Text] The government's attempt to fundamentally reform the nation's land system is now under way, based on the concept of “public” land possession

The concept was first introduced last August as a part of a government measure to cope with the rampant real estate speculation that swept the nation.

The government now feels the necessity of expanding the concept to solve problems related to land ownership and to eradicate exaggerated real estate speculation.

A research committee to introduce the concept of public land possession was launched last September with 35 members, led by Hu Chae-yong, president of the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements.

Hu said yesterday that the expansion of the concept is now inevitable because the supply of usable land is limited. Land prices are excessively increasing. Profits from land development is too privatized and too much of the nation's land is possessed by too few people, he added.

According to the Ministry of construction statistics, the nation's per capita land area is 2,386 sq. meters, compared with Japan's 3,096 sq. meters.

Exclusive of forest and arable lands, usable lands are only four percent of the total territory of the nation, in comparison with Japan's seven percent.

Limited land resources naturally leads to the limited supply of usable land, while demand for land has consistently increased with urbanization and industrialization.

Under such circumstances, the introduction of the concept of public land possession is urgently required, he said.

The demand for land increased from 3,329 sq. kilometers to 3,700 sq. kilometers in 1970 and to 4,250 sq. kilometers in 1980. It will rise from 4,908 sq. kilometers to 7,262 sq. kilometers by 1991, the ministry said.

Land prices have also consistently risen since the 1970s, far surpassing the increase level of commodity prices.

Entering the 1980s, the gap expanded as the commodity prices were stabilized due to the government's strong policy to restrain consumer prices.

During a period from 1975 to 1987, land prices increased 6.5 times, in comparison with housing prices at 4.0 times, wholesale prices at 3.6 times and the national gross product at 2.8 times, showing a flow of money into land purchases.

The excessive rise of land prices has resulted in the distorted distribution of the limited land resources among people, while creating a vicious circle leading to the increase of speculative demand for land.

The increase of land prices has also raised the cost for public projects, thus threatening price stabilization.

The portion of housing site prices steadily increased from 17.8 percent in 1975 to 24.2 percent in 1985, according to the ministry figures.

The portion of land prices in construction of public roads also sharply increased from 6.2 percent in 1979 to 18 percent in 1983 and 35 percent in 1987.

In addition, the privatization of profits from land development, which accompanied the increase of income without labor, has created and deepened social and economic evils.

For instance, change of land usage has led to the drastic increase of land prices, creating windfall profits.

When the usage of natural green area is changed into that of a housing site, land prices increase 2.35 times; the commercial area 2.73 times; and the industrial area 2.32 times, the ministry said.

The extreme privatization of the profits from developing land is mainly due to the imperfection of the current governmental system.

The committee recommended that the government introduce a system under which windfall profits from land development will be absorbed by the government for public projects.

The introduction of a ceiling on housing sites, as recommended by the committee, is also required, he said.

Regulations on the sale of forest and cultivated lands are also required, the committee said in its recommendation to the government.

Currently, only five percent of the total population own 65.2 percent of total private lands across the country. The five percent population possess 57.7 percent of private lands in Seoul, 72.3 percent in Pusan, 72.6 percent in Taegu and 71.9 percent in Songnam.

In the case of forest lands, the upper five percent own 84.1 percent of those lands, the ministry figures showed.

The ministry figures also showed that only 28.1 percent of total households in Seoul own land, 33.1 percent in Pusan, 38.3 percent in Taegu, 30.1 percent in Inchon and 22.1 percent in Songnam, in comparison with their house ownership ratio of 58.7 percent in Seoul, 55.4 percent in Pusan, 53.0 percent in Taegu, 59.8 percent in Inchon and 44.1 percent in Songnam.

The land possession of corporations is also too preponderated with only 10 of the 1,109,540 corporations having 11.9 percent of corporation lands, it said.

PPD's Kim Tae-chung May Postpone Moscow Visit
*SK1402010589 Seoul THE KOREA HERALD
in English 14 Feb 89 pp 2, 5*

[From the "Out and About" column: "Visits to Moscow"]

[Text] Opposition leader Kim Tae-chung said over the weekend that he may postpone his planned trip to Moscow if it appears that both ruling and opposition leaders will be visiting the Soviet Union at the same time in March or April.

Kim, president of the Party for Peace and Democracy [PPD], made the remarks while meeting reporters in The Hague, the Netherlands.

Kim was referring to the planned visits by Pak Chun-kyu, chairman of the ruling DJP [Democratic Justice Party], and Kim Yong-sam, president of the opposition Reunification Democratic Party, who are to visit Moscow in March and April respectively.

"It is not desirable that the ruling and opposition party leaders should compete with each other to visit Moscow, with which Korea has no formal diplomatic ties, and which has a differing ideology as well," he said. Kim Tae-chung has a standing invitation to visit Moscow from a leading Soviet academic research institute in April.

Government Invites Ministers From Mideast, Bloc
*SK1402014989 Seoul THE KOREA TIMES in English
14 Feb 89 p 6*

[Text] The government will invite 15 ministers from Communist and Middle East nations to the 11th International Road Federation (IRF) World Meeting slated for April 16-21 in Seoul, it was learned yesterday.

Sources at the Construction Ministry and the Korea Highway Corporations said the invitations signed by Minister Pak Sung will be directly mailed to his counterparts of the 15 nations, including the Soviet Union and China.

The sources said the countries the ministry will extend invitations to include most East European nations, such as Yugoslavia, Hungary, East Germany, and Iran, Iraq and Libya.

It will be the first time that a Korean minister has directly extended invitations on a large scale to his counterparts in countries with which Korea has no diplomatic relations. Korea exchanged diplomatic offices with Hungary last month.

The organizers, however, said North Korea's invitation will be delivered through the Geneva-based world federation.

According to the sources, ministers who deal with road construction and transportation from the 15 nations will be invited to the Seoul meeting.

The IRF conference will draw more than 2,000 foreign experts in road, construction, transportation and other road-related instruments and facilities, and 500 domestic specialists.

The sources said Korean contractors will establish contacts with the high officials of the invited nations to secure a stepping stone or to obtain orders in their nations.

The Communist and Middle East ministers' appearance here will provide a fantastic opportunity for Korean contractors to diversify their markets overseas, the sources said.

KFTA Seeks To Open Liaison Office in China
*SK1402021889 Seoul YONHAP in English 0205 GMT
14 Feb 89*

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 14 (YONHAP)—The Korea Foreign Trade Association (KFTA) hopes to open a liaison office in China by June at the latest to gather information on the country's market, a KFTA official said Tuesday.

The official said 10 KFTA officials, headed by No Chin-sik, vice chairman of the association, have been in China since Feb. 11 to meet with officials from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) and the China International Trust and Investment Corp. (CITIC).

The KFTA delegation is also discussing plans to station permanent liaison officers in Liaoning Province as well as at the head offices of CCPIT and CITIC in Beijing.

The official said the liaison office will be affiliated with KFTA's locally incorporated company in Hong Kong, not with the head office in Seoul.

Amid increasing trade and talk on direct investments between South Korea and China, KFTA first sought the establishment of a liaison office late last year in preparation for opening a trade office in China, the official said.

The office is expected to help domestic companies, which suffer from insufficient information on the Chinese market, he said.

Trade Minister To Visit West Europe

*SK1402070689 Seoul YONHAP in English 0652 GMT
14 Feb 89*

[Text] Seoul, Feb. 14 (OANA-YONHAP)—South Korean Trade and Industry Minister Han Sung-su leaves Wednesday for a series of meetings with trade ministers of three West European nations.

During his 11-day trip, Han will visit Belgium, Austria and the United Kingdom to discuss trade cooperation, joint investment and joint advancement into East Bloc countries.

Han is also scheduled to meet officials of the European Commission and GATT to improve economic ties.

In London, Han will explain Korea's efforts to balance trade: in Vienna, he will emphasize the importance of mutual cooperation for expanding trade with East bloc countries: and in Brussels and at the European Commission he will propose talks on alleviating trade friction.

Burma

Commission Reveals 'Election Timetable'

*BK1602155189 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese
1330 GMT 16 Feb 89*

[“Announcement No 194 of the Commission for Holding Multiparty Democratic General Elections, dated 16 February—11th day of the waxing moon of Tabodwe, Burmese Era 1350—Regarding Announcement on Work Program and Timetable for Holding Multiparty Democratic General Elections”]

[Text]

1. The commission has been relentlessly working to prepare for holding free and fair multiparty democratic general elections, as wanted by the people.
2. The commission in carrying out its work has drawn up a work program and timetable to ensure systematic procedures for the holding of the general elections.
3. The attached work program and timetable for holding multiparty democratic general elections is hereby announced as the chairman and representatives of the State Law and Order Restoration Council [SLORC] and representatives of the commission have consulted and agreed on the work program and timetable.
4. By 24 February 1989 the SLORC and the commission are to finalize their consultations on the draft people's assembly election law contained in the work program and timetable No 1 hereby announced in order to present the draft election law to the people and political parties for their suggestions and opinions. The draft law, with revisions based on suggestions, will be presented to the people and political parties by 1 March 1989 together with explanations to solicit suggestions and opinions from the people and political parties.

Signed by order: Aye Maung, secretary.

The timetable contains:

1. Solicitation of suggestions and opinions from the people and political parties, following the announcement of the draft people's assembly elections law, will require a period of 1 month and estimated time is election time [yway-yet] minus 14 months. Election time means the date of the election.
2. Submission of the draft law to the SLORC, if there are any amendments to be made after compiling the suggestions and opinions from the people and political parties, will require a period of 1 month and estimated time is election time minus 13 months.
3. Enactment of the people's assembly election law by the chairman of the SLORC will require 1 month and the estimated time is election time minus 12 months.

4. Drawing of the draft people's assembly election rules, based on the enacted people's election law, and for the commission to make rules, will require 1 month; the estimated time is election time minus 11 months.
5. Enactment of the people's assembly election rules after scrutiny by the commission will require 1 month; the estimated time is election time minus 11 months.
6. Drafting and announcement of directives based on the people's assembly election rules and by-laws will require 1 month; the estimated time is election time minus 10 months.
7. Drafting and announcement of guidelines based on the people's assembly election law and rules to ward and village subcommissions and polling booth supervisors and members will require 1 month; the estimated time is election time minus 10 months.
8. The time needed for the commission to form state and divisional subcommissions and township groups and township subcommissions will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 9 months.
9. The time needed for printing and mailing of the people's assembly election law and rules and commission directives and guidelines for ward and village subcommissions and directives for polling booth supervisors and members will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 9 months.
10. The time needed for sending stationery and forms to subcommissions will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 9 months.
11. The time needed for allotment and sending of election funds will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 9 months.
12. The time needed for making and sending to subcommissions the seals, rubber stamps, and ink pads will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 9 months.
13. The time needed for the commission to conduct courses on the people's assembly election law and rules and directives for the state, divisional, and township group subcommissions and further courses for other subcommissions will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 7 months.
14. The time needed for preparation, scrutiny, and announcement of electoral rolls by ward and village election subcommissions will be 2 months; estimated time is election time minus 7 months.
15. The time needed for township subcommissions to review the electoral rolls prepared by the ward and village subcommissions will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 7 months.
16. The time needed for sending back the electoral rolls scrutinized by the township subcommissions to the ward and village subcommission will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 7 months.
17. The time needed for the commission to visit states and divisions for consultations with members of the subcommissions and supervision of their work will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 5 months.

18. The time needed to scrutinize and announce the people's assembly candidate lists by the township group subcommissions will be 2 months; the estimated time is election time minus 5 months.
19. If the ballot sheet is to be used, the printing of ballot sheets containing names and symbols of the people's assembly candidates according to their constituencies and sending of the ballot sheets to the township subcommissions through the township group subcommissions, or if the ballot cards and ballot boxes are to be used, the time needed for sending of ballot cards to the township subcommissions from the township group subcommissions will be 3 months; the estimated time is election time minus 3 months.
20. The campaign period for people's assembly candidates will be 3 months; the estimated time is election time minus 3 months.
21. The time needed for appointment of polling booth supervisors and members by ward and village subcommissions in consultation with township subcommissions will be 3 months; estimated time is election time minus 3 months.
22. The time needed for the Foreign Ministry to send ballot cards to the Burmese Embassies abroad to enable voters who are abroad with the permission of the government to cast their votes will be 3 months; estimated time is election time minus 3 months.
23. The time needed to send out ballot cards to military personnel, students, trainees, and public servants who are outside their constituencies, in accordance with the provisions of the People's Assembly Law and Rules, will be 3 months; time estimated is election time minus 3 months.
24. The time needed for ward and village subcommission to give training to polling booth supervisors and members will be 3 months; estimated time is 3 months.
25. The time needed for making of ballot boxes and construction of polling booths will be 3 months; estimated time is 3 months.
26. The holding of the multiparty democratic general elections: Estimated time is election time [khant hman thi achein kala yway-yet].

Program May Reactivate Protests
*OW1702011889 Tokyo KYODO in English 2322 GMT
17 Feb 89*

[Text] Bangkok, Feb. 17 KYODO—Burmese authorities announced Thursday that the election will be held in May next year and the delayed schedule is expected to reactivate antigovernment protests.

According to Radio Rangoon monitored here, the schedule was announced by the Election Management Commission of Burma.

The commission said the general election will be held 15 months after a general election law is made public on March 1.

Prime Minister Saw Maung pledged immediately after taking power in a coup on September 18 last year to call a general election under a multiparty system.

Burma at present has 188 political parties and the National League for Democracy (NLD), the largest opposition party, has time and again called on the Military Government to hold a general election at an early date.

Burma watchers in Bangkok said the delayed election will likely trigger antigovernment movements among opposition parties and students.

In a telephone interview with KYODO News Service late Thursday night, one of the five Election Management Commission members said the schedule is final, and that an election will not be held within this year.

According to the commission announcement, a general election law draft will be made public on March 1 and the commission will seek opinions from eligible voters and opposition parties on the draft for 1 month after that.

It said considerable time is required before the election as the law draft must be approved and local election management commissions set up.

Moves chiefly among students seeking democracy in Burma erupted at the end of July last year but the moves subsided after former Gen. Saw Maung took office after a coup.

Brunei, Malaysia & Singapore

Malaysia

Trade Expansion Accord Signed With Iran
*BK1602105289 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
0927 GMT 16 Feb 89*

[Excerpts] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 16 (OANA-BERNAMA)—Malaysia and Iran Thursday formalized the establishment of a joint commission to strengthen bilateral relations and identify new areas of cooperation between the two countries.

A memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the establishment of the joint commission was signed by Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar and Iranian Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Mohammad Javad Iraianvi at the Malaysian Foreign Ministry (Wisma Putra) here.

They also signed the "agreed minutes" of a 3-day meeting of the commission which began here Tuesday. The inaugural meeting, cochaired by both the ministers, outlined the various areas of bilateral cooperation that would receive priority attention. [passage omitted]

In his comments, Mr Iravani said that since the Islamic revolution, his country had stressed the importance of developing relations with the Islamic, Third World, and nonaligned countries.

On the development of "an unprecedented solidarity among European and Western states, as well as certain developments in the Eastern bloc", Iravani stressed that the Third World, especially the Islamic nations should regard the situation as a warning.

"We should recognize the fact that colonialist countries have been using, in recent years, economic factors as a decisive weapon in their policies," he said.

He cited the existing debt burden imposed on Third World nations by the developed countries as an example of the weapons used.

Minister Views Trade Prospects

*BK1602100889 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
0909 GMT 16 Feb 89*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 16 (OANA-BERNAMA)—There should be more mutual involvement in the economic relationship between Malaysia and Iran as bilateral trade between the two countries has remained small, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abu Hassan Omar said Thursday [16 February].

He said prospects for increased economic, commercial, and other exchanges are promising and Malaysia hopes the Malaysia-Iran joint commission would contribute significantly to raising the trade levels with Iran closer to its real potential.

The minister was speaking at the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between Malaysia and Iran that concluded a 3-day meeting of the joint commission which began Tuesday.

Abu Hassan signed on behalf of Malaysia, while Iran was represented by her minister of economy and finance, Mohammad Javad Iravani.

Abu Hassan urged Malaysian private sector to undertake vigorous pursuit of the Iranian market.

He said occasional trips to Iran and the region or to leave matters to telex or telephone was not the way to do business in the Gulf region.

"I hope Malaysian private sector will develop and nurture personal relationship with their Iranian counterparts," he added. He also said Malaysia stood ready to assist Iran in whatever way it could in Iran's reconstruction and development programs.

Both governments have set in place various mechanisms, in particular the understanding of the letters of credit and the joint commission forum, he said.

Abu Hassan said the MOU formally established the joint commission as an integral part of the economic, scientific, industrial, technical, and trading relationship of both countries.

He added the resolution of the letters of credit issue and Iran's lifting of the ban on palm oil imports into Iran have combined to inject fresh impetus and enthusiasm in the resolve to facilitate trade and commercial flows and other exchanges.

In order that they might be sustained, he added both countries have to work together to further strengthen the bilateral economic, scientific, and technical relationship.

"To begin with, the joint commission process should be a result-oriented forum and must act in such a way that the path to further action is clear," he said.

"Secondly, although officials can set the stage for cooperation, much of the responsibility for action lies with our respective private sectors."

"These two elements working together must provide for renewed, revitalized, and deeper economic links between the two countries." Abu Hassan added.

Foreign Minister Hails Soviet Troop Withdrawal

*BK1602121789 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
1102 GMT 16 Feb 89*

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb 16 (OANA-BERNAMA)—Malaysia Thursday, welcomed the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan Wednesday.

Foreign Affairs Minister Abu Hassan Omar said in a statement that the Soviet disengagement was a positive step to pave the way for the people of Afghanistan to exercise their rights of self determination and restore the country's independence and sovereignty.

"Malaysia welcomes the total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva accords," he added.

Abu Hassan said it was Malaysia's hope that a broad based interim government would be formed in Afghanistan, which would effectively bring the desired peace and stability, and create favourable conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland.

"Malaysia is confident that the mujahidin and the people of Afghanistan will now be able to concentrate their energies on reconstruction programmes for the national development, progress and prosperity of Afghanistan," he said.

The commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Lt-Gen Boris Gromov, was the last of some 103,000 soviet troops to leave Afghanistan under last April's UN-mediated Geneva accords which called for a complete pullout by Feb 15.

Cambodia

Indochinese Foreign Ministers Hold Conference *BK1702052589 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] The foreign ministers of the three countries of Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos met at Chamka Mon state palace on the morning of 17 February to hold a conference.

Attending the conference were, on the Cambodian side, Comrade Hun Sen, party Central Committee Political Bureau member, Council of Ministers chairman, and PRK foreign minister; Comrade Dit Munti, first deputy foreign minister; Comrade Mrs Bo Rasi, deputy foreign minister; Comrade Long Visalo, deputy foreign minister; on the Vietnamese side, Comrade Nguyen Co Thach, Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee Political Bureau member, Council of Ministers vice chairman, and foreign minister of the SRV; Comrade Ngo Dien, SRV ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Cambodia; on the Lao side, Comrade Phoun Sipaseut, Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee Political Bureau member and foreign minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic [LPDR]; and Comrade Pheli Khounlaleuk, LPDR ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Cambodia.

In his opening speech, Comrade Hun Sen expressed a warm welcome and expressed profound thanks for the presence of the delegates. He also noted that this conference will discuss the situation in Cambodia as well as in the three countries to prepare for (?participation in) the second informal meeting in Jakarta aimed at seeking an appropriate solution to the Cambodian problem and peace, stability, and cooperation in the Southeast Asian region.

The conference also evaluated the situation in Cambodia and in the region since the first informal meeting in Jakarta and discussed problems to be tackled so that the second informal meeting in Jakarta will proceed successfully.

Birthday Greetings Sent to Lao Foreign Minister *BK1702053889 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 16 Feb 89*

[Text] PRK Foreign Minister Comrade Heng Samrin recently sent a greetings message to Lao People's Democratic Republic Foreign Minister Comrade Phoun Sipaseut on his 69th birthday. The message noted:

I am very happy to extend best wishes to you for your good health, long life, and greater victories in your noble mission.

I would like to express intimate salutations and highly praise your spirit of patriotism, love for socialism, proletarian internationalist ideals, and your contribution to consolidating and expanding the special militant solidarity and cooperation between our two Foreign Ministries of Cambodia and Laos, as well as among our three Foreign Ministries of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, for the cause of defending socialism and turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, friendship, and cooperation.

'Enemies', Armed Forces Activities Reported *BK1702060789 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] During the week 5-11 February, the enemies fired a total of 1,000-1,500 rounds of support shells of all calibers into various sectors along the border in Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, and Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Provinces.

Also during the past week, our Armed Forces at all units have paid attention to political, combat, and specialized training to enhance the efficiency of their combat against the enemies. In combat work, our Armed Forces put 68 enemies out of action, including 46 killed on the battlefield, 8 captured, and 12 who were forced to surrender. [all figures as heard] Our armed forces also seized 27 assorted weapons, 1,100 rounds of assorted ammunition, and a large quantity of war materiel.

Party Paper Denounces Sihanouk's Latest Moves *BK1702064589 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 1300 GMT 16 Feb 89*

[PRACHEACHON commentary: "Those Who Play With Fire Will Get Burned"; date not given]

[Text] While the world is expressing optimism about the process of finding a political solution to the Cambodian problem through peaceful negotiations, Sihanouk recently called a special meeting of the tripartite party in Beijing with the participation of Ranariddh, representing Sihanouk; Son Soubert, representing Son Sann; and Khieu Samphan, to mend the rift within the tripartite circle and to forge a unanimous stand before attending the second Jakarta informal meeting [JIM 2]. More importantly, they met to try to find maneuvers and tricks to destroy the developing tendency toward finding a political solution to the Cambodian problem and to create new obstacles to the forthcoming JIM 2 so that this meeting will not achieve results in accordance with the aspiration and hopes of peace- and justice-loving public opinion in the region and the world.

What ought to be denounced is the fact that the opposing groups still shamelessly raise their oft-repeated demand to dissolve the PRK and to dispatch international peace-keeping forces to Cambodia in accordance with the strange so-called five-point proposal, which is in complete contrast with the spirit of JIM 1 and which has already been rejected and discarded by the Cambodian people. The unreasonable and unrealistic proposal of the tripartite group clearly shows its stand to be devoid of goodwill and its intention to create obstacles to negotiations which are aimed at ending the Cambodian people's hardship, so as to prolong the Cambodian people's suffering through continued fighting. It is obvious that the demand to dissolve the PRK regime, which is the sole force preventing the return of the genocidal Pol Pot regime, is just a maneuver to open the way for Pol Pot to return to massacre the Cambodian people again.

At a time when the Cambodian people have sufficient capability to assume themselves the task of defending the country, ensure the motherland's safety, and have also created favorable conditions for the Vietnamese volunteer troops to withdraw seven times already—up to 50,000 troops were involved in the seventh withdrawal—the opposition groups have instead demanded that international peacekeeping forces be dispatched to Cambodia. The demand calling for the withdrawal from Cambodia of a foreign army and its replacement by a mixed foreign force is an unreasonable one. Everyone knows that lately Sihanouk, who has been boasting about being a patriot who loves the people 100 percent, is making himself an obstacle to a solution to the Cambodian problem and wants to extend the presence of the Vietnamese volunteer army in Cambodia at a time when Cambodia and Vietnam have announced that Vietnamese volunteer troops will be withdrawn no later than September 1989 within the framework of a political solution.

What is remarkable is that while the struggle for a just and reasonable political solution to the Cambodian problem in accordance with the aspirations and interests of the Cambodian people is making progress along a positive path, Sihanouk has instead expressed anger and dissatisfaction and tried to find maneuvers and perfidious tricks to create obstacles blocking this tendency. Sihanouk, in fact, is using a maneuver forcing us to accept the so-called five-point proposal as a condition for talks. In truth, this is forcing our people to commit suicide first and then negotiate. Furthermore, Sihanouk has expressed great dissatisfaction with Thailand—for inviting Comrade Chairman of the Council of Ministers Hun Sen to visit Thailand—saying that he will not attend JIM 2. More serious still, Sihanouk recently shamelessly announced that he is returning to head the CGDK [Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea] after resigning this position 10 times and after stating that he will not go back on this decision because the CGDK is a hideous thing which does not represent the interests of Cambodia and the Cambodian people.

We categorically denounce every activity leading to the danger of the genocidal regime's return and blocking

negotiations in any forum on the Cambodian problem, including the Jakarta informal meeting. Sihanouk's petulance and confusion do not benefit the Cambodian people. The opposition groups should be responsible to history. They are completely moving against the interests and aspirations of the Cambodian people and the common tendency in the region and the world. More than ever, our people are determined to constantly strengthen and expand the Cambodian revolution's own forces and unite firmly around the KPRP's [Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party] leadership in order to move toward assuming ourselves the task of defending and building the country and to fight and be ready to fight in every circumstance. This is aimed at creating a revolutionary edge in every field and at weakening the enemies until they completely disintegrate. Truth and justice will always be on our people's side. Those who play with fire will get burned.

Son Sann Resumes Guerrilla Group Military Post
OW1702091889 Tokyo KYODO in English 0800 GMT
17 Feb 89

[Text] Jakarta, Feb. 17 (KYODO)—Kampuchean guerrilla leader Son Sann said Friday he has resumed his post as commander-in-chief of one of three resistance forces but denied speculation of a coup in the group.

"I do not anticipate coup d'etat and there's no sign of it," Son Sann told reporters covering a new round of Kampuchean peace talks that begin Sunday.

Son Sann said he plans to talk with Gen. Sak Sutsakhan, his predecessor as top commander of the Armed Forces of the Kampuchean National Liberation Front (KPNLF). Son Sann, president of the resistance forces, also was a commander-in-chief.

Son Sann told reporters he received a letter from Gen. Chea Rithichut, field commander of the guerrilla group, that said, "all the representatives of KPNLF's national army refuse categorically to recognize Sak Sutsakhan" and a few other military leaders.

Those ousted have been accused of lacking military leadership and of corruption and misusing funds. The ousters have resulted in a decline in the number of KPNLF guerrillas, the letter said. The breakup of top military leadership has followed prolonged internal squabbling between Son Sann and Sak.

In a statement, Son Sann said, "The circumstances command that I resume the civilian, political and military powers."

"I wish to attend and participate in the work (of the new peace negotiations) as president of KPNLF with full powers," he added.

Son Sann will join two other resistance force leaders—Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Khieu Samphan—to face Hun Sen, prime minister of the Vietnam-backed government in Phnom Penh, at the negotiating table.

Vietnam, Laos and six Association of Southeast Asian Nations member countries are also sending delegates to the three-day talks, the second in seven months.

Sihanouk's Beijing Statement Reported

BK1702012889 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 16 Feb 89

[Text] In a statement released in Beijing, Democratic Kampuchea [DK] President Samdech Norodom Sihanouk said that under the present situation, it is his patriotic duty to resume DK leadership in order to lead the patriotic Cambodian resistance forces to seize genuine independence from the Hanoi aggressors.

The samdech called on the international community to take all-round measures against the Hanoi authorities' dark schemes to annex Cambodia and pay attention to the following points:

1. At present, there are over a million Vietnamese nationals sent to settle in Cambodia by the Hanoi authorities.
2. The Vietnamese aggressor troops are being disguised as puppet soldiers.
3. All levels of internal and external affair organizations of the Vietnamese puppet administration in Phnom Penh are under the Vietnamese control and command.

The samdech also called on the international community not to believe the Hanoi authorities' propaganda that they will withdraw all their troops from Cambodia by September 1989.

Sihanouk Thanks CGDK Leaders for Support

BK1702020289 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 1 Feb 89

[Text] "Reply message from Democratic Kampuchean President Samdech Norodom Sihanouk to His Excellency Khieu Samphan, Democratic Kampuchean vice president in charge of foreign affairs; Prince Ranariddh, personal representative of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk in Cambodia and Asia; and His Excellency Im Chhudet, minister attached to the Coordinating Committee for National Defense of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea"—dated 14 February]

[Text] Many thanks to you for your splendid letter dated 13 February 1989. The total support you extended to me on behalf of the Cambodian people and the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK] in the difficult circumstances of our national liberation struggle

has greatly encouraged me to carry on my activity to salvage our motherland which cannot be sacrificed to the mysterious international reconciliation.

Our three patriotic movements and three armed forces must closely unite in order to bring total credibility both at home and abroad to our sacred and historical struggle for national liberation and enable it to become even more effective on the battlefield.

We must put an end to all military incidents among our armed forces and show our enemies as well as the world community that we are fully capable to seize genuine peace for our motherland and our people, a peace which will provide Cambodia with 100 percent independence and the Cambodian people with their sacred and inalienable right to self-determination.

Please, Excellencies, accept my highest regards.

[Signed] Norodom Sihanouk, president of Democratic Kampuchea

[Dated] Beijing, 14 February 1989

PRC, Thai Remarks on Cambodia Acclaimed

BK1702025689 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 16 Feb 89

[Station commentary: "Cambodian Problem Must be Settled Totally and Comprehensively on the Basis of Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's Five-Point Peace Plan"]

[Text] During a meeting with Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila in Beijing on 10 February, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng said that the international and internal aspects of the Cambodian issue cannot be settled separately. Vietnam should not only genuinely withdraw its troops from Cambodia but should also be responsible for settling Cambodia's internal problems. Sitthi Sawetsila expressed his complete agreement with this view.

This opinion of the Chinese and Thai leaders is totally correct. The Cambodian problem must be settled totally and comprehensively so that Cambodia can again enjoy peace, security, and stability, thereby contributing to peace, security, and stability in this region as a whole.

This opinion is totally in accord with Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's five-point peace plan which calls for the total and unconditional withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and the establishment of a quadripartite government to organize general elections in Cambodia under the supervision of the international control commission.

If the Hanoi authorities accept this five-point peace plan, the Cambodian problem, both its international and internal aspects, will be settled totally and permanently and peace and stability will be restored in Cambodia and the whole of Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.

But the Hanoi authorities do not accept this reasonable five-point peace plan. On the contrary, they have maneuvered to divide the Cambodian problem which was caused by the Vietnamese aggression into two parts, that is international and internal aspects, and said that Vietnam will join only in settling the international aspects, leaving the internal part to be settled by the Cambodians themselves.

This is the Hanoi authorities' scheme to avoid being responsible for their acts of aggression in Cambodia, to settle the Cambodian problem by maintaining the puppet regime in Phnom Penh, thus enabling them to keep their forces—military and civilians—and the nearly one million Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia, and to further and forever occupy Cambodia through this puppet regime.

It is impossible to settle the Cambodian problem, both its international and internal aspects, in such a way, that is in accordance with this Vietnamese scheme. This is because through such a settlement, the Vietnamese aggressor forces will continue to occupy Cambodia and the Cambodian people still cannot enjoy peace nor the right to self-determination.

For this reason, the Cambodian people as well as various countries in the region and the world community have strongly opposed this Hanoi authorities' scheme to settle the Cambodian problem in two parts. All of them have firmly demanded that the Hanoi authorities—the aggressors and creators of the Cambodian problem—must be held fully responsible for the permanent and comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian problem to restore permanent peace, security, and stability in Cambodia and this region.

CGDK Official Comments on Vietnamese Settlers
BK1702043289 (Clandestine) Voice of the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2315 GMT 16 Feb 89

[Text] Im Chhuet, minister attached to the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea [CGDK] Coordinating Committee for National Defense, has said that the presence of Vietnamese nationals sent to settle in Cambodia by the Hanoi Vietnamese aggressors is a serious problem. The Hanoi authorities have made use of this matter to realize their strategy to annex Cambodia and as a major obstacle to the settlement of the Cambodian problem now and in the future.

He said that the Hanoi authorities have ordered their Cambodian puppets to allow these large numbers of Vietnamese nationals to settle in Cambodia in accordance with the puppet administration's law.

The CGDK, Democratic Kampuchea President Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, His Excellency Prime Minister Son Sann, the entire Cambodian people, and the international community hold that the Phnom Penh administration is an illegal administration installed at

gunpoint by the Hanoi authorities when they invaded Cambodia. It is an illegal administration nationally and internationally. Therefore, everything it arranges is illegal, nationally and internationally.

Indonesia

Spokesman Confirms Instructions to Kabul Embassy
BK1402123589 Jakarta Domestic Service in Indonesian 1200 GMT 14 Feb 89

[Text] The government today confirmed that it had issued an instruction to the Indonesian chief of mission in Afghanistan to leave Kabul anytime he deems the situation in the city to be critical.

Foreign Affairs Department spokesman (Syamsu Bahri) said this to newsmen today in response to reports that Indonesian Charge d'Affaires Izharuddin had left Kabul yesterday. He said that Izharuddin and two staff members had received the instruction from Foreign Minister Alatas to leave Kabul if the situation was deteriorating due to food shortage and dangerous military attacks.

Muslim Clerics Urged To Prevent Instigations
BK1702131389 Jakarta ANTARA in English 1230 GMT 17 Feb 89

[Text] Armed Forces Commander Gen Try Sutrisno asked Muslim ulemas and leaders to use their knowledge and authority to prevent the country's Muslims from negative, irresponsible and misleading instigations.

This request was made before the participants of the meeting of Tarjih Muhammadiyah Islamic Organization in Malang Thursday, the Armed Forces said in a press release.

If ulemas may play a role, abuse of religious teachings may be avoided, he said.

The general said that actions, which are against public norms or Islamic teachings, may harm and damage the image of Islam and also its followers.

Regarding the significant role of religions, the government, therefore, considers religious supervision an important part in the national life.

The government considers religious life inseparable from the Indonesian nation.

The government, however, does not intend to use religion as a state foundation although the government guarantees and assists the people in their effort to be God's servants, the general said.

Police Official Discusses Subversive Activities
BK1702064689 Kuala Lumpur BERNAMA in English
0611 GMT 17 Feb 89

[By Haris Syamaun]

[Text] Jakarta, Feb 17 (BERNAMA)—Indonesian authorities have found significant clues showing the connection between the recent clash in Lampung, South Sumatra and the riots in Jakarta's port area of Tanjung Periorek in 1984 and other incidents in Central and West Java, National Police Chief Gen Mohammad Sanusi said.

Thirty-two people died in a clash between security forces and members of the extremist group "Komando Mujahidin Fisabilillah" in central Lampung early this month.

"Some trouble makers involved in the clashes in Lampung are residents of Tanjung Periorek, Central Java and West Java. We have clues that several of these people were involved in the riot in Tanjung Periorek four years ago," Sanusi said in a parliamentary hearing Thursday.

He said intensive investigation conducted following the Lampung clashes showed that the poison arrows used in the fighting were made in Tanjung Periorek and Cimahi, West Java.

The authorities first discovered the activities of a group, who called themselves Jamaah Mujahidin Fisabilillah, referred to by the authorities as terrorists or trouble makers, in November last year, Sanusi said.

"We did not realise that the development was so fast, and led to the eruption of clashes on Feb 6 and Feb 7," he said.

He predicted that in the coming five years subversive activities would still be possible.

The subversion could be sponsored either by the remnants of the banned Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the pro-Beijing communists, the pro-Moscow communists influenced by the communists in Indochina.

Stating that the authorities had not discovered whether the Lampung trouble makers were rightwing extremists or leftwing extremists or a combination of both, Sanusi said that differences in race, religions, tribal origins and social groupings of citizens could still be exploited by certain anti-government elements to disturb national security and stability.

Laos

Foreign Minister Departs for Jakarta Talks
BK1702055089 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
0000 GMT 17 Feb 89

[Text] Our Lao delegation led by Phoun Sipaseut, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign affairs minister, left Vientiane yesterday afternoon to attend the JIM 2 meeting [second Jakarta informal meeting] in Jakarta on a political settlement of the Cambodian problem, which will be held from 19 to 21 February.

The meeting is convened at a time when the situation in Southeast Asia in particular is changing and favorable conditions have been created for developing and strengthening mutual relations among the countries in this region, especially in the economic and trading sector, an event which is necessary for the present era. If a positive outcome is achieved at the meeting, a good venue will be created for settlement of the Cambodian problem, thus contributing to turning Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, friendship, and cooperation and to safeguarding peace and security in the Pacific region and all over the world.

Seeing the delegation off at Wattai Airport were Sali Vongkhamsao, vice chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of economy, planning, and finance; and all deputy foreign affairs ministers, and a number of cadres concerned. Long Kem, Nguyen Xuan, Bambang Sumantri, and Teruo Hayakawa, respectively ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the PRK, the SRV, the Republic of Indonesia, and Japan to Laos, were also on hand at the airport to see the delegation off.

After the meeting, Phoun Sipaseut, acting in the capacity of special representative of the acting president of the LPDR [Lao People's Democratic Republic] and the LPDR Government, will pay an official visit to Japan to attend the national-level funeral of the late Emperor Hirohito, which will be officially held on 24 February 1989.

Party Delegation Returns From Bulgaria
BK1602020089 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
1200 GMT 15 Feb 89

[Text] This morning, the delegation of the LPRP [Lao People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee Foreign Relations Commission, led by Comrade Thongloun Sisoulit, member of the party Central Committee and deputy head of the commission, returned home after attending the conference of deputy heads of the foreign relations commissions of socialist countries on issues in the Far East, held in Sofia, Bulgaria, from 7 to 9 February. The conference studied the situation in the Far East and contributions made by the parties of the fraternal socialist countries to the settlement of problems in the region as well as the direction for future cooperation. The conference also studied certain issues which

will be raised at the conference of party secretariats from fraternal socialist countries which will be convened in Sofia in the 3d quarter of this year.

In addition, our delegation paid a courtesy call on the foreign minister of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to discuss the strengthening of relations and cooperation between the two countries.

Women's Delegation Returns From Cuba
*BK1602020489 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao
1200 GMT 15 Feb 89*

[Text] This morning, the delegation of the Lao Women's Union led by Mrs Onchan Thammavong, member of the party Central Committee and chairman of the Lao Women's Union, arrived in Vientiane after attending the conference of chairmen of women's unions from the socialist countries, held in Havana, the Republic of Cuba, between 6 and 8 February.

During the conference, the delegations exchanged views on the work of women's organizations, such as the contributions made by women to family and social work.

Philippines

Ramos Visits U.S. Military Installations
*HK1602100989 Hong Kong AFP in English 1003 GMT
16 Feb 89*

[Text] Clark Air Base, Philippines, Feb 16 (AFP)—Philippine Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos called for military self-reliance during a visit to this U.S. military facility Thursday.

"We cannot speak of independence if we do not strive for self-reliance," he told troops and local officials at the 10th anniversary of the founding of the Clark Air Base Command, a Philippine military unit in charge of security on the outer perimeter of the U.S. base.

Mr Ramos said the "capacity to protect our own interests" was among the requirements for statehood, and the Philippines must develop the capability to protect the "sovereignty and integrity of our national territory."

Manila and Washington signed an agreement last year on terms for continued U.S. access to Clark and nearby Subic Naval Base, the two largest U.S. overseas military facilities whose lease expires in 1991.

Prior to the October 1988 signing, the U.S. panel had contended that the bases provided for Philippine security from external threats, allowing the country's Armed Forces to concentrate on battling a communist insurgency.

Mr Ramos arrived here by helicopter two hours behind schedule due to mechanical breakdowns of several aircraft assigned to fetch him from Subic, where he also

addressed a gathering held to mark the 10th anniversary of the Subic Naval Base Command, his spokesman Eduardo Pangilinan told reporters.

He said Mr Ramos' Fokker plane would not start after his Subic speech, and his aides called for a helicopter from Villamor Air Base, the Air Force headquarters in Manila.

The helicopter developed engine trouble five minutes after takeoff from Villamor. A second helicopter made it to Subic but promptly aborted liftoff when it developed engine trouble, Mr Pangilinan said.

A helicopter from the nearby regional military headquarters at Camp Olivas finally brought Mr Ramos to Clark, he added.

Last year, Mr Ramos called on Congress to approve a higher military budget to modernize the country's air force and navy, which he described as "near obsolete."

In December Mr Ramos had to jump out of his military Fokker plane which caught fire on landing in bad weather in the eastern island of Samar.

De Villa Orders Tighter Security for Detainees
*HK1702094589 Manila Manila Broadcasting Company
DZRH in Tagalog 0800 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Renato de Villa has ordered tighter security measures for all military detainees inside the country's military stockades. Bing Formento of Mobile 11 with the details:

[Begin recording] Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Renato de Villa ordered the country's major service commands to impose tighter security over all military detainees in view of the numerous activities due to take place this month.

A memorandum was issued by De Villa to all the major service commanders, particularly the camp commanders of Camp Crame, Villamor Air Base, and other camps where military personnel involved in the antigovernment coup attempts are currently detained. De Villa reminded them to make head counts every hour and to examine detention centers and cells.

The memorandum also stipulated that no military detainee will be issued a pass by an official unless so authorized by the convening proper authorities and the order adheres to the government's rules and regulations.

At present, all military camps in Metro Manila are on red alert, while several top officials including Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos, Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Renato De Villa and other officials are in Baguio where they are to attend the graduation ceremony for the Philippine Military Academy Class of 1989 on Sunday. President Corazon Aquino is the guest of honor at the graduation rites.

The report also noted recent rumours of ultra-rightist plans to destabilize the government. However, this report was immediately denied by military officials. They did confirm reports of a meeting between renegade officers Gringo Honasan, Reynaldo Cabauatan, and Brigadier General Jose Maria Zumel.

Police Promise Good Security for Anniversary
HK1702020789 Manila Far East Broadcasting Company in English 2300 GMT 16 Feb 89

[Excerpt] Northern Police District [NPD] superintendent Brigadier General Eduardo de la Torre gave assurances that there will be no untoward incidents during the third anniversary celebration of the Edsa [Epifanio de los Santos Avenue] revolution. De la Torre met with ranking NPD officials yesterday to discuss the various problems which could arise during the celebration on February 25. He said they have already prepared a plan to neutralize any untoward incidents which might occur in the midst of the Edsa festivities. At the same time, De la Torre thanked the persons and civic organizations who have been helping to secure peace and order in areas under the NPD's responsibility.

Japan's Fukuda Denies Knowledge of Marcos Bribes
HK1702110389 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 1000 GMT 17 Feb 89

[Text] Former Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda today said that he had no knowledge of the reported bribing of deposed President Marcos by seven Japanese firms. Fukuda is currently in the country to attend an international conference on population. Sel Baisa for the details.

[Begin recording] Fukuda added that he was also unaware of a senator's proposal to ban the seven Japanese firms from operating in the country. The seven companies were named by former Highways Minister Balthazar Aquino in his testimony against the deposed president.

Fukuda paid a courtesy call on President Corazon Aquino this morning. He later told reporters that he spoke to the president about the importance of the population issue in relation to development and progress.

Meanwhile, the president said that her government is exerting all efforts to resolve the population issue in the Philippines. [end recording]

Malaysia Agrees To Repatriate Rizal Alih
HK1702042189 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan in Tagalog 0300 GMT 17 Feb 89

[Text] Foreign Affairs Secretary Raul Manglapus announced yesterday that a Malaysian official has assured him that the government will have no problem having Rizal Alih repatriated if he is indeed in Sabah. Manglapus added that he would later discuss ways to

locate Alih with Malaysian Foreign Affairs Minister Omar Abu Hassan. He added, however, that the Malaysian Government has not replied directly to the government's request for assistance.

Alih led the takeover of the Recom [Regional Command] 9 headquarters in Zamboanga and the killing of General Eduardo Batalla. He is reportedly alive and receiving medical treatment in a hospital in Sabah.

\$1.6 Billion in New Foreign Loans Sought
HK1702042889 Manila THE MANILA CHRONICLE in English 17 Feb 89 p 13

[By staff member Arleen Chupongian]

[Text] The Philippine Government would be seeking next month some \$1.6 billion loans from foreign commercial banks, Finance Secretary Vicente R. Jayme said yesterday.

This would be the first time since 1986 that the country would avail of fresh loans from its commercial creditors.

Jayme said in an interview that the targeted borrowing of \$1.6 billion could still be adjusted depending on the outcome of the ongoing negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a new financing program.

The country hopes to obtain \$1.3 billion from the IMF, \$900 million of which would come as part of a three-year extended fund facility (EFF) and another \$400 million as a contingency financing facility.

Jayme, who heads the Philippine debt panel also said that the government was also expecting a counterpart financing from the Japanese Government equivalent to the new loans from the Fund as part of the proposed Sumita debt relief scheme brought up in the recent IMF-World Bank [WB] conferences in West Berlin.

Basically, the proposal would allow an indebted country with a new IMF program to avail of counterpart financing from the Japanese Government to help sustain its economic recovery effort.

Jayme added that the debt panel, composed of Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez Jr. and himself, was still discussing the schedule of talks with commercial and official creditors.

The government had expressed a desire to open the debt negotiations with its creditors in March. This would be a special concession the Philippine Government would seek from its creditors who normally would agree to open negotiations only after the country had availed of a new IMF program.

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In another development, Jayme said that the anticipated \$500 million in new loans from the WB this year would go to the financial, energy and small and medium scale business sectors.

Last year, the country availed of \$500 million in new loans from the WB. This went to the government corporate sector, housing, irrigation, and energy sector. The WB is the country's biggest source of funds.

World Bank Agrees To Coordinate Aid
*HK1702023989 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan
 in Tagalog 0200 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] The World Bank has agreed to act as the central coordinating agency and funding source of the Philippine Assistance Program [PAP]. This was announced by World Bank President Barber Conable in a speech. However, he also stressed that details of the program should be supported by the Philippine Government.

As coordinating agency, the World Bank will draft plans for the PAP and identify the program's beneficiaries. Conable emphasized that the World Bank will not follow the policies or demands of donor countries to this program, otherwise known as the Multilateral Aid Initiative.

Ileto Sworn In as National Security Adviser
*HK1702080989 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan
 in Tagalog 0730 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] President Corazon Aquino today swore in former Defense Secretary Rafael Ileto as national security adviser replacing Noel Soriano who resigned in order to go back to private business. Since 3 January, Ileto and Soriano have consulted on security measures to prepare for the ex-defense chief's assumption of the new post.

Soriano rejected the president's offer for him to stay on as the cabinet officer for Cordillera regional development. It is believed that the president was pressured to relieve Soriano because of the gold digging controversy in Ft Santiago. The president thanked Soriano for his government service.

Meanwhile, the president has assigned Agrarian Reform Secretary Philip Juico as the temporary regional development cabinet officer. Ileto claimed that he could have assumed this post in a concurrent capacity but requested the president not to give him other responsibilities aside from the national security adviser position. Asked about the return of former President Marcos, Ileto said he no longer had any personal opinion on the issue. He said that as part of the president's cabinet he supports the official government position on the Marcos issue.

Former Marcos Minister Named to Aid Panel
*HK1702054589 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan
 in Tagalog 0400 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] Several senators have criticized the appointment of former Prime Minister Cesar Virata as an adviser to the mini Marshall Plan. They point to this as an indication that the machinations of former President Marcos continue within the present administration. Jojo Ismael has the details:

[Begin recording] During a session of the Senate today, several senators strongly opposed Virata's appointment as well as the continued tenure of the Central Bank's Jobo Fernandez and other people once connected with the Marcos regime. During an interpellation, Senator Aquilino Pimentel said he personally believes that the Aquino administration does not need the likes of Virata and Fernandez. He quoted the warning of national hero Jose Rizal that a man responsible for his country's corruption should not be allowed to be the instrument for further damage to his country. [end recording]

Chairman Denies Appointment
*HK1702093189 Manila Radio Veritas in Tagalog
 0900 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] Chairman Roberto Villanueva of the Philippine Assistance Program [PAP] coordinating council denied that former Prime Minister Cesar Virata was being recruited as an adviser to the PAP. Villanueva made the clarification following reports of criticism by Senator Aquilino Pimentel about the alleged appointment. Pimentel argued that if the services of former Prime Minister Cesar Virata were engaged, then the government might as well employ former President Ferdinand Marcos also.

Here is the statement by Chairman Roberto Villanueva.

[Begin recording in English] I am denying that I have hired the services of former Prime Minister Cesar Virata as consultant to the PAP, nor have I made any effort to engage the services of Mr Jesus Hipolito and Roy Golez as reported by some sections of the press. I have been meeting with various groups and individuals of the private sector as well as members of Congress and the academe, public administrators, and business leaders from various organizations. In meeting them I have been soliciting their views to seek ideas on how the private sector can effectively contribute and participate in a program to reduce poverty and channel resources into the countryside.

Mr Virata has been a member of one of those groups that I have consulted but he is not a consultant of the PAP. In this connection I am meeting tomorrow leaders of farm organizations, among them representatives of major farm groups here in the country. In addition to that we

are holding regional consultations in various regions and more than 10 regions have already been covered. So, I wish you would make this clarification. [end recording]

Mindanao Sultans To Pledge Allegiance to Aquino
*BK1702052989 Quezon City Radyo ng Bayan
in Tagalog 0400 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] Twenty-eight sultans and their ministerial councils as well as 15 members of Lanao Province's royal houses will meet with President Aquino to discuss the Mindanao problem. The delegation will be headed by Sultan Sadulla Ali Pakasum of the royal house of Marawi. The first item to be discussed will be the sultanate's obligation to the Maranao tribe and their relationship with the government. During the discussion, the sultans plan to pledge their allegiance to the Republic by means of a declaration to be handed to President Aquino.

Thailand

Chatchai Adviser Criticizes Sihanouk
*BK1702023589 Bangkok THE NATION in English
17 Feb 89 p 1*

[Text] An adviser to Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan warned yesterday that Kampuchean resistance leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk may miss "the peace train" unless he behaves like a "senior statesman" and contributes to the current Kampuchean peace process.

"My humble advice to him is that he has to be firm," said M.R. Sukhumphan Boriphat, referring to the prince's mercurial behaviour. "He cannot quit one day and come back the next."

Sukhumphan said he was speaking as an individual and not as an adviser to the prime minister.

Sihanouk announced his resignation from the presidency of the Kampuchean resistance government last July, but said last week he had agreed to resume the post. Sihanouk, who has made similar decisions on several other occasions, also predicted in Beijing that the current informal talks in Jakarta among the four warring Khmer factions and involved countries would fail.

The prince also criticized Chatchai's Kampuchea initiatives, saying they were very dangerous and favoured the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. He added that he would boycott the upcoming Jakarta talks to show his displeasure with Chatchai's meeting with Vietnamese-backed Premier Hun Sen in Bangkok last month.

"I am very upset by his criticism of our prime minister," said Sukhumphan. "It is not appropriate for a person who is regarded as a senior statesman like Prince Sihanouk to say such a thing."

Sukhumphan said Sihanouk's prediction that the Jakarta talks would fail reflects a "pessimistic view" and was a "show of disrespect" for Indonesian President Suharto, who has played an instrumental role in trying to bring peace back to Kampuchea.

Sukhumphan said time for peace in Kampuchea "is running out".

"The peace train is leaving the station and we don't want Prince Sihanouk to miss it," he said.

He said Sihanouk, who has international support to become leader of future Kampuchea following a political settlement, is in a position to contribute to the peace process, especially the Jakarta talks. "He still can say something that may give JIM II [second Jakarta informal meeting] a better chance of success," Sukhumphan said.

Sukhumphan also said that he has learned from a member of the Phnom Penh cabinet that Premier Hun Sen "is prepared to compromise" at the Jakarta meeting.

He also said that Chatchai's Kampuchean initiatives have received very positive reactions from at least three of the ASEAN countries—Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.

He said President Suharto was very pleased that he had been consulted by Chatchai before the latter met with Hun Sen.

Chatchai Interview on 'New-Look Diplomacy'
*BK1702024789 Bangkok THE NATION in English
17 Feb 89 p 1*

[Text] "First series of reports" from 2-hour interview with Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan by Suthichai Yun and The Chongkhadikit on 16 February at the prime minister's residence]

[Text] Thailand is primed to become the "nucleus" of an Asia-Pacific zone, with Australia and Japan providing regional balance to compete economically with an integrated European Community in 1992 and a protectionistic United States, Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said yesterday.

The prime minister confirmed he is pursuing a "new-look diplomacy" to seize the vast economic opportunities arising from the anticipated peace in Kampuchea and the thaw in relations among the superpowers.

The ten countries in Southeast Asia—the six ASEAN members, the Indochinese states and Burma—form a potentially strong economic union within the zone, the prime minister said.

Australia, the prime minister commented, "needs us". Japan, he added wryly, "has won the third world war (economically)."

He stressed that Thailand does not intend to be "top dog" or a "neo-colonialist" influence within the region. Instead, he stressed that the country's geographic position and outstanding economic performance, together with his government's diplomatic offensive for peace, will enable Thailand to play a significant role in the area.

Asked about criticism that Thailand has been accused of trying to exploit the natural resources of the Indochinese countries, the prime minister replied, "No, we aren't going to pursue a neo-colonialist policy towards our neighbours. And I am sure that the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea won't let that happen either. They are very nationalistic and will never allow Thailand to exploit or dominate them—economically anyway."

The prime minister said a committee has been set up to screen all Thai companies doing business in the Indochinese countries. "We have encouraged the Laotians, for example, to hold at least nominal equity in any venture set up by Thai businessmen there," he said.

Chatchai said the major powers are currently "in great difficulties" economically. If the U.S. was a private company, he said, it would have gone bankrupt, while the Soviet Union "could not afford to station troops here and there anymore".

He expressed no serious concern over the U.S. reducing Thailand's Generalised System of Preferences privileges because "with its financial problems, the U.S. was only trying to cut down on our profits to partly offset its deficit."

He remarked, half-jokingly, "If we were firm with the Americans, they would be obliging. If we were compliant, they would ride herd on us. They are cowboys, and we have to be bucking broncos."

With peace on the horizon in Kampuchea, he said, Thailand will stand a good chance to move in and set up economic ties with Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. "The world is different today. The U.S., the Soviet Union and China are all tired of fighting. Everybody is talking about peace and economic reforms. Thailand has to catch up with the rest of the world and, without doubt, we have dramatically moved ahead into industrialisation. Our foreign policy has to be adjusted to cope with the new realities," he said.

He also said new accesses on the Andaman Sea will have to be created—with a deep-sea port already being planned at Krabi—to relieve the congestion in the Gulf of Thailand. "We must try to avoid jamming the Gulf of Thailand with all our economic activities and I am looking at new outlets on the Andaman Sea so that we can diversify our sea trade routes to various parts of the world," he said.

Despite the approaching peaceful solution to the Khmer problem, Chatchai said a strong defence would still be necessary. "A strong fence makes good neighbours," he said, reiterating that Thailand will not lower its guard in defence matters.

Socialist Labor Federation Seeks More Influence
BK1702023789 Bangkok BANG"OK POST in English
17 Feb 89 p 9

[By Suraphon Thuanngoen]

[Text] The current visit by two high-level Soviet labour officials can be regarded as a major move that indicates an intense competition to gain influence in Asia and the Pacific region between international labour organisations of capitalist and socialist blocs.

The two officials are Amilbee Abaeirov [name as published], a member of All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), and Oleg Kharlamov, a labour expert on foreign relations for Asia and the Pacific.

The AUCCTU is affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the pro-socialist international labour organisation.

Their seven-day visit to Thailand which began on Wednesday is seen as an attempt by the WFTU to seek affiliations from the Thai labour movement which has long been affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), a capitalist labour organisation.

Next week, ICFTU secretary-general V.S. Mathur will also visit Thailand. It is believed his visit is intended to find out whether or not the Soviets have made any progress in expanding relations with Thai workers.

The ICFTU is a major financier of the Thai labour movement. This year it has set aside 10 million baht to support activities of the Labour Congress of Thailand (LCT) and Thai Trade Union Congress (TTUC), two of the four labour congresses in the country.

It is quite obvious that the WFTU is stepping in at time when Thailand's policy is more open to socialist countries, especially the Indochina states.

Moreover, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have changed their attitudes towards countries in the opposite bloc. This condition is favourable for the WFTU to expand its membership.

The WFTU has a membership of 270 million. Half of its affiliations are from socialist countries with the rest in developing countries.

Last year, the WFTU sought permission from the Interior Ministry to set up its regional office in Thailand, reasoning that Bangkok is the centre of this region and that the regional office of the rival International Labour Organisation (ILO) is already based here.

However, there was no response to the WFTU proposal since the then Government under the premiership of Gen Prem Tinsulanon followed an ultra-rightist policy.

The WFTU's attempt to gain influence in this region was apparent for the first time when it organised an educational seminar of the Bata International in Samut Prakan in October 1987.

After that the attempt to gain Thai affiliations has continued.

On January 11 this year, WFTU secretary-general Deb-kuma Ganguli had a meeting with Labour Department director-general Siri Kewalinsarit. He obtained permission for the WFTU to hold an international seminar in Bangkok in October.

The seminar will also be participated by representatives of WFTU, ILO and ESCAP [United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific].

Mr Ganguli said after his meeting with Mr Siri that the Thai government has no objection to the seminar being held here provided the organisers fully observe Thai laws and regulations.

This was a clear indication the Labour Department had relaxed its restrictions towards the WFTU.

The visit by the two Soviet labour officials and their easy access to Thai labour leaders, ILO officials and government officials responsible for labour affairs is a sign that the WFTU will probably have a bigger role in the Thai labour movement in the future.

The two obtained official permission from the Thai Government for their visit.

In fact, WFTU is not new to the Thai labour movement. Before the time of former prime minister Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkram in the early'40s, the Thai labour organisation was operating under the name of "Saha Achiwa" which was later changed to "Thai Labour Association" and affiliated with WFTU, simply because the ICFTU was not in existence as yet.

When Field Marshal Plaek took power, the government at that time was influenced by the United States. As a result, workers affiliated with WFTU were arrested and jailed.

The situation worsened during the time of former Prime Minister Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat who revoked all the laws concerning labour affairs, thus ending WFTU's role in the country.

The ICFTU then stepped in and has since gained greater influence among Thai workers.

A source said that the WFTU's attempt to try and regain its lost ground in Thailand began when Gen Kriangsak Chamanan was prime minister. Gen Kriangsak, who had a policy that Thailand should have relations with both socialist and capitalist countries, allowed Thai union leaders to meet WFTU representatives secretly outside the country.

After Gen Kriangsak's return from his historic Moscow visit in the Brezhnev era, Thai workers were allowed to openly contact the WFTU. The first group of six Thai workers to visit Moscow after that was led by Sunthon Kaewnet.

The contact with WFTU was, however, made under certain restrictions imposed by the government.

The Bata International seminar in 1987 was the first official return of WFTU to Thailand.

At present four major Thai labour organisations are affiliated with WFTU. They are the Iron and Metal Federation of Thailand, Textile Federation, Shoes and Leatherware Federation and Transport Federation.

The Thai Durable Textile Workers Union has also filed an application to become a WFTU member.

It may be concluded that the current visit by the two Russian officials is a major step for expanding WFTU membership here.

But, the government's policy towards this matter has not been clearly defined.

Vietnam

Foreign Ministry Spokesman Comments on JIM 2
*BK1702022289 Hanoi VNA in English 1528 GMT
16 Feb 89*

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 16—The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a regular press conference here this afternoon.

In reply to questions by XINHUA and PAP about the coming second Jakarta informal meeting [JIM-2], the spokesman said:

"Today, the 16th of February, 1989, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach left Hanoi for Phnom Penh to attend the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea during which they will examine the evolution of the situation in the region and the Kampuchean question since JIM-1 and make preparations for JIM-2. On February 18, Nguyen Co Thach will leave for JIM-2 in Jakarta.

Earlier, Vietnamese Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co had left at the head of a Vietnamese delegation to the meeting of the working group in preparation for JIM-2.

JIM-2 is convened in the context of new developments favourable to the settlement of the Kampuchean problem and the question of peace and stability in the region as a whole.

Vietnam hopes that JIM-2 will be a success, thus meeting the ardent desire of the Kampuchean people and the people in the region and the world public as a whole. Together with the countries and parties concerned Vietnam will do its utmost to make JIM-2 a success and hopes that the participants which have contributed to the success of JIM-1 will make their positive contributions with a full sense of responsibility and constructive attitude to the success of JIM-2."

Asked to comment on the documents of the recent Beijing meeting of the tripartite Kampuchean factions, the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman said:

"The three Kampuchean factions, which are in essence a single opposition faction in Kampuchea, have no foothold in the country and which are losing support from outside have, nevertheless, put forth demands in disregard of realities in Kampuchea, particularly their demand for the abolition of the People's Republic of Kampuchea while the PRK is controlling the whole territory of Kampuchea, and for usurping three-fourths of power in Kampuchea, and thus gaining absolute advantage over the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Radio Reviews 'Background' of Cambodian Issue
BK1702044689 Hanoi International Service in English
1000 GMT 16 Feb 89

[Unattributed "article on the background of the second informal meeting on the Kampuchea issue to be held in Jakarta"]

[Text] The second informal meeting on the Kampuchea issue, known as JIM 2, will be opened in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 19 February.

Since the first meeting in Bogor, all sides and countries concerned with the Kampuchea issue have altered their viewpoints on how to solve this question. Notably, the tripartite Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea which used to refuse talks with the PRK now finds it necessary to negotiate with the representatives of the present government in Phnom Penh. Following a meeting with the Thai Prime Minister Mr Chatchai Chunhawan on 30 January, these Kampuchean factions agreed to participate in JIM 2. They even acknowledged the role of the PRK in the framework of a solution to the Kampuchea issue.

Meanwhile, other nations in the region also made fair statements on the government of Mr Heng Samrin. Particularly, they share the view that the Kampuchea problem should be solved as soon as possible. Of note was the Thai prime minister's invitation to Mr Hun Sen, chairman of the Kampuchean Council of Ministers, to

visit Thailand. Mr Chatchai's move was witnessed with amazement and admired by the press and political circles. Mr Chatchai claimed that Thailand treated Mr Hun Sen as a friend and wanted to contact the representative of the PRK so as to solve the Kampuchea problem. Furthermore, Thailand started business contacts with Kampuchea. A spokesman for the Thai Government said on 1 February that Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan requested Kampuchea to export timber to Thailand to help the wood shortages in his country. Earlier, a Thai parliamentary delegation paid an official visit to Kampuchea and underscored the need to improve bilateral relations.

Together with the normalization of relations with Kampuchea, Thailand in recent days has also changed its policy toward Vietnam. Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said that he approved of the turning of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea from battlefields into market places. Another manifestation of Thailand's new policy toward Vietnam is the first official visit to Vietnam by Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi Sawetsila after 13 years, and the Thai prime minister himself also declared that he will pay an official visit to Vietnam. These activities would help Thailand understand Vietnam and narrow differences between Thailand and Vietnam in many international problems including the Kampuchea issue.

For its part, China began to recognize Vietnam's goodwill in solving the Kampuchea issue. Last December, for the first time in 10 years, China hailed Vietnam's decision to withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea by next September. Moreover, the Chinese Government leaders and its Foreign Minister Qian Qichen voiced China's disapproval of Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders' presence in the future government of Kampuchea. It is also the stand of all concerned sides and countries.

With these developments, they are coming to JIM 2 in a new spirit of mutual understanding, and it is expected that these factors will help bring JIM 2 a success. However, public opinion in recent days cannot help ignoring Prince Norodom Sihanouk's attitude. According to the American newspaper INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Prince Norodom Sihanouk has favorably changed his attitude toward the Khmer Rouge. American press pointed out that this is a dangerous step that undermines his position in the settlement of the Kampuchea issue.

Sooner or later the Kampuchea issue must be resolved. At present there remain differences in finding a fair and reasonable solution to the Kampuchea issue. There are some similarities on the international aspect of the Kampuchea issue, that is the Vietnamese troop pullout must be linked to the cessation of foreign aid to the opposition Kampuchea sides and the internal aspect of the Kampuchea issue must be solved by the Kampuchean sides without any foreign interference.

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Afghanistan
*BK1702041889 Hanoi VNA in English 1546 GMT
16 Feb 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA Feb. 16—"The people and Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam fully support the correct stance and goodwill attitude of the Republic of Afghanistan expounded in its February 1989 statement."

So said a statement released here today by the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry in support of the Afghan Government's statement which calls on the opposition forces to participate in the process of national reconciliation, and in negotiation with the government in order to put an early end to bloodshed and restore peace in Afghanistan. The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry's statement continues:

"The Vietnamese people and government demand that all opposition parties and countries signing the Geneva accords on Afghanistan respond to the goodwill of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, strictly fulfill their obligations, stop all acts of interference into the affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan, and let the Afghan people determine their own destiny.

"The Vietnamese people and government reaffirm their full support to the fair policy of national reconciliation and persistent efforts of the Republic of Afghanistan to early restore peace, defend and build an independent, neutral, and nonaligned country, thus meeting the ardent aspiration of the Afghan people, and contributing to peace and stability in South Asia and other parts of the world."

More on Statement

*BK1602153589 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1430 GMT 16 Feb 89*

[“Foreign Ministry’s Statement on Afghan Issue”—date not given]

[Text] On 12 February 1989 the Republic of Afghanistan Government issued a statement calling for the opposition forces to participate in the process of national reconciliation to advance toward negotiating with the government to stop bloodshed and restore peace in Afghanistan soon after the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Since the signing of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan, and in upholding their foreign policy of peace, the Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have upheld their good will to seriously implement all provisions of the accord. The Republic of Afghanistan Government has made great contributions, and on many occasions, proposed negotiations with the opposition forces aimed at stopping the painful killing of brothers and sisters and at restoring peace in Afghanistan. Full and serious implementation of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan will create conditions for the Afghan factions to forget the conflict, hostility, and differences to

cooperate in seeking a just and rational political solution to the Afghan issue. However, an Afghan opposition force, which has received support and assistance from a foreign country, still rejects the just cause and continues its armed activities, thus causing losses to life and suffering for thousands of Afghan innocents and creating concern to those who wish for peace in Afghanistan and in the South Asian region.

The Vietnamese people and government totally support the correct stand and attitude of good will of the Republic of Afghanistan as reiterated in its 12 February 1989 statement calling for all opposition forces and signatory countries of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan to respond to the goodwill of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, seriously implement their obligations, stop all interventions to the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan to let the Afghan people determine their own destiny.

The Vietnamese people and government affirm their total support for the just and rational policy of national reconciliation and unyielding efforts of the Republic of Afghanistan aimed at restoring peace soon in Afghanistan, defending and building an independent, neutral, and nonaligned Afghanistan, thereby meeting the Afghan people's earnest aspirations and contributing to restoring peace and stability in the South Asian region and the rest of the world.

Amity Group Aid Protocol Signed With USSR
*BK1602155589 Hanoi VNA in English 1520 GMT
16 Feb 89*

[Text] Hanoi VNA February 16—A protocol on cooperation for this year between the Vietnamese and Soviet friendship organizations was signed in Moscow on Feb. 15.

Signatories were Vietnamese Ambassador to the Soviet Union Nguyen Manh Cam, on behalf of the Vietnam Union of Peace, Solidarity and Friendship Organizations and the Vietnam-Soviet Union Friendship Association, and Gherman Titov, on behalf of the Union of the Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society.

Under the protocol, Vietnam and the Soviet Union will celebrate major anniversaries of their countries. The Soviet side will help in promoting the Russian language learning in Vietnam.

State Bank Announces New Dong Exchange Rate
*BK1702110389 Hanoi International Service in English
1000 GMT 17 Feb 89*

[Text] The Vietnamese State Bank has announced a new exchange rate of Vietnamese currencies against other foreign currencies. According to this announcement 1 U.S. dollar is equal to 3,500 dong Vietnamese currency.

Papua New Guinea

Prime Minister Braces for No-Confidence Vote

BK1702024889 Hong Kong AFP in English 0222 GMT
17 Feb 89

[By Peter Mackler]

[Text] Port Moresby, Feb 17 (AFP)—The big question around Papua New Guinea is who has "the numbers" as Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu braces for a possible challenge to his leadership after only seven months in office.

Most analysts say the 41-year-old former history lecturer appears strong enough at the moment to withstand a no-confidence vote if it is sought by the opposition in this Pacific country.

But in the quicksilver world of Papua New Guinea politics, where alliances can shift suddenly, few are willing to take definite bets on what will happen after Parliament convenes Monday.

"It's the sort of thing that can change on the day," said one diplomat. "You can't call these things. Even the people themselves make up their mind on the day."

Mr Namaliu came to power in July after a no-confidence vote ousted the government of Paias Wingti—the third time such a move had succeeded since independence from Australian administration in 1975.

But he is now under fire for his handling of a series of crises, including industrial unrest at the country's two main mines and a rampage by soldiers demanding more pay.

The prime minister says he is preparing for a motion of no confidence and reckons he can count on 60 or 61 of the current 108 members of parliament.

His Pangu Pati has only 33 to 34 seats and depends on other groups, including the People's Action Party (PAP) of the Armed Forces' ex-commander Ted Diro, who has been investigated for alleged improper timber deals.

Some analysts give Mr Namaliu as many as 65 to 66 votes, but warn this could collapse quickly if his coalition partners figure they can cut a better deal for power under Mr Wingti.

"He (Mr Namaliu) has a reasonable chance of staying where he is, but I wouldn't put it any higher than that," one diplomat said.

There is also the chance that Mr Wingti, head of the People's Democratic Movement (PDM), might forego a challenge if there is a real chance of losing, analysts said.

They said a defeat might oblige him to hand over the leadership of the opposition to any one of several would-be successors, including former Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan.

Diplomats are divided as to the possible impact of another successful no-confidence vote for the mineral-rich country, still groping towards political and economic stability.

One said business would go on as usual since Papua New Guinea's brand of coalition politics is powered by personalities rather than ideological differences.

But another said it would be "a disaster" for the country's efforts to present an image of political calm to would-be investors in gold, copper or oil projects here.

"It would be a return to Italian politics—a new government every six months," the diplomat said.

Officials are quick to point out that Papua New Guinea is at least resolving its leadership struggles through constitutional means and not coups, as have many other newly independent states.

But Mr Namaliu is pushing a constitutional amendment to extend from six to 30 months the "grace period" for a new government before a no-confidence motion can be presented.

The opposition agrees in principle. Yet, with the move requiring two-thirds approval from two consecutive sittings of Parliament, its passage appears problematic given the volatility of politics here.

The Parliament is elected for five years, with the last general polls held in 1987. But no prime minister has lasted a full legislative term.

Mr Namaliu became premier shortly after taking the helm of the then opposition Pangu Pati from the flamboyant former Prime Minister Michael Somare, who lost no-confidence votes in 1980 and 1985.

A quiet-spoken, scholarly man who has studied in Australia and California, Mr Namaliu has won praise for his keen intellect and integrity.

But doubts have persisted over whether he is tough enough to deal with the rough and tumble of Papua New Guinea politics and tackle its worrisome law and order problem.

First came riots last year by striking workers at the Ok Tedi gold and copper mine. This was followed by sabotage at the giant Bougainville mine by local landowners seeking huge sums in compensation.

A further embarrassment was last week's protest by soldiers who smashed windows and overturned cars claiming they were cheated out of promised pay hikes. The government quickly approved the raises.

All of these problems had been festering for years before Mr Namaliu came to power.

But, as one diplomat said: "There is a strong sense that Namaliu hasn't been very decisive, that his government hasn't come to terms with these crises and managed them well."

But the prime minister says that more than decisiveness is needed to resolve the conflicts in this Melanesian country of 3.5 million people.

"It's also making sure that you take the interest of all parties concerned into account and that you don't aggravate the situation to an extent where it is likely to backfire on you," he told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE this week.

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